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Abstract 
Health outcomes fulfill a number of roles in the health sector. Economists, clinicians, 
researchers and managers use health outcomes in a range of different contexts for 
distinct purposes. New management approaches that use contracts as the basis for 
health service accountability have attempted to take health outcomes from their 
clinical role into a management setting. In particular, the purchasers and managers of 
some health services expect that service providers should demonstrate that they 
improve the health outcomes of their patients to justify their on-going funding. 
However, a number of organisations have experienced barriers to the application of 
the outcomes approach to health service management and there has been no 
systematic evaluation of the approach. Nor has there been an investigation into why 
purchasing organisations have difficulty introducing health outcomes into purchasing 
contracts. The result is that managers and purchasers continue to assign resources to 
the pursuit of health outcomes as an accountability tool.  
This thesis addresses two research questions around the use of health outcomes in 
community and allied health service accountability. The first is the barriers to the 
application of health outcomes to health services accountability. The second question 
examines the conditions that must be met before health outcomes can be used as an 
accountability tool in purchasing contracts for allied health.  
The research questions are addressed through the analysis of case studies that explore 
systematically the approach taken by two organisations, the Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs and ACT Community Care, in their attempts to identify health outcomes that 
could be used in purchasing contracts for community and allied health services. The 
case study analysis uses a health services research approach that draws on 
multidisciplinary techniques including epidemiology, health services management 
and anthropology. 
The thesis describes the accountability interactions within the purchaser-provider 
model. Accountability is not a uniform construct. It consists of many domains, levels 
and interactions. In health service delivery, there are a number of different actors and 
a wide range of interactions for which they are accountable. Two important 
interactions are identified: professional accountability, which describes the 
accountability of the health service professional to their patient; and contractual 
accountability, which is the obligation of the health service provider (or providing 
organisation) to the purchaser through their contractual agreement. I conclude that 
health outcomes are not an appropriate domain of contractual accountability but they 
 v
are an important component of professional accountability and I discuss the 
implications of these finding for theory and practice. 
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1.1 Thesis overview 
The ultimate test of the efficacy and effectiveness of medical care is 
its outcome on patients (Starfield 1974:39). 
What is the role of health outcome measures in health service accountability? Health 
outcomes are perceived as the ‘ultimate validators’ of health care quality and 
effectiveness (Donabedian 1966; Starfield 1974:39). Therefore, it makes sense that 
service providers should be held accountable on the basis of the outcomes of their 
care. New management approaches, which use contracts as the basis of health service 
provider accountability, have attempted to do exactly that by incorporating health 
outcomes into purchasing contracts. However, in the majority of cases, the 
organisations have been unable to use health outcomes, relying instead on other 
indicators of health service quality and effectiveness (Weller, Holt et al. 1997). This 
thesis systematically explores the approach taken by two organisations, the 
Commonwealth Department of Veterans’ Affairs and ACT Community Care, in their 
attempts to identify health outcomes to be used in purchasing contracts for 
community and allied health services.  
1.2 The research problem 
If we can’t measure it, we can’t do it. 
This statement was made by a health promotion manager at a workshop I attended in 
1997. It emphasises a perception shared by many of the health service providers with 
whom I work. That is, they believe that they are expected to justify their professional 
existence on the basis of measurable improvements in the health status of their 
patients or ‘health outcomes’ and they will not be permitted to engage in activities 
that cannot be legitimized this way. This view is reinforced by the academic 
literature, policy makers, managers, professional associations and importantly, by the 
organisations that purchase health services (Ellwood 1988; Walters 2000; Wrobel 
2000).  
It seems obvious that the goal of health services should be the optimisation of health 
outcomes. Yet, when I graduated as a podiatrist less than ten years ago, I had never 
heard the term ‘health outcomes’. I started working in private practice, 
unquestioningly applying my limited repertoire of skills to a wide range of 
conditions. I knew I had delivered good care when the patient said, “I feel like I’m 
walking on clouds”. If the patient did not return, I assumed that they were unhappy 
with my care. As far as I am aware, none of my patients lost any of their toes as a 
result of my treatment. A few of my patients actually ‘got better’ but in fact, most 
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returned every six to eight weeks for the management of ongoing foot problems - 
whether they needed to or not.  
This did not mean that I was not concerned about my patient’s outcomes, but I had 
never considered measuring or quantifying them. Since I have started studying health 
outcomes, I have asked a number of providers how they know they are delivering 
effective services. A chiropractor told me, “I’ve just always done what I’ve done and 
never questioned it really.” A dentist said, “ I think my bank balance is a pretty good 
indicator that I’m doing a good job”. Many others said that they did not know. 
The emerging culture of accountability now means that these answers are not good 
enough. Health service providers who have previously been protected from scrutiny, 
particularly within the domain of patient care, are gradually having aspects of their 
practice exposed to purchasers, insurance companies, the public, registration boards 
and professional associations (Weller, Holt et al. 1997; ACTCOSS 1999; 2001).  
The term ‘health outcomes’ has infiltrated most areas of health service delivery 
during the past decade, accompanied by other discourses of accountability including 
‘evidence based medicine’, ‘best practice’, ‘quality assurance’, ‘clinical guidelines’, 
‘effectiveness’, ‘performance’ and ‘accreditation’ (Strathern 2000). This jargon 
would not be complete without an emphasis on ‘stakeholders’ and ‘consumers’. Most 
of these terms are not new, nor are they unique to the health sector. They have been 
borrowed and adapted from private sector management principles that emphasise 
efficiency, accountability and the power of consumers (Shore and Wright 2000).  
One result of this new language is that over the past decade, health service 
organisations and purchasers have shifted their emphasis from simply the provision of 
a certain amount of care to a focus on the effectiveness of that care (ACT Health 
1998). Since the output of health services is health outcomes, it makes sense that they 
should be able to demonstrate their effectiveness in terms of the measurable outcomes 
of care. In reality, however, few health organisations do actually measure and report 
on health outcomes, but they still deliver services. This dilemma underpins the 
research problem that I address in this thesis. 
My interest in the role of health outcomes in health service accountability arose 
through my work with two organisations, the Commonwealth Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs and ACT Community Care. Both organisations adopted new 
systems of governance which resulted in revised models of accountability for the 
purchasing of allied and community health services. Health outcomes were the 
common theme underpinning the accountability systems in each case.  
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Both organizations experienced difficulties with the application of the outcomes 
approach. They were not alone. The Divisions of General Practice, New South Wales 
Health and the Department of Veterans' Affairs Community Nursing attempted to 
adopt an outcomes based funding model (section 2.5). None of these organisations 
were able to implement the outcomes approach as they had originally intended. 
Instead, they funded a series of short-term health outcome projects, or introduced 
innovative, but resource intensive quality monitoring systems for health service 
providers (Weller, Holt et al. 1997). Even the evaluation of the National Health Goals 
and Targets on the basis of health outcomes was fraught with difficulties that led to 
numerous modifications to their framework (Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993). 
The widespread use of the term ‘health outcomes’ in the literature, by health service 
managers, researchers, health economists, policy makers and purchasers has been 
accompanied by a prevailing perception that health outcomes can form a basis of 
health service accountability (Ellwood 1988; Hayward, Ciliska et al. 1996; ACT 
Health 1998). In other words, health service providers are expected to demonstrate 
that the health services they deliver improve health outcomes so that they can justify 
their on-going funding. The attempts by ACT Community Care, the Commonwealth 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs and other organisations to include health outcomes 
in their purchasing agreements illustrates this perception. Notwithstanding the logic 
inherent in the health outcomes argument, there are few, if any, examples of their 
effective implementation in purchasing contracts. However, to date there has been no 
systematic evaluation of the approach. Nor has there been an investigation of the 
reasons that organisations have difficulty implementing the use of outcomes in 
contracts.  
This thesis investigates the barriers to the application of health outcomes in health 
service accountability through the systematic evaluation of the outcomes approach in 
two community and allied health services.  
1.3 The research settings 
Two contexts are of importance for this research. The first is the social context that 
has led health service organisations in Australia to focus on new models of 
accountability. The second is the organisational settings in which the empirical 
research is conducted.  
The social setting for this research, and indeed the underlying drive for changing 
mechanisms of accountability can be described in terms of changing models of 
governance. Governance refers to the methods that societies use to distribute power 
and manage public resources and problems (United Nations Development Program 
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2000). The changing models of governance are symptomatic of the increasing 
rationality of governments, or, what Michel Foucault called ‘neo-liberal 
governmentality’ (Foucault 1991). This refers to government adoption of free market 
principles in economics and the activities of the state, as well as the conduct of 
individuals. Accountability is one of the key components of the new governmentality 
and is defined as the process through which actors are held responsible for their 
actions (Fox and Brown 1998). The new managerial approaches have many names 
including New Public Management and new-managerialism (Hood 1991).  
The health sector has adopted the principles of modern governance in a number of 
ways that influence all levels of service provision. One of these is the disaggregation 
of public sector bureaucracies into separate purchasing and providing organisations 
where the agreed outputs of care are defined by contracts between the purchasers and 
the providers (Bloom 2000). Accountability will be described in more detail in 
section 2.3 of the thesis. 
The setting for the empirical research involves two Australian organisations, both of 
which have adopted new models of governance for the provision of community and 
allied health services. Both organisations use contracts as the basis for their 
purchasing relationships and attempted to incorporate health outcomes into those 
contracts.  
ACT Community Care, is an example of an organisation that has undergone 
bureaucratic separation from the primary purchaser of its services, the ACT 
Department of Health and Community Care. The focus on health outcomes and 
outputs arose through the use of contracts as a mechanism of accountability in the 
purchaser-provider separation.  
Unlike ACT Community Care, which is the major provider of a range of community 
health services within the ACT, the Commonwealth Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
purchases health services on behalf of veterans nationally. In contrast to ACT 
Community Care, where the purchasing contract specifies the outcomes and outputs 
between the purchasing and providing organisations, DVA enters into contracts with 
individual health service providers for the provision of allied and community health 
services. As a result of the different organisational structures, two distinct approaches 
to the use of health outcomes emerged.  
Both organisations had the common desire to embrace outcomes management to 
ensure the accountability of health service providers. Further, both organisations had 
to compromise from their intended approach of including measures of health 
outcomes in contracts between the purchaser and the provider / providing 
organisation. The role of health outcomes in purchasing contracts for community and 
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allied health services by ACT Community Care and DVA forms the organisational 
setting of this thesis. 
I have chosen to use the term ‘community and allied health services’ to describe the 
types of care provided by ACT Community Care and the Commonwealth Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs. The literature fails to adequately define the term “allied health” 
(Grimmer, Sheppard et al. 1999) and the use of this term would not do justice to the 
wide range of service types offered by the two organisations. For example, the 
services provided by ACT Community Care include alcohol and drug counseling and 
methadone support, disability housing and support services as well as a wide range of 
more traditional health services, such as nursing, physiotherapy, occupational therapy 
and podiatry. An important component of the community based care provided by 
ACT Community Care is their links with other community organisations such as 
Meals on Wheels, Home Help and Handy Help which are normally labeled as 
community services. The definitions and roles of community and allied health service 
providers are described in greater detail in section 2.2. 
DVA purchases a wide range of services for veterans, including community services. 
Community health services were purchased and managed separately to allied health 
services at the time of undertaking this research. The Local Medical Officer (LMO) 
acts as the gatekeeper to the majority of allied health services including speech 
pathology, dietetics, physiotherapy, podiatry, dentistry, occupational therapy, social 
work, psychology, prosthetics and orthotics, chiropractic and osteopathy. All but the 
latter two services are provided by ACT Community Care.  
1.4 The research questions 
Through the analysis of the case studies, I aim to address two questions around the 
use of health outcomes in health service provider accountability; 
1. What are the barriers to the application of the health outcomes approach to 
health service accountability for community and allied health services? 
2. What conditions must be met before health outcomes can be used as an 
accountability tool in purchasing contracts for allied health? 
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1.5 Methodology 
The research questions are examined within a health services research framework. 
Health services research is defined as 
the multidisciplinary field of scientific investigation that studies how social 
factors, financing systems, organizational structures and processes, health 
technologies, and personal behaviors affect access to health care, the 
quality and cost of health care, and ultimately our health and well-being. Its 
research domains are individuals, families, organizations, institutions, 
communities, and populations (Academy for Health Services Research 
2000:1). 
The principal analytical tool employed within the research is case study analysis. 
However within each case study, a variety of research techniques have been 
employed, including surveys, focus groups, interviews and the examination of 
archival sources. 
The multidisciplinary nature of health outcomes research means that I have drawn on 
a range of disciplines to examine the application of the outcomes approach, including 
health service management, epidemiology and anthropology. 
Health service organisations form the primary research domain for this thesis. Within 
the two organisations, I examine professional and managerial relationships, 
particularly with respect to accountability roles.  
1.6 Scope of the research 
This research draws on empirical data obtained from case studies of two Australian 
organisations that attempted to incorporate health outcomes into purchasing contracts 
for community and allied health services. This thesis does not aim to achieve 
generalisability in a statistical sense. Instead, I aim to make a heuristic contribution to 
the understanding of the applications of health outcomes to health service 
accountability by other organizations intending to apply a similar approach.  
The result of this thesis, therefore, is not a set of rules that can be taken and applied 
elsewhere. Rather I envisage that other health service organisations can take the logic 
that I have derived from this investigation to help inform their own application of the 
health outcomes approach in similar settings. The research has implications for the 
theory of health outcomes and accountability by clearly defining the parameters for 
the use of health outcomes in a range of settings.  
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1.7 The structure of the thesis 
There are six chapters and four appendices in this thesis.  
Chapter Two commences with a description of the community and allied health 
setting of the research and the barriers to clearly defining this group of providers. The 
changing accountability requirements of health service organisations and individual 
providers forms the second part of the chapter. I argue that it is the increasing need 
for transparent and explicit measures of health service accountability that have led 
health service purchasers, funders, managers and providers to embrace health 
outcomes. I describe the features of health outcomes that have reinforced their appeal 
to this audience. A number of Australian organisations have adopted the outcomes 
approach over the past decade and encountered some difficulties. I review the 
outcomes models adopted by six organisations, including an example from the 
education sector, and discuss the implications of these for the application of outcomes 
in health service accountability. The need for a systematic investigation of these 
barriers leads to the research questions, which concludes the chapter.  
Chapter Three discusses the case study approach and the issues of generalisability 
and validity employed in this study.  
Chapter Four presents the first case study. ACT Community Care is the major 
provider of community based health and disability services within the ACT. In 1996, 
ACT Community Care underwent administrative separation from the purchaser, the 
ACT Department of Health and Community Care. The result of the purchaser – 
provider separation was a move to contracts as the basis for funding and 
accountability. The nature of contracts, emphasising outcomes and outputs rather than 
inputs and processes, led those involved to try to identify health outcomes that could 
be incorporated into the purchasing contract. This chapter describes the approach 
adopted by ACT Community Care, and the compromises they had to make.  
In contrast to ACT Community Care, which is a health service provider, the 
Commonwealth Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) is a large purchaser of 
health services. As a result of the requirement to adopt new models of health service 
provider accountability, DVA wanted to identify health outcomes that could be 
included in purchasing contracts with over 30 000 providers. They too compromised 
in their approach. In Chapter Five I describe the process undertaken by DVA to 
identify health outcome measures for allied health professionals and the resulting 
model they adopted. 
In Chapter Six, I introduce the analytical framework of the thesis to examine the 
reasons why health service organisations are unable to apply the health outcomes 
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approach in the way that they intend. The analysis focuses on the accountability 
interactions within the purchaser-provider model. Accountability is not a uniform 
construct. It consists of many domains, levels and interactions. In health service 
delivery, there are a number of different actors and a wide range of actions for which 
they are accountable. Two important interactions are identified: professional 
accountability, which describes the accountability of the health service professional to 
their patient; and contractual accountability, which is the obligation of the health 
service provider (or providing organisation) to the purchaser through their contractual 
agreement. I identify the role that health outcomes can take within each model of 
accountability. This in turn clarifies the barriers to the applications of health 
outcomes theory as each organisation has attempted to apply it.  
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a discussion of the theoretical, policy and 
management implications of the findings from this research. In particular, I describe 
the implications of the research for the applications of health outcome measures and 
new systems of accountability in the health service setting. I discuss the importance 
of these findings for community and allied health services, patients, clinicians, 
managers and purchasers.  
1.8 Contributions of the research 
This research makes several contributions, both to the theory and the applications of 
health outcomes and community and allied health service accountability.  
The review of the literature contributes an understanding of the complexities of the 
group of practitioners that come under the banner of ‘community and allied health 
services’ in the Australian context. The potential breadth and variability of these 
services creates a distinct set of needs for the introduction of accountability systems 
which are likely to differ from the acute care sector, where the majority of existing 
models have been developed.  
The examination of health outcomes within an accountability framework, whilst 
logical, has received little explicit attention within the literature. The exploration of 
the changing systems of accountability provides a context in which the barriers to the 
application of the outcomes approach can be clearly explored from the perspective of 
a range of stakeholders and for different purposes.  
The discussion of published examples of six organization’s attempts to introduce the 
outcomes approach, and the barriers that these organizations faced, challenges the 
widely held belief that health outcomes are a useful accountability tool.  
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The in-depth investigation of two organizations that attempted to introduce the health 
outcomes approach provides unique insights into the issues, barriers, organisational 
and structural requirements in each case. This is the first time such an analysis has 
taken place in the context of community health organizations in Australia. Whilst 
there is value in the uniqueness of each case, the cross-case comparison provides 
valuable insights for purchasers, managers and clinicians attempting to introduce the 
outcomes approach in other settings. 
The research outcomes can inform purchasers and funders about the appropriateness 
of the use of health outcomes as a mechanism of accountability for community and 
allied health services. By examining health outcomes within an accountability 
framework, the role of health outcomes is seen in the context of a wide range of 
alternative indicators of health service accountability and effectiveness.  
Managers and health service providers can use the results of this research to aid 
decision making about the measurement of health outcomes in the clinical setting. 
The research describes the conditions that must be met to ensure that health outcomes 
data are useful and meaningful. It also describes the management and accountability 
hierarchies necessary to ensure that all stakeholders use outcomes information 
effectively. 
The acceptability and expectation of public accountability in all areas means that it is 
an area ripe for investigation. This thesis provides a basis for accountability analysis 
within community and allied health services. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Outcomes allow for accountability by clearly measuring 
performance and characterising the impact of treatment 
(Edelstein 1998:212). 
The health outcomes rhetoric has lulled many purchasers and funders into the belief 
that they can capture the multiple processes and structures that go together to make 
up health service delivery into a single outcome measure (Sax 1990). The research 
that forms the basis of this thesis arose from my experience with organisations that 
attempted to augment their traditional indicators of health service accountability, such 
as volumes and costs with more meaningful measures of health service effectiveness 
using health outcomes. The above quote encapsulates the expectations of these, and 
other organisations that have embraced the health outcomes approach. Yet, there are 
few examples of the successful application of the approach in its pure form. The 
difficulties faced by funders, purchasers and managers that have tried to adopt health 
outcomes management is rarely acknowledged. The result is that the health outcomes 
discourse is gaining popularity in health service settings with little guidance about the 
appropriate methods of implementation or the barriers that the organisations may 
face. 
This chapter introduces the rationale for the adoption of new accountability 
mechanisms by health service purchasers, funders and managers. A review of the 
health outcomes literature demonstrates why health outcomes appear to be a logical 
solution to the new accountability concerns, whilst illustrating some of the barriers to 
their application. The health outcomes approach has been adopted in a number of 
contexts for the purpose of ensuring health service efficiency, effectiveness and 
resource allocation. As part of the review of the literature, I examine examples of the 
application of outcomes in six Australian organisations and describe the successes, 
barriers and compromises identified within each.  
2.2 Community and allied health services 
The setting for this research is community and allied health services. In this section of 
the literature review I describe the characteristics of community and allied health 
service providers and the contextual and pragmatic issues that bring them together. I 
briefly examine the issues around ‘medical dominance’ and the relevance of this for 
my research areas.  
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I have chosen to use the term ‘community and allied health’ to describe the services 
covered in this thesis because of the large number of practitioners who do not identify 
with the label of ‘allied health’, such as nurses, disability workers and alcohol and 
drug case managers. These practitioners sometimes work alongside allied health 
professionals, under the same organisational structures and together in multi-
disciplinary teams, thus their accountability requirements are similar. However, there 
is not a collective term that appropriately describes them. Even the label ‘community 
and allied health’ does not accurately portray the scope of practice of these providers. 
The term ‘community’ has the effect of locating them within a particular sector of 
health care. In fact, these providers deliver services from the public and private 
sector, in hospitals and the community, education, welfare and local government. 
Disability workers are generally not identified as ‘health’ providers because they do 
not diagnose or treat health conditions (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997). Rather, 
they help their clients to function optimally in the context of their physical, social and 
economic environment. Because of the lack of a single label to appropriately describe 
these services, I will continue to use the term ‘community and allied health’.  
Little has been written about community and allied health service providers 
collectively. Instead, the literature is fragmented into descriptions of allied health, and 
within that, the multiple, poorly defined and contextually dependent disciplines from 
which they are constituted (Boyce 1996). Alcohol and drug services, whilst often 
included under the banner of ‘community health’, include a range of providers, some 
of whom have no formal training in the area. Disability services are not always co-
located with health services and they have a discrete literature. Nursing is 
traditionally allied with medicine and is most commonly seen as hospital based care. 
However nurses also fulfill a diverse range of roles in the community setting which 
they often undertake with a great deal of autonomy.  
The term ‘allied health’ was first used in 1966 by the US Department of Health 
Education and Welfare when describing health care professionals in legislation 
addressing workforce shortages in the health field. Since then, the term has been 
widely adopted, however there is still no consistent definition of allied health. In the 
United Kingdom, the Cope Committee began investigations into 'medical auxiliaries' 
in 1949, which included radiographers, chiropodists, physiotherapists, laboratory 
technicians, dieticians, almoners and speech and language therapists (Larkin 1983). 
The Professions Supplementary to Medicine Act 1960 was introduced for the 
registration of all of the above disciplines, except speech therapists (who withdrew 
during the course of the bill). The council of the Professions Supplementary to 
Medicine presided over these (and other) disciplines until it was restructured as the 
Health Professions Council in April 2002 (Department of Health 2000). Boyce 
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identifies the first National Allied Health Conference in 1992 as a pivotal time for the 
development of allied health as recognisable entity in Australia (Boyce 1996).  
International variations in definitions of allied health services are apparent. In the 
United Kingdom, historical systems of care organization and funding have led to a 
clear separation between ‘health’ and ‘social’ care that is less distinct in Australia 
(Hudson 2002). Definitions of which disciplines constitute allied health services in 
the UK under the Health Professions Council include physiotherapists, occupational 
therapists, speech and language therapists, arts therapists, dieticians, medical 
laboratory scientific officers, orthoptists, chiropodists, prosthetists and orthotists, 
radiographers, clinical scientists, paramedics (Department of Health 2000). In 
Australia, it is less easy to identify the component providers because of the variations 
in settings and funding models that influence the approaches to care.  
The use of a collective term to describe community and allied health providers has 
little clinical significance given the diversity of their roles and training. However, the 
relatively small numbers in each of the component disciplines calls for a unified 
approach (Federwisch 1998). In the 1996 census there were over 150 000 nurses and 
nearly 45000 general and specialist medical practitioners in Australia (Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2001). In contrast, there were 23000 dentists, just under 9000 
physiotherapists and only 1500 podiatrists (Appendix A). As a result of their 
individual small sizes, allied health services are often seen and managed collectively 
within organisations and by purchasers and funders (Boyce 1996; The Coalition of 
Health Professionals 2001). The Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged 
Care has supported the united approach through a range of multi-disciplinary funding 
initiatives (National Allied Health Casemix Committee 1999; National Allied Health 
Best Practice Consortium 1996).  
The potential for the ‘allied health’ label to exclude other disciplines is reinforced by 
the number of organisations representing these services that do not include ‘allied 
health’ in their title. For example, the Australian Council of Allied Health 
Professionals was renamed the Health Professionals Council of Australia in 1998 
(Health Professions Council of Australia 1998). Other groups include the Coalition of 
Health Professionals in New South Wales and the Tasmanian Health Professionals 
Council. The natural union of the smaller, and sometimes more marginalised health 
providers whose membership consists of services other than allied health may call for 
the creation of a new collective description which acknowledges the dynamic nature 
of the health workforce. 
The Health Professions Council of Australia (HPCA) was established to represent 
allied and other health professionals on national health issues and claims to be the 
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largest national representative of allied health professionals (Health Professions 
Council of Australia 1998). The Council aims to position itself as the "third force" in 
health, to ensure allied health professionals are strongly represented at the 
Commonwealth level, along with the established voices of medicine and nursing.  
A number of state and regional groups have formed to represent allied health and 
other non-medical professionals for lobbying purposes and to support specific needs 
of professionals and patients. An example is the Coalition of Health Professionals 
(NSW) which was formed in response to the introduction of ‘preferred provider’ 
purchasing models by health insurance companies (The Coalition of Health 
Professionals 2001). Similar models have evolved in other states. These groups 
provide each of the disciplines with bargaining strength and political lobbying power 
that their individual small sizes do not allow. The needs and interests of individual 
rural allied health providers are supported through the Services for Australian Rural 
and Remote Allied Health (SARRAH 2000).  
National commitment to community health in Australia was first made through the 
Whitlam government in 1973 (Palmer and Short 1994). The Community Health 
Program was introduced to reduce the dependence of the community on 
institutionalisation, shifting the emphasis of health service delivery to disease 
prevention rather than treatment and providing an alternative to traditional medical 
care in the delivery of health services. 
Publicly funded community and allied health services are purchased, managed, 
organised and delivered in different ways due to variations in the ways that the states 
embraced the Community Health Program and subsequent Commonwealth initiatives 
such as the Home and Community Care Program (HACC), the National Drug 
Strategy and the recent Enhanced Primary Care (Palmer and Short 1994; 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care 2000). Boyce undertook a 
seminal study of the organisation of allied health professions in Australian General 
Hospitals, however this research has not been repeated in the community setting in 
Australia (Boyce 1996).  
Two distinct community and allied health service organisations are illustrated by the 
case studies in this thesis. The Department of Veterans' Affairs purchase services 
from conventional allied health services such as dentists, physiotherapists, 
occupational therapists, as well as the less traditional domains of chiropractic and 
osteopathy within their allied health classification (DVA 1999). The services are 
generally purchased as individual occasions of care from private providers or 
hospitals. In contrast, ACT Community Care does not employ chiropractors or 
osteopaths, but provides services through a range of programs, often within multi-
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disciplinary teams. For instance, a diabetes team may include combinations of 
diabetes educators (who are generally nurses), podiatrists and dieticians. ACT 
Community Care also employs disability case managers and alcohol and drug 
workers (ACT Community Care 1999) and manages the provision of allied health 
services both within the community and in The Canberra Hospital (ACT Health 
1998). 
There are a number of other models for the provision of community and allied health 
services including case management and case coordination. The recent national 
coordinated care trials investigated central fund-holding and service coordination for 
the purchase of services including community and allied health services (Kalucy, 
Esterman et al. 2000). A similar approach has been adopted by the recent Enhanced 
Primary Care (EPC) initiatives of the Commonwealth Department of Health and 
Aged Care which reimburses general practitioners for coordinating the multiple care 
needs of their patients (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care 2000).  
Services have been established for groups with particular needs, such as aboriginal 
and islander health services, youth and women’s health. Each of these models present 
different possibilities for the organisational structure of community and allied health 
services which will depend partly on the availability of local service providers and the 
needs of the particular community in which they work. 
State and regional variations in health needs, service availability and funding 
mechanisms means that the organisation of community and allied health service 
providers is likely to be highly contextually dependent. The specific disciplines 
included in the two case studies are physiotherapists, chiropractors, osteopaths, social 
workers, occupational therapists, podiatrists, alcohol and drug case workers, 
dieticians, psychologists, prosthesists, dentists and community nurses. Rather than 
describe them in detail here, I have summarised their roles, educational prerequisites, 
state registration requirements, gender ratios and typical employment settings in 
Appendix A.  
Much of the commentary on allied health services revolves around the relationship 
between allied health and medicine (Friedson 1974; Gardner and McCoppin 1996). 
Allied health professionals have long been seen as subordinate to medicine through 
medicine’s ‘restricted recognition’ of their role (Willis 1989). Gerald Larkin, in his 
book Occupational Monopoly and Modern Medicine, describes the influence of the 
medical profession in defining (and restricting) the scope of practice of allied health 
professions in the UK over the past century due to their control over much of the 
legislation regarding health practice (Larkin 1983). Whilst no comparative study has 
been undertaken in Australia, the medical profession's ability to limit the work of 
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allied health professions can still be seen. For instance, as recently as 1998, 
podiatrists in Queensland were prevented from obtaining limited medication 
prescribing rights in a bid to the Poisons Review Committee. Queensland Health 
convened a meeting in which objections were raised by 'key stakeholders', consisting 
predominantly of members of the medical profession (Bennett personal 
communication, 2002). In the US, state variations in legislation and regulation 
influence the extent of medical dominance. For instance, the Montana Medical 
Association claims the authority to monitor requests by non-medical providers to 
increase their scope of practice (Montana Medical Association 2002) because they 
perceive that they, as doctors, preside over all health care issues.  
Only medical physicians have attended … (extensive training) … 
Only medical physicians therefore have the education or training to 
oversee the entire health profession's scope of practice (Montana 
Medical Association 2002). 
The divisions between medicine and allied health are described in terms of disparities 
in income, autonomy, status and power, which have been attributed to the 
predominance of females in allied health professions (Gardner and McCoppin 1996). 
However, the notion of medical dominance has been criticised on the basis that the 
parameters of medical dominance and professional autonomy are poorly defined and 
professional relationships are inevitability subject to contextual differences (Boyce 
1996).  
The lack of a detailed analysis of Australian community and allied health services 
outside of the hospital setting makes generalisations about the impact of medical 
dominance difficult. Additionally, state variations in regulatory systems mean that 
there are likely to be different levels of medical control over the roles of particular 
disciplines. Medical dominance is likely to be influenced by different models of 
community and allied health service organization and funding. For instance, most 
community and allied health professions in Australia now enjoy first contact 
practitioner status, in that they do not require a referral from a medical practitioner in 
order to provide care, with the exception of some funders, such as the Department of 
Veterans' Affairs (Palmer and Short 1994). Community and allied health service 
providers are employed in a variety of settings that confer professional autonomy. For 
instance, the disciplines of physiotherapy, psychology, speech pathology, dietetics 
and podiatry have an extensive private sector workforce, reinforcing the notion of 
professional autonomy (Selby-Smith and Crowley 1995). 
The importance of the dominance of the medical paradigm for this research is its 
influence on the accepted models of determining health service effectiveness for 
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community and allied health services, which most disciplines have adopted 
unquestioningly. For example, many disciplines embrace evidence-based practice 
which specifies a hierarchical approach to evaluating the quality of information about 
health interventions (Sackett, Rosenberg et al. 1996). Evidence based practice 
privileges certain types of evaluation, which have typically been less appealing to 
community and allied health services. 
For instance, physiotherapists have developed their own database of randomised 
controlled trials called the Physiotherapy Evidence Database (PEDro) (Sherrington, 
Herbert et al. 1999). The developers of this system acknowledged that many 
physiotherapy trials are not accessible on Medline and that few physiotherapists have 
the appropriate research skills or resources to undertake either randomised controlled 
trials or a systematic review of the literature. This lack of appropriate research skills 
and access to resources has been emphasised in a study of Australian podiatrists 
(Payne 1999). Postgraduate research is a relatively recent innovation for many 
community and allied health disciplines, providing limited capacity to support the 
growth of evidence based research. A further complication for community and allied 
health service evaluation, given the diversity of service types and locations, is the 
difficulty accessing valid and reliable data (Baker, Norton et al. 1998; McColl, 
Roderick et al. 2000). The appropriateness of the accepted technologies for evaluating 
the broad range of community and allied health service interventions has not been 
critically examined. 
For the purpose of this thesis, community and allied health services can best be 
described as a clinically diverse group of non-medical providers that are united for 
practical management purposes or collective bargaining power. There is not a single 
model that accurately captures the way that community and allied health services are 
organised and delivered outside the hospital setting in Australia. Examples of two, 
distinct models are illustrated in the case studies. The dominance of the medical 
paradigm is attributed with shaping the constructions of appropriate practice for many 
of the component disciplines.  
The following section describes the changing systems of accountability within the 
health sector which have led purchasers, providers and managers to embrace the 
health outcomes approach. 
2.3 Accountability in health care  
The notion of accountability in health care has evolved radically over the past century 
and continues to change at a rapid pace. These changes can be attributed to a number 
of social and economic factors that have converged to create an increased focus on 
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the transparency of different aspects health service provision. As a result of the 
variety of interpretations and applications, accountability is a complex area to explore 
and describe. This section examines some of the interpretations of accountability and 
its current role in health service delivery and management.  
Three key movements or phases in health care stand out in terms of their influence on 
the current approaches to accountability;  
• The professionalisation of medicine and subsequently, other health related 
disciplines;  
• The scientific validation of medicine; and 
• New-managerialism.  
Because each of these factors are largely described in separate bodies of literature and 
from different perspectives internationally, it is difficult to clearly determine their 
temporal and practical inter-relationship. Neo-liberal governmentality, or one of it’s 
applications to management, ‘new-managerialism’ is attributed with introducing the 
most significant changes to the current concept of accountability, thus, much of the 
recent literature explores the range of accountability concepts through this paradigm 
(Shore and Wright 2000). However, in the health field at least, the other movements 
pre-date new-managerialism. In many cases, new-managerialism has integrated 
components of the professional and scientific approaches to accountability, and 
adopted them as a management responsibility. For instance, the use of health 
outcomes in purchasing contracts illustrates a shift in the concept of health care 
quality from an implicit, professional responsibility to an explicit management 
responsibility. In this section, I will examine different definitions of accountability 
and the contribution and application of each of the above three approaches to the 
current application of accountability within the health field.  
2.3.1 What is accountability? 
The range of influences on the notion of accountability have changed the way that the 
term is used (Mulgan 2000). The traditional definition of accountability is ‘to be 
called to account to an authority for one’s actions’ (Jones 1992). However, the term 
accountability has been adopted in a range of contexts, and has a different meaning in 
each context. Mulgan describes accountability as 'chameleon like', but has teased 
apart four interpretations of the term (Mulgan 2000); 
1. Accountability has become synonymous with the traditional use of the term 
‘responsibility’ to describe the “individual responsibility and concern for the 
public interest expected from public servants”. 
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2. Accountability is a form of control which is a used by democracies to control 
government action. Many institutions can drive these accountability changes 
such as courts, statutory authorities and regulatory boards using procedures 
such as judicial review and public service codes. There a range of factors that 
constrain governments in a democratic society, including competitive 
markets, mass media and interest groups.  
3. Accountability is used to reflect the extent to which governments are 
responsive to the needs or wishes of its citizens. 
4. Accountability represents the dialogue that occurs between citizens that 
forms the basis of democracies.  
These different interpretations of the same word highlight the complexity of the 
modern notion of accountability. The range of applications of accountability in 
practice further complicates the term. There are a range of accountability 
relationships and within these, a number of factors, or domains, for which different 
parties can be held accountable. Accountability relationships can be formal or 
informal. They can based on implicit or explicit agreements between parties, and can 
use different technologies to make the agreements, commonly contracts (Mackintosh 
2000). Contracts between stakeholders can specify the volume and types of care 
delivered, the time frame in which the care should be provided, the price and the 
quality of care. The procedures used to determine whether parties are adhering to 
their contracted behaviours vary, and include audit, publishing of league tables and 
complaints mechanisms. The stakeholders in the accountability relationships and may 
include consumers practitioners, managers and public servants, each of whom have 
different information requirements.  
Kazandjian defines accountability in the context of its current application in health 
settings; 
Accountability is the extent of liability ascertained through an evaluation of 
the goodness of a performance by a party in response to the requests of 
another (other) party(ies) based on some type of agreement between all 
involved. Accountability also incorporates the requirement that the 
performers do accurately, completely and continuously educate the 
beneficiaries about the reasonable expectations they should have regarding 
the goodness of the outcome (Kazandjian 2002:206).  
This definition acknowledges that both the provider and the beneficiary in an 
accountability relationship require some knowledge, understanding and expectation 
of the outcomes of the process or service. 
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The growth of new approaches to accountability have been fuelled by a number of 
factors, including cost containment, or the need for ‘value for money’(Wennberg 
1990), the growth of the consumer movement (Hurst 1996) an increasing awareness 
of the potential for errors in medicine (Leape, Brennan et al. 1991) and the growth of 
a management driven culture (Armstrong 2002). 
Local and international studies have demonstrated large variations in health care 
expenditure without corresponding differences in health status (Wennberg and 
Gittelsohn 1982; Relman 1988; Gerszten 1998; Emerson 1999). The recognition of 
these disparities has forced some providers to become accountable both for the costs of 
health care and variations from accepted best practice. Other management strategies 
that have led to accountability on the basis of health care costs include health 
maintenance organisations, Diagnosis Related Groups, purchaser – provider 
separation which use contracts to specify a price for set outputs and systems of 
budget holding and capitation in the UK (ACT Department of Health and Community 
Care 2000; Bloom 2000).  
The consumer movement started in the 1970s when Ivan Illich’s book the Medical 
Nemesis created doubt about of medicine’s credibility by pointing to the high rates of 
medically induced illness (Illich 1976). The increasingly articulate voice of 
consumers and dissatisfied patients resulted in the formation of consumer groups, 
formalised consumer consultation mechanisms and litigation against health 
practitioners (Gladstone 1993; ACTCOSS 1999; Bethell 1999). The result of these 
changes was the recognition of the need for more formal systems of accountability of 
providers for the safe and effective delivery of care to their patients. In the United 
States, consumers who are forced to make choices about health care plans are 
demanding open access to more transparent mechanisms of accountability, such as 
health service quality indicators (Bethell 1999). Some of the current influences of the 
consumer movement are the focus on patient centred care (Hurst 1996), and user 
involvement in health service development and delivery (Stewart 2001). The result is 
that consumers become an increasingly important stakeholder in accountability 
models. They are consulted about how health services should be developed and 
become partners in the delivery of health care (Delbanco, Berwick et al. 2001).  
There are a number of accountability models (Dwivedi and Jabbra 1989; Sinclair 
1995; Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). Accountability can be defined in terms of the 
stakeholders (locus of accountability), the domains for which they can be held 
accountable, and the procedures through which adherence to the systems can be 
determined (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). Emanuel and Emanuel list six domains of 
accountability in health care; professional competence, legal and ethical conduct, 
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financial performance, adequacy of resources, public health promotion, and 
community benefit. However, these domains will be shaped by the values that 
underpin the health care system so may vary according to the service type and the 
political and cultural norms shaping health care delivery. For instance, the growth of 
consumerism in health care and focus on patient centred care may see the addition of 
a new domain of consumer consultation or satisfaction. In addition Emanuel and 
Emanuel describe three dominant models of accountability in health care; the 
professional, economic and political models.  
Professional accountability, is the accountability between the patient and provider 
and between the provider and their profession. It has been well documented in the 
literature and forms the traditional basis for most health service provider 
accountability (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996; Sharpe 2000). Within this model, the 
health service provider’s action is directed towards the patient's health or well-being.  
In the economic model, patients are viewed as consumers. Doctors, allied health 
services, hospitals and health services are seen as providers or economic producers 
that are accountable to purchasers. In the economic model, the primary domains of 
accountability are financial performance and professional competence. In the 
purchaser-provider model, the contract is the main procedure of economic 
accountability (Bloom 2000).  
The political model involves the interaction of patients and health care providers as 
"citizen members". The health care community determines the domains of 
accountability in the political model. Political accountability, or the notion of 
including consumers in decision making processes and on management boards, has 
received a great deal of attention recently (Cleary and Edgman Levitan 1997; 
Williamson 2000).  
To reduce accountability interactions to the three models described above is 
somewhat simplistic, however forms a useful classification of different levels of 
accountability in the health sector. As the remainder of this section will show, there 
are a number of components of each of the approaches to accountability which are 
subject to different interpretations and applications. 
2.3.2 The evolution of the current concept of accountability 
This section explores three important factors that have influenced health service 
accountability in its current form; the professionalisation of medicine, the scientific 
validation of medicine, and new-managerialism. Whilst the first two movements pre-
date new-managerialism, they have shaped the values of the health care delivery 
system, thus they have been incorporated by managers into the new accountability 
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frameworks. However, as new-managerialism is the dominant setting for much of the 
accountability literature, I will start this discussion by describing new-managerialism.  
2.3.2.1 New-managerialism 
Shore and Wright argue that the meaning of the terms accountability, professionalism 
and quality have been changed through their appropriation by accountants and 
managers through the introduction of neo-liberal governance (Shore and Wright 
2000). The introduction of the principles of neo-liberal governance into management 
has many terms, including ‘new-managerialism’ and ‘new public management’ 
(Hood 1991). For consistency, I will use the term new-managerialism in this thesis.  
Historically, public sector management has been dominated by a clear hierarchical 
relationship between accountability and responsibility. Each public servant was 
accountable, through hierarchical structures to their department, which in turn was 
responsible to the cabinet and then to the people. This model was criticised because it 
was seen as too rigid and bureaucratic, narrowly focussed, preoccupied with structure 
and process, undemocratic, insular, and that it took away public choice (Hughes 
1994). 
In response to the criticisms of traditional management, private sector styles of 
management have been adopted by the public sector. Replacing the traditional models 
of accountability which relied on ‘top down’ control within an official hierarchy 
(Stone 1995), new public sector management relies upon performance-based 
management or “accomplishment accountability” (Barrados, Mayne et al. 2000). 
New-managerialism has resulted in a diminished public sector role, which has 
become limited primarily to policy making and financing functions and increasingly 
separated from the delivery of services (Clarke and Newman 1997). In other words, 
new-managerialism has seen the reworking of budgets to be transparent in accounting 
terms with costs attributed to quantifiable outputs and outcomes instead of inputs.  
Theoretically, public service managers, who have increased accountability for the 
results and less accountability for the method of achieving the results, can be creative 
or even “entrepreneurial” in the methods they use to achieve their goals (Kernahan 
2000). The values of new-managerialism are reinforced in the Australian Public 
Service Bill (1999) which highlights the importance of the new professional values of 
‘achieving results and managing performance’. Accountability is a fundamental part 
of new-managerialism where contracts have replaced the authoritarian hierarchies as 
the method of ensuring that actors deliver what the purchaser expects of them (Lane 
1985).  
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The notion of accountability is that those acting on behalf of another person or group, 
report back to them, or are responsible to them in some way. This is a principal-agent 
relationship where the agent carries out tasks on behalf of the principals and reports 
on how they have been performed (Hughes 1994). In new-managerialism, the 
principle-agent relationship helps define who is responsible to whom, and for what, 
thus clarifying the accountability relationships and the contractual obligations 
between parties.  
The influence of the new management styles is the introduction of systems designed 
to promote managerial efficiency and accountability in professional practice with 
increasing surveillance of activity, assessment of spending and measures of outcome 
(Gladstone 1993). Armstrong argues that management is a generic process which is 
removed from expertise in any particular process (Armstrong 2002:282). In other 
words, managers can take management theory and apply it within any setting. 
However, in order for them to be able to apply their generic skills, the procedures 
within the organisation need to be constructed in a way that managers find 
"comprehensible and amenable to purposive intervention" (Armstrong 2002:282). 
Thus the new management systems require that the components of systems and 
organisations can be defined, monitored and, ideally, manipulated in a way that will 
help achieve management goals.   
Audit is one of the key procedures of accountability within new-managerialism 
(Power 1997). Audit is a ‘portable management tool’ in which ‘environments are 
rendered accountable, structured to conform to the need to be monitored ex-post’ 
(Power 1994:8). Audit requires that the components of the organization be broken 
down into a series of definable tasks that can be monitored. By doing this, audit 
actually comes to define the roles and relationships between the public, purchasers 
and professionals as well as create and define the problems that require solving 
(Power 1994). Whilst audit is an important tool of new-managerialism, it is not 
isolated to this movement. Audit reflects a wider requirement for openness and a 
response to consumerism (Jary 2002). The importance of audit as a management tool 
is reflected in the growth of ‘performance indicators’, ‘mission statements’, ‘clinical 
practice guidelines’, ‘targets’ and ‘league tables’ (Jary 2002). Audit does not 
generally examine the primary activities involved in delivering a service, but focuses 
on the systems of control, or the ‘policing of policing’ (Power 1994).  
However, the adoption of audit style accountabilities in the health sphere presents 
some difficulties. Where, say, in the manufacturing sector, the processes and outputs 
of production can be clearly defined in terms of mechanised actions and countable 
products, the processes and outputs of health care are less easily definable (Van 
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Peursem, Pratt et al. 1999). If measures are used as management tools, then they need 
to reflect the quality of management, however in health care, the quality of 
management and the quality of health care practice are not always synonymous (Van 
Peursem, Pratt et al. 1999). As Donabedian points out, the indicators and outputs that 
are favoured by managers do not necessarily reflect the quality of the service 
(Donabedian 1966:27). 
An important component of this discussion is the way that audit procedures have 
come to be defined in the health sphere, which has, in part, arisen from the models of 
professionalism and the scientific paradigm of health care, which will be expanded on 
under the following two headings. Essentially, current forms of audit and 
management are based on the privileging of objective, measurable indicators of 
outcome (Kazandjian, Lawthers et al. 1993). These indicators have, in part, been 
defined by the prevailing paradigms in health care, which are the dominance of the 
medical profession, and the drive for scientific validation of health care. One 
influence of this is an accountability framework which privileges scientific / objective 
knowledge over subjective input or narrative. These influences are described in the 
subsequent sections.  
2.3.2.2 The professionalisation of medicine  
The notion of the professionalisation of medicine is important in this context for two 
reasons; first, because professionalism is defined, in part, by systems of 
accountability and autonomy; secondly, because the professionalisation of medicine 
has had an important influence on the shape of the Anglo-American system of health 
care.  
Professional accountability has been described as "a system marked by deference to 
expertise where reliance must be made on the technical knowledge of experts and 
where close control from outside the organization is inappropriate” (Romzek and 
Dubnick 1987 cited in (Mulgan 2000).  
The classical sociological definition of professionalism has three features. The first is 
a clear definition of the elements of work over which the individual has autonomy or 
control. The second is legislative recognition of the profession by the state, protecting 
the profession from encroachment by another profession. Thirdly, professionals have 
ownership over an exclusive body of knowledge and skills and a code of ethics that 
protects their legitimacy (Friedson 1974). Professional groups further distinguish 
themselves through their own regulatory autonomy through systems of professional 
accreditation and often have control over their relationship with the service recipient 
(Kritzer 1999).  
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Buchanan has described the “social bargain” of professionalism in which society 
grants special privileges such as significant powers of autonomy, in the form of self-
regulation and social status, in return for the necessary benefit of medical services 
(Buchanan 1996). The privileged position bestowed to the medical profession gave 
them the ability to define their own systems of accountability, which have, until 
recently, been implicit and lacked external transparency. 
The ability of professionals to control their work, and in the case of medicine to 
control, or at least monitor the work of other disciplines has created the systems of 
health care accountability that have predominated over the past century (Larkin 1983; 
Montana Medical Association 2002). These have largely been implicit, informal 
systems of accountability that have served to protect the boundaries and reputation of 
the professional group rather than the public. For instance, in the early nineteenth 
century, the American Medical Association promoted discretion and silence with 
regard to the practice of colleagues, which was poorly suited to producing a 
systematic understanding of therapeutic safety or effectiveness, as later research 
demonstrated (Liberati, Apolone et al. 1991). 
However, the autonomy of professions has come under threat over recent years. The 
terms deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation are commonly used. Haug 
described the concept of deprofessionalisation as “a loss of professional occupations 
of their unique qualities, particularly their monopoly over knowledge, public belief in 
their service ethos and expectations of work autonomy and authority over clients” 
(Haug 1973). Proletarianisation has been described as "a theory that predicts the 
decline of medical power as a result of deskilling and the salaried employment of 
medical practitioners (McKinlay and Stoekle 1988). However both of these concepts 
are criticized on the basis that they are too general and miss the multidimensional 
nature of professional autonomy (Rosenthal 2002).  
More recently, there has been an awareness of the influence of new-managerialism on 
professional autonomy (Hunter 1996; Borthwick 2000; Dent and Whitehead 2002). 
The implications of the changes are not entirely clear, and appear to vary across 
disciplines and health systems (Rosenthal 2002). There is an argument that 
'performativity' is replacing professional autonomy (Dent and Whitehead 2002). That 
is, the privileging of objective forms of knowledge over subjective, which makes 
professionals accountable on the basis of objective, measurable indicators of 
effectiveness, rather than previously utilised, subjective indicators. Dent argues that 
the adoption of these control techniques by managers will actually promote 
‘empiricisim and technology’ which will undermine some professions whilst 
supporting others (Dent and Whitehead 2002).  
 33
Broadbent and Laughlan reinforce the notion of the privileging of empiricism and 
technology by arguing that new-managerialism relies on the application of accounting 
techniques to the actions of professionals to reduce the “indetermination and 
technicality ratio”. This refers to the parts of a role that can be defined and 
communicated by a set of rules as opposed to the parts that cannot be clearly defined 
by a set of rules (Broadbent and Laughlin 1998). The authors claim that increasing 
the importance of the roles that can be defined by rules or expanding the technical 
definitions of the tasks being performed achieves this.  
An examination of the impact of performance indicators on general practitioner 
autonomy in the UK reinforces the notion that new-managerialism judges 
professionals against explicit measures and that professionalism is no longer assumed 
(Exworthy, Wilkinson et al. In press). Interestingly, the GPs in this study criticized 
the performance indicators on the basis that they were 'not scientific', even though 
scientific credibility is promoted as the basis for introducing many of these changes in 
the health sphere.  
The growth of podiatric surgery in the UK illustrates how new-managerialism can 
extend the scope of practice of non-medical practitioners, whilst reducing the 
dominance of medicine over the practice of other disciplines (Borthwick 2000). The 
introduction of new systems of accountability enabled podiatric surgeons to use 
evidence of cost-effectiveness and audit practice as a mechanism to compete with 
orthopaedic surgeons. Podiatrists were able to demonstrate shorter waiting times for 
foot surgery, which gained favour with the Department of Health by demonstrating 
increased accessibility to care. Budget conscious fund holding GPs were found to be 
more likely to use podiatric surgeons than orthopaedic surgeons to undertake forefoot 
surgery. The Royal College of Surgeons (RCS) and the British Orthopaedic 
Association expressed opposition to the growth of podiatrists on the basis of their use 
of 'surgeon' in their title and RCS's belief that they 'governed' surgery. Borthwick 
describes this as a clear "challenge to the monopoly in foot surgery", previously 
owned by orthopaedics.  
The implications of new-managerialism on professionalism are difficult to predict, 
and likely to influence a range of areas of the health workforce. In Australia and the 
UK, there have been recent changes to the systems of regulation that make the 
concepts of professionalism more explicit. The principles of regulation in health 
include ensuring clarity regarding standards, maintenance of public confidence, 
transparency and fairness of procedures, responsiveness to and protection of the 
public (Department of Health 2000).  
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The regulatory systems in most Australian states and territories have undergone 
review over recent years. As health care regulation is undertaken at state / territory 
level, it is difficult to ascertain a clear picture of the regulatory protocols adopted by 
each discipline across the country. A summary of the allied health regulatory 
requirements is provided in Appendix A.  
A number of allied health associations in Australia have introduced voluntary 
accreditation systems (Appendix A) (Nancarrow and Clark In press). Clinicians 
undertake a range of activities, and in some cases, pay for the privilege of being 
certified an accredited practitioner (or certified practice in the case of physiotherapy). 
They currently do not achieve any increased financial benefits, nor is the 
accreditation status recognised by any purchasing authorities. The domains and 
procedures used to determine professional accreditation vary across the disciplines, 
and consumers values are not incorporated in the establishment of any of the 
accreditation programmes (Nancarrow and Clark In press).  
In the United Kingdom, mechanisms have been recently introduced in both health and 
social care to help maintain standards and therefore the quality of services. These 
changes arose, in part, from the recommendations from the Report of the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary Inquiry (the Kennedy Report) (Department of Health 2000). Whilst 
the Kennedy Report had the most direct effect on the General Medical Council, the 
medical regulatory body, the same regulatory principles have been applied to other 
professional bodies involved in the delivery of patient care. 
The NHS Plan included a proposal for the formation of a UK Council of Health 
Regulators (Department of Health 2000). As a consequence a number of regulatory 
bodies in health commenced their work on April 1st 2002. These include the Health 
Professions Council (HPC), Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), the General 
Medical Council (GMC), General Dental Council, General Optical Council, Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society, General Chiropractic Council and the General Osteopathic 
Council (Department of Health 2000). The GMC, NMC and HPC have reviewed their 
regulatory frameworks to include regular revalidation of health service providers’ 
fitness to practice and ongoing continuing professional education (Department of 
Health 2000; Irvine 2001).  
The introduction of new management structures have created an environment in 
which formerly accepted ‘rituals’ such as professional practice are now teased apart 
into a series of definable, quantifiable and externally verifiable components. It is the 
monitoring of these components that form the new basis of health service 
accountability. The professions appear to be voluntarily adopting many of new 
accountability standards, as the growth of professionally derived systems of 
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accreditation illustrate. However, the impact of these systems on professional 
autonomy is a replacement of the traditional notion of trust with explicit indicators of 
performance. As section 2.4 demonstrates, health outcomes are seen as the ultimate 
indicator of performance and effectiveness, despite the lack of clear examples of their 
application in the health care setting.  
2.3.2.3 The growth of scientific medicine 
The focus on safety and quality in health care started in the early twentieth century 
and coincided with the growth of medical technologies, such as anaesthetics and 
antibiotics. Sharpe has termed this the ‘era of scientific medicine’. This period 
heralded an acknowledgement that clinicians needed to “demonstrate that their 
practices were compatible with the rigorous medical science they both espoused and 
relied on for prestige” (Sharpe 2000:33). The growing body of scientific knowledge 
led to more rigorous forms of evaluation, such as the randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) and the introduction of the notion of quality in health care which was first 
proposed by Ernest Codman in 1916 (Codman 1916).  
Miller and Crabtree describe the typifying features of the biomedical model (Miller 
and Crabtree 2000); 
1. Scientific rationality; 
2. Emphasises individual autonomy as opposed to family and community; 
3. Focus on the body is a machine which is defined by physicochemical data 
and objective, numeric measurement; 
4. Mind/ body separation; 
5. Diseases as definable entities; 
6. The patient as an object and alienated from the physician; 
7. Emphasises visual cues; 
8. Diagnosis and treatment are made from the outside; 
9. Reductionism and the seeing of universals.  
These features undepin the basis of many of the health outcome measures that are 
available, but also reinforce the systems that have been adapted by managers in the 
aim to reduce the impact of treatment to a numerically definable result of care.  
The biomedical model has created a perception that health care interventions should 
be definable, reproducible, able to be scientifically validated and lead to a clear 
outcome if performed under the right circumstances. For instance, over recent years, 
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there have been a number of attempts to systematically manage, and incorporate the 
body of scientific evidence into practice. Cochrane proposed that the evidence arising 
from RCTs should be identified, evaluated and summarised in a systematic way, 
leading to the use of systematic review and meta-analysis of published (and some 
unpublished) data and the development of the Cochrane Library in 1993 (Cochrane 
1989).  
The implementation of ‘best practice’ care has been reinforced through the 
introduction of clinical practice guidelines (Haines and Hurwitz 1992; Grimshaw and 
Russell 1993; Grimshaw and Russell 1994; Grimshaw and Hutchinson 1995). 
Clinical guidelines are defined as systematically developed statements designed to 
assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific 
clinical circumstances in (Grimshaw and Hutchinson 1995). The Australian National 
Health and Medical Research Council has introduced a range of clinical practice 
guidelines to help overcome "unjustifiable variations in clinical practice for the same 
condition" (NHMRC 1999). The perceived benefit of clinical guidelines is their 
potential to reduce professional uncertainty, and hence inappropriate variation in 
practice. This will, in turn enhance health care rationing through better direction of 
resources (Grimshaw and Hutchinson 1995). A range of mechanisms have been 
developed that are designed to facilitate the application of clinical guidelines, such as 
‘clinical pathways’ and ‘standardised care plans’. These models are based on the 
assumption that a provider will adhere to the documented processes of care and only 
record deviations or ‘variances’ from these processes (Blau 1997; Chou and Boldy 
1999; Smith and Gow 1999). The critics of evidence based medicine and clinical 
guidelines claim that they represent a ‘cookbook approach’ to medicine (Woolf 1993) 
and a threat to professional autonomy (Hill 2000).  
The growth of the scientific validation of medicine has provided managers with a 
framework against which clinicians can be held accountable and performance 
managed. Individuals and organizations can be held accountable on the basis of 
published league tables. Good practice is based on replicable, objective approaches to 
care that are based on the best evidence available. Clinician files are audited for rates 
of adherence to the ‘rules’ governing their practice. Guidelines are given to prescribe 
the way that care is delivered and the onus is on the clinician to demonstrate that they 
have adhered to these guidelines.  
Professionalism has moved from an exclusive domain of a privileged few that was 
defined by autonomy and internal, implicit mechanisms of accountability to a 
management led model that measures accountability against an externally defined set 
of performance indicators. Many professional groups condone this approach, as 
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illustrated by the voluntary adoption of professional accreditation systems and the 
endorsement of organisational quality standards (Nancarrow and Clark In press).  
2.3.3 International applications of the new systems of accountability 
The new systems of accountability have been introduced in many health systems, 
including Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, despite 
different approaches to organising and financing health care in each country.  
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom was the first European nation to adopt the private sector 
approach to the publicly funded National Health Service (Griffiths and Hughes 2000). 
These changes were mandated in the National Health Service and Community Care 
Act, 1990 and included the separation of the NHS into purchaser and provider roles. 
The ‘purchasers’, health authorities and fundholding GPs, had the power to purchase 
services from NHS Trusts. The competing NHS Trust hospitals secured funding by 
entering into contracts with purchasers. The NHS Trust hospitals were divided into 
cost centres called clinical directorates in which clinicians were required to work 
alongside managers to deliver care within agreed budgets. This arrangement, as well 
as the employment of doctors directly by the NHS trusts, rather than the health 
authorities created a new level of governance of the health service which extended to 
the micro-management of the health service by the government, rather than simply 
the allocation of resources. 
The Patient Charter (which has recently been superseded by ‘Your Guide to the 
NHS’) was an important outcome of this model of management (Griffiths and 
Hughes 2000). The Patient Charter specified a number of quality targets, such as 
waiting times for patients. Trusts that did not achieve the targets, or that failed to 
supply the information about quality were subjected to financial penalties.  
The new accountability systems extended to the management of clinicians who were 
required to negotiate with managers to ensure that they could meet the contractual 
requirements. Contracts specified the quantity, quality and the cost of the services to 
be delivered, which, in many cases, only the clinicians had the knowledge to provide 
this information. This, in turn, led to the growth of ‘evidence-based purchasing’ 
which was linked to the NHS Research and Development Initiative which emphasises 
effectiveness and measurable outcomes.  
Clinical governance was introduced in the UK as a quality and accountability 
mechanism designed to improve current and future care delivery (Department of 
Health 1998). A number of accountability procedures are incorporated under the 
clinical governance umbrella, including the introduction of personal learning plans, 
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complaint analysis, significant event analysis, benchmarking and sharing best practice 
(Campbell, Sheaff et al. 2002). Health trusts have incorporated different approaches 
to clinical governance. Managers of primary care trusts who were interviewed about 
the introduction of clinical governance raised important issues around the 
implementation of new mechanisms of accountability. It involved 'getting the culture 
right'; the introduction of sustainable infrastructure in terms of organisational values 
as well as information technology; and avoiding a culture of blame (Campbell, Sheaff 
et al. 2002). Managers perceived that there was a lack of clarity about the role of 
quality systems in the implementation of clinical governance. The same managers 
identified barriers to the implementation of the clinical governance which included a 
lack of support by practice staff, lack of financial and technological resources to 
implement the approach and too rapid a pace of change.  
Broadbent has traced the impact of the new management styles accountability on GP 
practice in the UK in the early 1990s (Broadbent and Laughlin 1998). The authors 
identify three different approaches to the delivery of care which have been directed 
by contractual outputs. Prior to 1990, general practice was illness based with a 
curative emphasis and per-capita financing. Accountability was to the patients and the 
profession. In 1990, as a result of the introduction of the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act, 1990, contractual arrangements specified a shift to disease 
prevention and health promotion. Per capita financing was linked to contractual 
requirements, such as home visits to the over 75’s and consultations that were aimed 
at reducing the risk of illness. Direct financing was provided for achieving targets for 
childhood immunisation and conducting child surveillance. Accountability was made 
more explicit to the professions through medical audit, and to the purchaser, through 
contractual fulfilment. After 1993, the contracts were revised to change the emphasis 
on health promotion and increase the importance of population health data collection. 
The labour government changed these systems of accountability yet again with the 
introduction of clinical governance. These changes illustrate the power of contracts to 
influence the emphasis of the delivery of health care and control the levels of 
information being fed from the purchaser to the provider.  
Under proposals in the New NHS Modern, Dependable and subsequently, the NHS 
Plan, the performance of NHS organizations is ranked in league tables which draw on 
performance indicators and key target areas (Department of Health 1997; Department 
of Health 2000). The value of the indicators are being debated on the basis of their 
robustness, their ability to detect significant differences between organizations, the 
weightings given to various performance preferences the level to which they reflect 
'good practice' (Brown 2002; Klein 2002).  
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Flynn and colleagues examined the impact of new-managerialism on community 
health services in the NHS through case studies of three NHS community health 
services in England (Flynn, Williams et al. 1996). Their study highlights a number of 
difficulties with the approach in this setting. Firstly, they identify the problem clearly 
defining community health services, however categorise them as formal health 
services that are not provided by a GP or in a hospital. In addition, they are seen as 
‘network’ organisations which are involved in continuous negotiation with a range of 
different agencies, providers and voluntary organisations.  
Flynn et al highlight some of the common criticisms of the application of ‘quasi 
markets’ to health service management, including market failure, and the question of 
whether purchasers have the skills to effectively act as agents for consumers. Market 
failure describes the imbalance of knowledge between the purchasers of care and the 
providers of that care; where there are barriers to the introduction of new suppliers; 
and where evidence of outcomes is unreliable. However, their analysis of three case 
studies of community health services in the English NHS identified further barriers to 
the approach.  
Purchasers and providers perceived that new-managerialism was more difficult to 
apply to community health services than acute services because of differences in the 
nature of service delivery. For instance, community health services focus on ‘care 
rather than cure’, are more continuous and the end-point of care delivery is less easily 
identified. In contrast, the model fits more neatly bounded services such as surgery 
which have a more clearly defined intervention and outcome.  
“Contracts between organisations will be attractive to the extent that the good 
or service is amenable to unambiguous written specification; joint gains from 
collective action are potentially available; implementation does not create 
costly haggling; monitoring agreements is not costly; and penalties for non-
compliance can be enforced at low cost” (Flynn, Williams et al. 1996). 
The introduction of new-managerialism and the resultant focus on contracts as a way 
of procuring income changed the roles, responsibilities and relationships of all the 
stakeholders involved in care delivery. Providers required new skills in business 
planning and marketing strategies in order to address the new contractual 
requirements of their services. The changed relationships between the purchaser and 
the providers required major changes in organisational and professional culture. 
The concept of competition that is implicit in new-managerialism was a problem for 
community health services. The very nature of community health care means that 
services need to be located within their community. Inefficiencies were likely to arise 
from the duplication of services in a single area in order to increase competition. In 
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contrast, the acute sector lends itself more to competition because of the ability of 
purchasers to chose from services that are provided in a distinct location, but more 
likely to be replicated. 
The use of contracts as a basis for service purchasing brought with it a new set of 
prerequisites: the services need to be defined; the quantity and price of the services 
had to be agreed; the quality of services had to be determined; and the conditions 
under which either party could withdraw from the contract had to be made explicit. 
These issues presented a number of barriers within the community health setting. As 
previously stated, there were difficulties clearly defining and coding community 
health services. The definitional issues were confounded by the wide range of 
procedures available, the variety of providers employed in the community setting, the 
heterogeneous nature of the service users and the difficulty defining a community 
‘contact’. As a result, purchasers tended to focus on activity data, even though it was 
acknowledged by both purchasers and providers that this was a poor indicator of what 
actually takes place in health service delivery. 
The identification of outcomes was linked with the ability to address population 
needs with health services, leading to the widespread introduction of health needs 
assessments. However, there were difficulties determining how to link needs with 
services and then to demonstrate the outcomes of those services. Additionally, it was 
unclear whose role it was to undertake the health needs assessment. The providers felt 
that they had access to more appropriate information about health needs due to their 
hands on role, however the purchasers were resourced to examine population need. 
One case study site demonstrated the conflict that arises when funding is linked with 
resources, needs and outcomes: when issues arose about which services to prioritise, 
they questioned whether to invest in services based on population need, or those that 
provide an income to the service area.  
The lack of comparative data in the community setting created difficulties in the 
development of contract information. In contrast, the acute sector had been collecting 
information for a number of years about their services that could be used in contract 
development. 
Service costing was also difficult to determine. Flynn et al define five dimensions that 
can be included in cost data: settings (location of care delivery); condition (patient’s 
condition); activity (type of care or procedure); clients (who is being cared for) and 
care input (who is delivering the care). The only information that was routinely 
available in community health services was information about care input, resulting in 
large variations in costs across services, whilst providing little information about the 
actual services provided.  
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There were also problems measuring the quality of care. Two elements of care quality 
were considered important: the specification of the services required, and the impact 
of services on patient care, or outcomes. This led to two difficulties in the purchasing 
process. Firstly, it was unclear how to incorporate health care quality into contracts. 
Secondly, services were unsure how to measure or demonstrate the outcomes of care.  
The measurement of outcomes was highlighted as a difficulty in all three community 
health services examined by Flynn et al. The purchaser and providers believed that it 
should be possible to introduce health outcomes into community health services, 
however only a few examples had been introduced during the study period. 
Interestingly, all the organisations were optimistic about the possibility to identify 
appropriate outcome measures in community health services (such as wound healing 
rates and length of treatment times), although two acknowledged that they did not 
have sufficient resources to develop the measures required. The result was the 
continued reporting on process data, rather than outcomes.  
The introduction of new-managerialism itself created excessive demands for 
information which were difficult to meet due to limited information technology 
resources, and difficulties defining the components of the information (such as 
outcomes, services, and contacts). There was debate around who should have access 
to particular information. For instance, the provider questioned whether the purchaser 
should have information about resource use, or just activity levels and costs. There 
was a perception by one case study site that a focus on outcomes in purchasing 
contracts would inappropriately increase the transparency about all levels of service 
input that was provided to the purchaser, rather than simply reporting on outputs or 
throughput. 
The problems with the introduction of new-managerialism in the community health 
sector appear to be dominated by the difficulty defining what the community sector 
does, who the services are for, and how to measure the outcomes of the care, or as 
Flynn summarises: these are problems of ‘conceptualisation, information and 
location’ (p32). All three case studies highlight the difficulties monitoring quality as a 
purchasing tool, focussing on activity and expenditure instead.  
The UK system has undergone a number of changes subsequent to the election of the 
Labour Government in 1997 which still includes the separation of purchaser and 
provider. However a more collaborative approach to health care delivery has been 
introduced through pooled budgets and Joint Investment Plans which are based on 
'service agreements' rather than purchasing of clinical services (Department of Health 
2000; Department of Health 2002).  
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The United States 
The new management techniques have been applied to health care in the United 
States since the mid 1980's. The Health Care Financing Administration introduced the 
notion of institutional 'report cards' in 1987 in response to mortality rates of Medicare 
patients (Wakefield, Hendryx et al. 1996). Report cards have now been adopted by 
the managed care sector as a way of providing comparative information about the 
costs and quality of care to the service users (McGillis Hall 2002). Report cards can 
be mandatory, or be provider initiated.  
Provider initiated report cards are seen as a mechanism of public accountability by 
the health care providing organisations (Kohn, Corrigan et al. 2000). Two types of 
report cards have emerged; the consumer report card, which is designed to inform the 
public; and the balanced scorecard, which is aimed at measuring organisational 
performance and allows benchmarking between organisations (Kaplan and Norton 
1993). Balanced scorecards examine performance from four perspectives; the 
customer, internal, innovation and learning, and financial. Variations on these four 
themes have been adopted in the Canadian health setting, and in other services (Baker 
and Pink 1995).  
The use of report cards has both highlighted a number of barriers to performance 
measurement, and has itself come under criticism. The use of report cards has led to 
the realisation that "disclosure of performance is often based only remotely on 
unknown relationships between processes and outcomes" (Kazandjian 2002:207). 
Research has shown that report cards are of more interest to health care organisations 
than consumers (Bently and Nash 1998). Further, there is evidence of a lack of 
standardisation of and consensus on report card indicators (Slovensky, Fottler et al. 
1998; McGillis Hall 2002). Much of the published literature on report cards describes 
their use in the acute care setting, thus the indicators employed tend to reflect an 
acute and medically dominated approach (Gandhi, Francis et al. 2002; McGillis Hall 
2002). One study that attempted to apply the report card model in an ambulatory 
setting found a lack of correlation between the variables of performance that were 
measured (Gandhi, Francis et al. 2002). A study which examined the use of report 
cards in the management of diabetes (as a prevalent primary care condition) found 
that they were unable to detect differences between doctors and questioned the 
relevance of these indicators for reflecting what was actually done (Hofer, Hayward 
et al. 1999).  
Australia 
In Australia, the health sector has adopted the principles of new-managerialism in 
different ways at the state and national levels. Nationally, the changes to the systems 
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of hospital funding reflect the rapidly shifting values of the health service, and the 
perception that changes to the funding mechanisms can be used as a tool for health 
care reform. The Australian Health Care Agreements (AHCA) superseded the 
Medicare Agreements in 1998, establishing a range of indicators against which the 
States and Territories are accountable for the provision of public hospital care 
(Department of Health and Aged Care 2001). The replacement of the Medicare 
Agreements was designed to remove perceived barriers to the provision of care and 
reduce the incentives for cost-shifting between the Commonwealth and States and 
Territories (Magarry 1999). Performance indicators include hospital activity levels 
and costs; waiting times and service accessibility; Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Health; the integration of care processes; primary care access; quality; 
medical training and research; mental health and palliative care (Department of 
Health and Aged Care 2001). The AHCA acknowledge the need to develop 
appropriate performance indicators on efficiency, quality, appropriateness, 
accessibility and equity of health services and has prioritised the development of 
improved information technology infrastructure within the health system (Department 
of Health and Aged Care 2001).  
The AHCA has been attacked on the basis that it is still an approach to funding rather 
than an instrument to implement health policy and that it does not incorporate 
primary care (Reid 2002). A recent meeting of the Australian Health Ministers 
Council highlighted the importance of the continuity of care and interface between 
different sectors of care which may be incorporated into the 2003 - 2008 AHCA 
objectives (Reid 2002).  
At the state and territory level, new-managerialism has been adopted through the 
disaggregation of public sector bureaucracies into separate purchasing and providing 
organisations (Bloom 2000). Two different models of purchaser provider separation 
have emerged. New South Wales and Queensland have adopted a model of 
integrated, regional health care through a centralised purchaser and provider, 
whereas, for example, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT have adopted the more 
market oriented, output based funding through separation of the purchaser and 
provider roles (Bloom 2000). The effect of these reforms have been the 
establishments of contractual agreements between the purchasers and the providers 
(Bloom 2000:142), commonly termed the ‘purchaser – provider’ model. The result of 
the purchaser-provider model is the establishment of contractual interfaces between a 
number of stakeholders, such as parliament and the executive; political and 
bureaucratic purchasers and public or private providers (Stewart 1999). 
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Purchaser – provider separation is designed to optimise efficiency by ensuring that all 
actions and information are explicit and that parties can be held accountable for their 
actions. Purchaser - provider separation enables the purchaser to obtain more accurate 
information about the costs of services by subjecting providers to competition, by 
benchmarking providers against each other, and by forcing providers to specify the 
exact nature of the goods and services they will provide at a specified price (Stewart 
1999). The impact of NPM on health service provision is the privileging of scientific / 
objective knowledge over narrative or subjective knowledge. The systems that have 
been established to ensure accountability within health services under NPM reinforce 
these models.  
Despite the fact that management style accountability techniques have been used in 
the health sector for nearly 20 years in many countries, it appears that accountability 
technology is still in its infancy. The shifting applications of accountability models 
reinforce Mulgan's chameleon-like metaphor. The more managers and clinicians try 
to define and unpack the components of health service delivery, the more complex 
these components become. Additionally, the changing values of health care delivery 
need to be incorporated into a constantly shifting set of indicators of effectiveness. 
There is increasing recognition that the measurable, auditable items are not always a 
good reflection of how well care was delivered or the outcomes of that care, nor do 
they necessarily reflect the values or requirements of the stakeholders (Kazandjian 
1995). In many cases, the new accountability approaches have been developed within 
the acute care sector, with an assumption that the same approaches should be 
applicable in the community or ambulatory setting. However as the UK and US 
examples illustrate there is increasing evidence that the ‘non-hospital’ setting does 
not lend itself to the same technologies of accountability as the acute sector.  
2.3.4 Summary 
Accountability is an increasingly important, and growing area of health service 
management. Cost containment, consumer demands and the acceptance of the neo-
liberal values of self-regulation have shaped our society into one that actively 
condones, and even demands transparency of operation in health care and other areas 
of management. The increasing need to exhibit these values has led health service 
purchaser, funders, managers and providers to search for indicators that will ideally 
serve the dual purposes of demonstrating health service effectiveness whilst 
providing a basis for health resource allocation (Ellwood 1988). In some cases, these 
'indicators' have been derived from the values underpinning the scientific validation 
of medicine and professionalism, however they have been reconstructed in explicit, 
externally verifiably ways. Formal, explicit systems of professional and contractual 
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accountability are replacing the traditional models of professional accountability that 
were accepted in medical care until the second half of last century. 
It is apparent that the despite the fallibilities of the new systems of accountability, 
they are a powerful tool in the way that they are used to control the health system. 
They have the power to challenge existing professional boundaries; to form a basis of 
resource allocation; provide external verification of health service effectiveness and 
the accountability of individual practitioners.  
Health outcomes have been adopted as a mechanism to address accountability 
requirements in some settings. The following section examines the reasons that health 
outcomes appear to be a logical solution to the question of health service 
accountability. 
2.4 Health outcomes 
The use of the term ‘health outcomes’ has increased exponentially since the early 
1980s as a result of their broad range of applications in a number of fields of health 
and health services research. ‘Health outcomes’ have evolved to encompass almost 
every aspect of health or byproduct of the health service delivery process, from 
quality of life to mortality, health service utilisation and hospital readmission rates 
(Milne and Clarke 1990). The most commonly used definition in Australia is the 
Sunshine Statement of the Australian Health Ministers Advisory Committee (AHMAC, 
1993) which defines a health outcome broadly as  
A health outcome is a change in the health of an individual, or a 
group of people or population, which is wholly or partially 
attributable to an intervention or series of interventions. (AHMAC 
February 1993, Modified NHIMG 1996, (AIHW and Commonwealth 
Dept Health and Aged Care 1996).) 
Other definitions of health outcomes are similar to the AHMAC definition with two 
notable exceptions. Best defines health outcomes from the perspective individuals to 
include “how comfortable, how accessible and how appropriate” the care is, 
highlighting the role of the non-health aspects of care in achieving an outcome as well 
as the importance of including all stakeholder perspectives in health outcomes 
measurement (Best 1988). McCallum proposes that health outcomes are not necessarily 
dependent on an intervention and that a change in health status can arise from an 
intervention or “lack of intervention, on the natural history of a condition” (McCallum 
1993).  
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The ‘health outcomes movement’ is described as the “science of measuring outcomes 
and integrating that process into the routine care of patients” (Weeks in (Gerszten 
1998). The health outcomes movement has, in itself become an institution which is 
expected to address a wide range of issues around health service delivery, such as the 
quality of patient care, the relative effectiveness of different technologies and 
interventions (Gerszten 1998), the facilitation of economic choices on the basis of 
sound research (Ellwood 1988), and to help organisations establish benchmarks, 
negotiate contracts and use health outcomes to market themselves (Walters 2000).  
The managed care literature has coined the term ‘outcomes management’, which is 
the routine measurement of changes in health status and quality of life resulting from 
therapeutic interventions (Marcus 2000). In contrast to clinical trials, outcomes 
management relies on the data collected as part of routine health care delivery, thus is 
dependent on excellent patient information. 
The health outcomes movement has, in turn, created a need for quantifiable measures 
of health status other than rates of mortality and morbidity. Entire books are 
dedicated to the discussion of types of health outcome instruments and their 
development (Bowling 1991; Jenkinson 1994; Jenkinson and McGee 1998). An 
overview of the types of outcome measures is provided in section 2.4.2. 
The growing popularity of health outcomes can be attributed to a number of factors:  
• Donabedian emphasised the importance of health outcomes in his systems 
approach to health service quality, which focuses on health service structures, 
processes of care and health outcomes (Donabedian 1966).  
• In 1981, The World Health Organisation (WHO) published the Global Strategy 
for Health for All by the Year 2000 (WHO 1981) which resulted in the 
establishment of a range of health goals and targets in a number of countries 
including the United States, Europe and Australia (Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993). In 
Australia, the focus on improving health outcomes became a mechanism for the 
allocation of health resources through the Australian Health Goals and Targets. In 
turn, the states adopted the ‘health goals and targets’ approach and subsequently 
pressure has been placed on health service organisations to be accountable for 
their contribution to health outcomes (Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993).  
• Medical and allied health professions have reinforced the focus on health 
outcomes by embracing evidence-based medicine to demonstrate the health 
outcomes of medical interventions.  
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• The increasing supply of specialist health service providers and technologically 
driven diagnostic and treatment options have been blamed for creating increased 
demand for their high cost services without any demonstrated effect on health 
outcomes (Gerszten 1998). Thus, health outcomes are used as a way of directing 
health resource allocation. 
• Neo-liberal governmentality has resulted in new models of health service 
management in which contracts form the basis of health service accountability. 
Contracts, by their nature emphasise the outputs and outcomes of health services 
rather than processes and inputs. The drive to include ‘outcomes’ in contracts has, 
in some instances, been translated into attempts by health service managers and 
purchasers to use health outcomes. 
Each of these examples illustrates a slightly different application of health outcomes. 
Many disciplines have adopted the term ‘health outcomes’ for related, but often 
disparate purposes. The result is that health outcomes are defined by a number of 
roles within the health sector. For patients and health service providers, health 
outcomes represent a change in the health status of the patient that can be attributed to 
an intervention. For purchasers, outcomes are reflected in the contractual obligations 
that the provider has to fulfill. For economists, they are any by-product of the health 
system that can be quantified and costed as a basis for resource allocation. For 
managers, they are the outputs arising from the combination of health system 
structures and health service processes. For researchers, outcomes are the empirical 
evidence that an intervention does or does not work.  
Despite the diversity of applications of health outcomes, the discourse is not 
differentiated for different disciplines, implying that health outcomes theory can be 
applied across disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, the health outcomes literature 
tends to be diffuse and confusing due to the wide range of contexts in which health 
outcomes can be used and the variety of stakeholders attempting to apply them. The 
potential diversity of applications of health outcomes may explain some of their 
appeal to purchasers, funders, managers and health service providers. The following 
quote illustrates the perceived, all-encompassing capabilities of health outcomes. 
It is clear that health-care allocation decision-makers, third party 
payers, and patient consumers want to know the effects of treatment and 
the associated costs. Every practice setting is rich with information that 
can be used to address these issues. By collecting outcomes data in your 
practice setting, you have the opportunity to demonstrate benefit and 
use objective information to formulate cost benefit ratios. (Beck 
2000:95) 
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The same author also claims that health service providers can use outcomes data to 
guide providers about patient satisfaction, evaluate clinical processes and evaluate 
various health care technologies. What more could a health service provider, manager 
or purchaser want from a single measure?  
The true motivation behind the drive for health outcomes is difficult to isolate, and 
could be attributed to any or all of the factors listed above. The following quote by 
Sax describes the perception that health outcomes are intrinsically linked to health 
service quality as well as having an ‘integrative function’. 
End results are sometimes grouped under the five D’s – Death, 
Disease, Disability, Discomfort, and Dissatisfaction… outcome 
measures have the advantage of face validity as a dimension of 
quality. They also have an integrative function because the end 
result represents the net effect of many factors and processes (Sax 
1990:120). 
The discourse of health service quality incorporates many of the proposed functions 
of health outcomes and is the banner under which many purchasers and providers 
appear to have embraced the outcomes approach. The integrative function of 
outcomes described by Sax captures this. The following section examines the role of 
health outcomes in health service quality in more depth. 
2.4.1 The role of health outcomes in health service quality 
The Institute of Medicine defines quality as 
the degree to which health services for individuals and populations 
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent 
with current professional knowledge (Schuster, McGlynn et al. 1997:2). 
That medical care does not always improve health outcomes, and can, in fact lead to 
adverse consequences has been acknowledged since at least the days of Hippocrates 
(Hippocrates 1952). However, it was not until 1912 that L J Henderson stated that 
this was ‘the first year in human history in which the random patient with a random 
disease consulting a random physician had a better than 50/50 chance of benefiting 
from the encounter’ (Carter 1958:27). Still, in the US, between 3 and 5% of all 
hospital admissions end in some form of adverse event , or, the death of at least 44 
000 people each year (Brennan, Leape et al. 1991). A similar Australian study found 
that rates of error were around 15% (Wilson, Runciman et al. 1995). 
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Modern approaches to health care quality are often attributed to Avedis Donabedian. 
However as early as 1912, Ernest Codman proposed the “end result system” which 
was based on the 
Common sense notion that every hospital should follow every patient 
it treats, long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has 
been successful, and then to inquire ‘if not why not? (Codman 
1984:22).  
The central component of the end-result system was the patient record, which he said 
should include details of the symptoms, diagnosis, treatment and follow-up. Codman 
also proposed an assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment based on a range of 
classifications such as error due to lack of technical skill or knowledge, error due to 
lack of surgical judgement and the patient’s refusal of treatment. 
These data were designed to serve an auditing function that could then be used to 
establish benchmarks for the performance of physicians in hospitals. The system was 
revolutionary at the time as it focussed on the therapeutic outcomes of care as 
opposed to costs and throughputs. Codman himself used and published the results of 
this system, however experienced a great deal of resistance by surgeons in the 
implementation of the model. This was in part, because surgeons, at that stage, held 
honorary positions in most hospitals, making medical administrators reluctant to hold 
them accountable.  
The American College of Surgeons considered Codman’s model in 1916, however 
the approach that was finally adopted in 1918 as the “Minimum Standard for 
Hospitals” focussed on the structure of health service delivery, omitting both the 
analysis of health outcomes and the reporting of preventable error (Sharpe 2000). 
Codman’s model was possibly the precursor to a recognition of the need for some 
type of monitoring of the outcomes of care in a clinical setting. The importance of 
health outcomes was emphasised by Avedis Donabedian in 1966, who wrote that 
‘outcomes remain the ultimate validators of the effectiveness and quality of medical 
care’ (Donabedian 1966). Donabedian is credited with the conceptualisation of 
outcomes and the introduction of methods to make the concepts usable (Opit 1988). 
The importance of Donabedian’s approach is first, the inclusion of outcomes within 
the quality perspective of heath care since because “outcome measures have the 
advantage of face validity as a dimension of quality” (Sax 1990:120). Secondly, 
Donabedian reconceptualised health outcomes into a systems approach to health care 
that focuses on the structural characteristics of the service, the processes of care and 
the outcomes of care (Donabedian 1966). The systems approach underpinned the 
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future conceptualisation of health outcomes and their subsequent applications in 
research, policy and management.  
The integrative function of health outcomes described by Sax has obvious appeal to 
the purchasers and funders of health services. It implies that the effects of the 
processes and structures that constitute the health service can be captured with a 
single outcome measure or indicator. This provides the benefits of simplicity, a basis 
for comparison and benchmarking and an indication of how effective the service was, 
rather than ‘how much’ of it was provided. 
In contrast, Fiona Moss promotes the measurement of processes on the basis that they 
are easier to measure, they can be determined at the time of the intervention and 
provide more information about the quality of the care delivered than health 
outcomes (Moss 1999).  
Interestingly, the health outcomes approach has been promoted on the basis that 
processes and structures have been the traditional focus of evaluation of health care 
and they have been “selected arbitrarily, without valid linkages to favourable health 
outcomes” (Weller, Holt et al. 1997:12). Yet, changing the measure so that the focus 
is on health outcomes measure does not automatically correlate with improvements in 
the processes or structures. Indeed, the “integrative function” of health outcomes 
removes the detail of the particular components of health care to focus instead on 
what was achieved. 
Recent studies have shown that health service processes are related to health 
outcomes in some cases. For instance, mortality rates have been found to be lower in 
patients who undergo revascularization than in those that have coronary angiography, 
twelve months after receiving the intervention (Schuster, McGlynn et al. 1997). 
Another study found that better quality consultations, as measured by retrospective 
file audits, did not significantly influence patient outcomes (van Berkestijn, Kastein et 
al. 1999). Sometimes, processes that are clearly linked to health outcomes are labeled 
‘outcome related performance indicators’. Performance indicators are described as 
A statistic or other unit of information which reflects, directly or 
indirecty, the performance of a health or welfare intervention, facility, 
service or system in maintaining or increasing the wellbeing of its target 
group (Armstrong 1994:1). 
However, as the application of performance indicators in league tables and report 
cards has indicated, performance indicators do not always reflect performance 
accurately (Brown 2002; Klein 2002). As the previous section illustrated, the majority 
of performance indicators have been developed in the acute sector and are of 
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questionable value in community and allied health services (Flynn, Williams et al. 
1996; Gandhi, Francis et al. 2002; McGillis Hall 2002). 
The widespread adoption of quality improvement initiatives by health services has 
seen an expansion of the parameters of quality. For instance, New South Wales 
Health focuses on six dimensions of quality in health care; safety, effectiveness, 
consumer participation, efficiency, access and appropriateness (NSW Health 1998). 
Other authors still cluster these components of care under the Donabedian triad 
(Schuster, McGlynn et al. 1997). ACT Community Care Clinical Quality 
Improvement Framework has combined the concepts of quality and clinical 
governance and identified five headings that form the basis of clinical quality: 
customer participation, vision / mission / values, continuous clinical quality 
improvement, results and outcomes focus and learning organsation (ACT Community 
Care 1999).  
Accreditation is one mechanism that has been adopted by organisations and 
professions to address the issues of continuous quality improvement (Skok, Swerissen 
et al. 2000). Accreditation systems are designed to incorporate aspects of 
organisational structures, processes and outcomes. A number of agencies exist in 
Australia to guide accreditation standards for health services, and some for a much 
broader range of services (Australia 1994; Australasian Podiatry Council 2000; 
Australian Physiotherapy Association 2000; Council 2001). Some prominent 
examples of accrediting organisations include the Australian Council on Healthcare 
Standards (ACHS 1999). The ACHS has developed a series of clinical indicators for 
eighteen different conditions or service types, such as anaesthetics, surgery and 
paediatric pathology. The indicators address a range of clinical issues, including 
outcomes, such as morbidity from a particular procedure and processes, such as 
compliance with the criteria for the management of a particular condition. The Royal 
Australian College of General Practitioners has developed a set of accreditation 
standards, with approximately 60% of practices registered for accreditation 
(Australian General Practice Accreditation Limited 2000). Other models include the 
Quality Improvement Council, which promotes a culture of organisational change, 
growth and development within the organisation. Home and Community Care 
(HACC) has developed standards for HACC funded services which have been 
included in services agreements since 1995. It is proposed that in the future, agency 
funding will be linked to the HACC standards (Skok, Swerissen et al. 2000).  
Individual professional accreditation is gaining acceptance across a range of allied 
health disciplines (Nancarrow and Clark In press). The systems of accreditation for 
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each allied health discipline are summarised in Appendix A and will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Six. 
The notion of health service quality has grown and evolved in line with the new 
demands for accountability. The adoption of quality systems by health service 
providers further reinforces the ideals of transparency and self-monitoring that are 
valued by our society whilst addressing some of the accountability requirements of 
consumers, purchasers and funders (Schuster, McGlynn et al. 1997; Strathern 2000).  
The Donabedian systems approach of structures, processes and outcomes is still 
widely accepted, and forms the basis of most quality initiatives used today. Of the 
three components, health outcomes still have the greatest intuitive appeal to 
purchasers, managers and providers. 
Outcomes measurement has become increasingly popular in the past few 
years, perhaps because outcomes are the most direct measure of the 
health of a population. For example, outcomes can be used to assess the 
quality of care a health system provides its diabetic patients: it can 
measure whether the system's diabetic patients have foot ulcers, how well 
its diabetic patients can maintain their regular activities such as walking 
to the store, and whether they are satisfied with their foot care as well as 
overall care. (Schuster, McGlynn et al. 1997:5) 
Outcomes measurement is dependent on being able to quantify certain domains of a 
patient’s health before and after an intervention is delivered (Weller, Holt et al. 1997). 
The next section describes the classification and types of instruments that are 
available to measure health outcomes. 
2.4.2 Outcomes measurement 
There are a range of suggested classifications for health outcomes (Bowling 1991; 
Jenkinson 1994; Schuster, McGlynn et al. 1997). Broadly, measures of health 
outcome can be classified as being subjective or objective. Within each of these 
categories, either patients or health service providers can define the outcomes of care 
(Table 2.1). For example, pain is an example of a subjective measure that can only be 
determined by the patient. In contrast, blood pressure is an objective measure that is 
normally determined by a health service provider and does not necessarily correlate 
with the reporting of subjective symptoms by the patient (Barsky, Cleary et al. 1992).  
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Table 2.1 Classification of health outcomes 
  
Clinician defined 
 
 
Patient defined 
 
O
bje
ct
iv
e 
 
Glycosylated haemoglobin A1c 
Blood pressure 
Range of motion 
Five year survival status 
Tumor size 
Wound healing rates 
Electrolyte levels 
Readmission to service 
Death 
 
Su
bje
ct
i
v
e 
 
Functional status 
Mini-mental score 
 
Quality of life 
Functional status 
Satisfaction with care 
Pain 
Objective measures of health outcome include traditional indicators such as 
biochemical, physiological and radiographic measures. Examples of clinical measures 
include blood pressure and glycosylated haemoglobin A1c to determine the level of 
diabetes control. Most clinical measures tend to be clinician defined and interpreted, 
and in many cases (not always), require some form of technology to extract the result.  
The recognition that mortality and morbidity are less than optimal outcomes for most 
health service interventions has led to a search for more appropriate measures of 
health outcome. For example, the National Health Service in the UK determined that 
one of the outcomes of primary care interventions should be reduced rates of 
avoidable hospitalisations for conditions such as asthma, diabetes and epilepsy 
(Jankowski 1999). Their hypothesis was that if primary care services were effective, 
then there would be low rates of hospitalisation for these conditions. They actually 
found that hospital utilisation was more dependent on socio-economic status than any 
other variable, so the attribution of avoidable hospitalisations to primary care 
effectiveness was unreliable. 
Clinical measures tend to focus on discrete diagnosable problems that are 
anatomically localised or affect particular organs or systems so, it is hardly surprising 
that they are generally poor indicators of how the patient actually feels (Barsky, 
Cleary et al. 1992). For example peptic ulcers are often unrelated to presence of 
symptoms, asthmatic dyspnoea is poorly correlated to measures of airways 
obstruction and the symptoms of diabetes are more closely related to depression than 
to levels of glycaemic control (Barsky, Cleary et al. 1992). Barsky explains this 
discrepancy by the fact that most patients experience their health as an overall state of 
well-being or global experience. 
Asking the patient how he or she feels using a measure called ‘self-rated health’ has 
been found to be an accurate predictor of mortality, (Scott, Macera et al. 1997), 
subsequent hospitalisation (Gold, Franks et al. 1996), and number of physician 
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contacts (Miilunpalo, Vuori et al. 1997). Self-rated health has been found to be more 
sensitive than many objective measures at predicting these occurrences (Simons, 
McCallum et al. 1996).  
The health outcomes movement emphasises a shift from traditional, objective 
outcome indicators to ‘patient derived’ outcome measures (Gerszten 1998). The 
recognition of the limitations of focussing on clinical indicators alone, combined with 
the need to be able to compare the outcomes of a variety of interventions across 
different patient groups, led to the development of a new range of instruments 
designed to measure ‘health related quality of life’ (HRQoL). The concept of health 
related quality of life was constructed against a background of the belief that the goal 
of all health interventions should be to improve patient quality of life. As quality of 
life is not determined solely by health status, the concept of ‘health related’ quality of 
life measures was developed in an attempt to isolate those aspects of ‘quality of life’ 
that can be attributed to health. Health related quality of life is defined by Patrick as 
“the value assigned to duration of life as modified by the impairments, functional 
states, perceptions, and social opportunities that are influenced by disease, injury, 
treatment, or policy” (Patrick 1997).  
An entire science, which is strongly grounded in psychometric instrument 
development and evaluation, has developed around the measurement of HRQoL. A 
range of ‘generic’ HRQoL instruments, of which the Medical Outcomes Study Short 
Form 36 (SF-36) is probably the most well known, are available to be used as a basis 
for health outcome comparison within, and across a range of interventions (Ware and 
Sherbourne 1992). Additionally, a variety of ‘condition specific’ instruments have 
been developed which look at the non-clinical impact of interventions designed to 
treat specific conditions, diseases or body parts, for example, the Arthritis Impact 
Measurement Scale (AIMS) (Soderlin, Nieminen et al. 2000) and the Foot Health 
Status Questionnaire (FHSQ) (Bennett, Patterson et al. 1998). 
In order to conceptualise and measure these aspects of health, researchers have 
developed multi- dimensional models of health, involving more than one health 
concept or dimension (Kaplan, Bush et al. 1976; Rosser 1988; Ware and Sherbourne 
1992). The health concepts most frequently included in such models are: 
• morbidity (disease or impairment); 
• limitations to functional abilities (disability); 
• role limitations because of health problems (handicap); 
• bodily pain; 
• mental health (psychological distress and psychological well-being); 
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• vitality (energy/fatigue); and 
• general perception of health (eg. excellent/good/fair/poor). 
Despite the well-validated (and complicated) techniques involved in developing and 
validating many of the HRQoL measures, they have not been immune from criticism. 
The major limitation of HRQoL measures is that they take the quality of life 
preferences developed within particular groups and expect them to be generalisable to 
other groups or populations. It has been suggested that these instruments are 
representative of a western model of health, and may not be appropriate for cultures 
which have different concepts of health, sickness and causes of disease (Fox-Rushby 
and Parker 1995). The result is that HRQoL measures still only ask specific questions 
about a narrow group of domains that could potentially be affected by health at the 
risk of excluding others which may be of more importance to the patient or more 
relevance to their health. One author goes so far to say that health outcome measures 
do not actually look any more specifically at patient outcomes than the physiological 
measures, they are just a different aspect of physician driven outcomes (Jenkinson 
1994). For this reason, it is important that health service purchasers can be certain 
that the outcomes of care reflect either objectively measured objective parameters of 
health status, and / or patient reported parameters. 
An example by Hill highlights the problems inherent in using a generic health related 
quality of life measure, in this case, the SF-36, in the evaluation of a continence and 
mental health clinic (Hill, Harries et al. 1996). Their study found that patient health 
status, as measured by the SF-36, declined during the intervention period. However, 
face-to-face interviews found that the intervention had actually improved the 
continence and/ or coping strategies of the majority of patients. The declining SF-36 
scores were attributed to other co-morbidities, or non-health factors, such as a death 
in the family. In other words, the SF-36 was not sensitive enough to detect the 
changes resulting from the two interventions. Most authors now recommend 
combining generic and specific health related quality of life measures to avoid this 
problem (Hill, Harries et al. 1996). 
As an extension of the HRQoL phenomena, health economists have developed 
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) which combines the quality of life gained with 
equivalent additional life years gained from an intervention (Ubel, Nord et al. 2000). 
QALYs are used as one method of comparing the relative value of different 
interventions for the purposes of resource allocation (Matchar 2000). Given that 
QALYs are proposed as a method of allocating resources, they have recently been 
criticised on the same basis as HRQOL measures, that is, the difficulty of 
generalising individual health preferences across an entire population. One reason for 
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this is that that the population samples used to derive QALY weights are not random, 
representative samples, but frequently convenience samples. 
Another type of subjective measure, ‘patient generated measures’ overcomes the 
problems associated with the attribution of set values or domains inherent in other 
HRQoL instruments. They do this by asking the patient to nominate the areas of their 
life that are affected by the condition being treated. The method of administration of 
each instrument varies but in general, the patient ascribes a value to the nominated 
area to reflect the importance of that aspect of their life. The instruments vary in 
levels of mathematical complexity allowing some to arrive at a single score to reflect 
the patient’s overall quality of life, whereas the simpler instruments compare the 
patient’s progress against each of the nominated domains. The most common of these 
instruments are the Patient Generated Index (Ruta, Garratt et al. 1994) and the Self-
Evaluated Index of Quality of Life (SEI QoL) (Hickey, Bury et al. 1996). Patient 
generated and HRQoL measures have the advantage over clinical measures that they 
can be used to evaluate a variety of health interventions, including those for which 
there are limited clinical measures.  
The National Coalition on Health Care list a number of criteria that health outcomes 
should fulfill to be of use in health service accountability (Schuster, McGlynn et al. 
1997). They should be risk-adjusted to account for factors (such as age, gender, and 
severity of the illness) that influence outcomes but are beyond the health care 
system's control. Without risk adjustment, it is impossible to determine how much of 
the improvement or worsening of outcomes can be attributed to the care delivered (or 
not delivered) by the health care system. Risk adjustment is dependent on being able 
to identify a number of characteristics about the patients receiving the service that can 
be linked to service delivery. 
The outcomes are most powerful when the components of health service that impact 
on that outcome are known. This enables quality managers to identify and alter 
processes of care if the desired outcome is not achieved. 
Ideally, health outcomes will be a direct reflection of the health service that is being 
evaluated. For instance, the outcomes of diabetes care often take a long time to 
manifest and can represent the results of many years of care (Greenfield, Kaplan et al. 
1994). So it would take many years to determine whether a podiatric intervention 
successfully prevented the onset of ulceration, by which stage it would be difficult to 
attribute the outcome to the intervention. 
The measurement of health outcomes requires a large enough population to be able to 
detect meaningful changes. When observing for uncommon outcome events, large 
populations will need to be monitored. 
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Health outcomes have obvious appeal to health service purchasers, funders, managers 
and providers as a simple tool to ensure health service accountability. The 
“integrative function” of outcome measures removes the detail of the way the 
outcome was achieved to provide a simple summary of the actual outcome of care. 
This makes outcomes ideal for contracts that specify outputs and outcomes, rather 
than inputs and processes. Many outcome measures have the ability to incorporate 
consumer perspectives on health service delivery, rather than simply focusing on 
clinician derived outcomes of care. The quantification of health outcomes potentially 
enables health service providers, managers and purchaser to establish benchmarks on 
the basis of the outcomes of care.  
There are a diverse range of outcome instruments that appear to have utility in a 
number of settings. Despite the appeal and potential advantages of health outcomes, a 
number of Australian organisations have attempted to implement the health outcomes 
approach. In most cases, the organisations were forced to compromise from the 
approach. The following section illustrates the approach applied by six of these 
organisations. 
2.5 Examples of the application of the outcomes approach  
This section reviews the approaches taken by number of Australian organisations to 
measure health outcomes. The examples are the National Goals and Targets – Health 
Priority Areas, the New South Wales Health Outcomes Initiative, the Outcomes 
Based Funding of the Divisions of General Practice, the Australian Health Ministers’ 
Advisory Council (AHMAC) Working Party on Mental Health and the use of 
outcomes in the National Literacy and Numeracy Project. The list is not exhaustive, 
however illustrates the implementation of the outcomes approach from a number of 
different settings. 
2.5.1 National Goals and Targets - Health priority areas  
Australia was a signatory to the ‘Global Strategy for Health for All by the year 2000’ 
agreement that was adopted by the member nations of WHO is 1981 (Palmer and 
Short 1994). The Better Health Commission was established in 1985 to identify the 
current health status of the population and underlying problems, and propose 
mechanisms for their improvement. Extensive research and consultation led to the 
development of five national health priority areas (Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993). 
Strategic direction for those attempting to implement health improvement strategies 
was provided by The Health for All Australians report (Health Targets and 
Implementation Committee 1988).  
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The administration and monitoring of the effectiveness of the priority areas using the 
Health for All Australians presented a number of difficulties. Health for All 
Australians only defined targets where substantial statistics already existed, with 
goals based around mortality and morbidity and reductions in risk factors (Nutbeam, 
Wise et al. 1993). The conceptual framework of the 1988 report did not reflect the 
broader social and environmental determinants of health such as lifestyle factors and 
environmental and policy changes. Instead the target focussed on the narrow 
measures of mortality and, morbidity. This, and other international examples led 
Australia to take on a broader approach to the setting of goals and targets which was 
released in 1992. The new framework grouped goals and targets as preventable 
mortality and morbidity, health lifestyles and risk factors, health literacy and health 
skills, healthy environments, and the health care system. The ‘health care system’ 
proposed a focus on the health outcomes derived from the delivery of health services, 
emphasising the role of health outcomes in resource allocation.  
“This will require, in turn, a greater concern for the efficient use of 
resources and for the attainment of greater equity of outcomes” 
(Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993:16). 
Other difficulties in achieving Health for All Australians included a number of 
deficiencies in existing data sources, preventing the accurate assessment of 
improvements in health outcomes (Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993). The mechanisms of 
accountability for achieving the goals were not clearly articulated. The mainstream 
health sector continued to focus on the delivery of clinical and diagnostic services, 
with little reference to their improvements on overall population health status. 
The first set of health goals and targets were published in 1988. In 1990, the National 
Health Strategy (NHS) was established to identify ways of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the health system with a focus on health care 
financing. Since then, the achievement of the national health goals and targets have 
been reviewed regularly, as have the methods of allocating resources to help achieve 
these goals. By 1990, most states had established their own health goals and targets, 
although there was still little indication of the impact on health services.  
In 1995, the National Health Goals and Targets were renamed ‘National Health 
Priority Areas’ due to a number of difficulties implementing health goals and targets. 
Namely, there was lack of national reporting requirements, too many indicators and a 
lack of emphasis on treatment and the ongoing management of disease (AIHW and 
Commonwealth Dept Health and Aged Care 1996). The development of targets was 
one thing, but the ability to accurately monitor these raised a new set of difficulties as 
acknowledged by the Australian health ministers in 1992;  
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Achieving change will take time, not least because of the paucity of useful 
measures of health outcome which could serve as a basis for funding 
decisions (Nutbeam, Wise et al. 1993:242) 
The National Health Goals and Targets Program is a working illustration of an 
evolution of the outcomes approach for resource allocation at a national level. The 
program is credited with increasing the emphasis on health outcomes nationally and 
at state levels. However, the commonwealth lacked the clear directions for 
implementation and accountability to achieve the desired outcomes and accurately 
monitor their progress.  
The states, in turn, adopted the outcomes approach and were able to learn from some 
of the difficulties faced by the Commonwealth, as the NSW Health Outcomes 
Initiative demonstrates. 
2.5.2 New South Wales Health Outcomes Initiative 
The New South Wales (NSW) Health Outcomes Initiative was established in 1991. 
NSW was the first state to introduce initiatives that built on the National Health Goals 
and Targets introduced in 1988 to identify specific priority areas that were proposed 
as an “outcomes based accountability mechanism” (NSW Health Department 1991). 
A discussion draft paper released in June, 1991 titled “The development of health 
outcomes – the future for NSW health” noted that  
Previous efforts to encourage the use of targets for health outcomes have 
floundered because they have failed to properly assess information needs 
and information management, have failed to introduce accountability for 
the achievement of specified goals and targets, and have not developed 
adequate mechanisms for consultation…(NSW Health Department 
1991:i) 
The document identified ten priority areas for action that were related to the health 
goals and targets including a range of preventable and treatable diseases and the 
addition of health service quality improvements. For example, some of the goals for 
hospital services included; to ensure hospitalisation results in improved health status, 
to minimise rates of unplanned readmissions to hospital, and to reduce complication 
rates, adverse drug reactions and hospital acquired infections. No levels were set for 
these targets due to the paucity of baseline data.  
This was the first attempt, at a state level, to define measurable quality targets in 
health care. They were notably absent from subsequent drafts of the document. In 
August 1991 a discussion paper was circulated to all states and the Commonwealth 
which proposed a move away from the “open ended activity driven” funding of 
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Medicare and toward a “more outcome directed system” where the outcomes would 
be agreed through Commonwealth – State negotiation. In February 1992, a revised 
paper was circulated which set a broader range of goals, and targets but no priority 
areas for action.  
Area health services, in turn adopted the health outcomes initiative, using the 
framework to guide service development, however reported frustration at the level of 
involvement maintained by the Department.  
The result of the NSW Health Outcomes Initiative was the funding of a highly 
diverse range of projects. At the state level, the emphasis changed from setting targets 
to producing data (Dugdale 1992). There was an increasing emphasis on health care 
quality and hospital based accreditation. 
NSW Health now appears to have replaced the emphasis on health outcomes with 
performance indicators. The following disclaimer illustrates the current perception of 
the relationship of health service delivery to outcomes; 
The health of the community is influenced by many factors which 
predominantly fall outside the sphere of influence of the health system 
such as socio-economic status, ageing, environmental and lifestyle issues. 
This makes the development of meaningful linkages between government 
activities and performance at this level difficult (New South Wales 
Council on the Cost of Government 2000:6). 
Whilst the national and state based approaches did not result in outcome based 
funding, and the measurable targets remained largely unmeasured, the emphasis on 
outcome based resource allocation has seen improvements in systems of data 
collection and a series of quality based initiatives at both the hospital and community 
levels. 
2.5.3 Outcomes based funding – Divisions of General Practice 
Divisions of General Practice are organisations based on regional groups of general 
practitioners (GPs). They are designed to support GPs working together to improve 
the quality and continuity of care, meet local health needs, promote preventative care, 
and respond rapidly to the needs of the community (Young and Liaw 1996). 
The implementation of ‘outcomes based funding’ for Divisions of General Practice 
was initially proposed in 1996 (Commonwealth Department of Health and Family 
Services 1997). Prior to 1996, the Divisions had been in their development phase, 
which meant that funding focussed on the establishment of divisions and providing 
incentives for GP involvement. The funding basis of the Divisions was due to 
 61
increase in late 1996, which led to deliberations about the basis of funding allocation 
for Divisions. The project was overseen by the Outcomes Based Block Funding 
Reference Group who proposed; 
A move to outcomes based funding would entail a program approach 
based on defined and agreed outcomes in a number of key areas in 
which change could be measured over time. There would be a sharper 
focus on what the divisions actually deliver to their communities 
(including their GP members) and less on how and who delivers 
(Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services 1997:2). 
Despite the broad interest in health outcomes, the goals of the outcomes based 
funding approach were not made explicit, beyond the “need for accountability” and 
the desire to embrace evidence based medicine (Weller, Holt et al. 1997). 
The proposal emphasised that whilst the outcomes would define the scope for the 
agreement, funding would be determined by achieving agreed progress towards those 
outcomes. It also acknowledged some of the potential difficulties around 
implementing outcomes based block funding, including the inability to attribute the 
outcomes to the intervention, the barriers around data collection, and the limited 
funding available to Divisions to support this approach. The proposal also highlighted 
that a focus on outcomes led to the risk of focussing on the measurable and easily 
achievable outcomes of care. 
The initial approach to the introduction of outcomes based funding was the 
development of a matrix that specified a range of health priority areas. The matrix 
examined the outcomes and outcome indicators at the population level, the role of 
general practice in achieving these goals, and the indicators to measure what the 
Divisions could do towards the achievement of these goals. Priorites for indicator 
development were based on the national health priority areas and the availability of 
evidence to link the outcomes to general practice. In many cases, rates of adherence 
to clinical practice guidelines were proposed as a proxy outcome indicator. An 
example of the matrix for early detection of risk for falls in the elderly is illustrated in 
Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Example of outcomes and indicators for outcomes based funding 
Injuries: 
falls in 
the 
elderly 
Health outcomes 
at the population 
level 
Health outcome 
indicators at the 
population level 
What general practice can do 
(outcomes) 
Indicators for 
what general 
practice can do 
Early 
detection 
of risk 
Decreased 
mortaility & 
morbidity, 
improved quality of 
Mortality rates due to 
falls for >65, hospital 
admission rates due to 
falls for people >65; 
Improve identification of early 
risk factors including 
polypharmacy, improve 
monitoring of age related 
% older people 
identified as being 
at risk 
% appropriate 
 62
life hospital admission 
rates due to fractured 
lower limbs of men 
and women >75 
changes:vision, muskuloskeletal, 
neurological changes, and 
initiate appropriate home 
assessments (OT) 
home 
assessments 
completed 
 
Chain of evidence What divisions can do 
(outcomes) 
Possible strategies Indicators to measure 
what divisions do 
 
Series on clinical 
management problems in 
the elderly (NHMRC), falls 
and the older person, 
medication and the older 
person 
Increase skills in GP 
gerontology, improve GPs 
pharmacological 
knowledge, improve 
systems for GPs to 
monitor risk factors in the 
older patient 
Coordinate or provide 
training for GPs in 
gerontology and 
pharmaceutics 
% GPs upskilled 
%GPs implementing 
management care plans 
for practice populations at 
risk 
% practices seeking 
consumer feedback 
The Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services employed 
consultants to review the proposed outcome indicators and information requirements 
to implement the approach (Weller, Holt et al. 1997). The consultants concluded that 
the lack of information technology infrastructure in Australian general practice was a 
barrier to the collection of outcome based indicators. For instance, many of the 
indicators required the identification of patients with certain characteristics, such as a 
diagnosis of diabetes or a particular age and gender. This information was necessary 
both to form a denominator for change in rates of the condition and to help the 
identification of target populations for the delivery of preventative services such as 
immunisation or screening. The low rates of computerisation of general practice at 
the time of this report would have prevented the introduction of these initiatives.  
Many of the indicators and clinical practice guidelines that were proposed in the 
preliminary proposal were still in the developmental stages and had not been 
appropriately evaluated. Some were clearly difficult to attribute to a general practice 
based intervention, such as rates of hospitalisation. For instance, the many potential 
sources of error in hospital datasets, state differences in the types and quality of data 
collected meant that this was a complex indicator. The few indicators that were 
endorsed were those with clear relationships between the outcome and the indicator, 
such as rates of cervical screening and immunisation. Whilst the consultants endorsed 
the use of clinical practice guidelines as a method of achieving health outcomes, they 
acknowledged the difficulties with GP uptake and monitoring of the guidelines. 
In 1999, the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care released an 
implementation guide for the twenty-one divisions piloting the Outcomes based 
funding Approach (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care 1999). In 
comparison with the highly prescriptive outcomes and performance indicators of the 
1997 consultation phase, the implementation guide was broad, and allowed the 
Divisions a great deal of scope in the delivery of their care. 
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Neither this guide nor the plan templates attempt to provide direction on 
the actual content of plans, ie what activities divisions should be doing in 
their local areas (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care 
1999:3). 
The new requirements of the Divisions included; the development of a three-year 
strategic plan, which included the outcomes to be achieved in each program, a one 
year business plan, improvements in evidence based care and the provision of 
performance information that focussed on activities achieved by the divisions. The 
Department expected that outcomes based funding would, amongst other things, 
enable Divisions to “have a continuous cycle for monitoring outcomes and using this 
information to improve the quality of the divisions’ programs” (ibid. p6). 
The Divisions involved in the pilot of the Outcomes based funding approach have 
completed their reports on the first funding cycle, which ran from January 1998 until 
June 2000. An example of a report is that by the ACT Division of General Practice. It 
has a Strategic Plan that included six goals and seventeen objectives. None of these 
goals or objectives specifically include health outcomes. The Division reported 
against eight “outcomes based funding related programs”, including HIV/AIDS, 
mental health, after hours care, coordinated care and a youth health program. The 
only health outcome related performance indicator that was reported from the initial 
matrix was immunisation rates. Most of other projects were short-term programs 
which were funded for a specific period of time, some of which reported on health 
outcomes, but the majority reported other outcomes such as the establishment of or 
attendance at training. Ironically, the move to outcomes based funding reduced the 
operating revenue of the ACT Division of General Practice by approximately 50%. 
At the same time the research, evaluation and education officer was made redundant 
(the report does not make a causal link) when it appears that a large proportion of the 
outcomes based funding was dedicated to evaluation. 
The Outcomes based funding of the Divisions of General Practice aimed to ensure 
general practitioner, and divisional accountability through the use of a suite of health 
outcome measures and performance indicators. A number of the difficulties around 
the application of the approach were identified prior to the implementation of the 
outcomes based funding. However, the reality of the implementation reflected an 
extremely dilute version of the original proposal. The initial strategy involved a 
highly resource, and information intense investigation of the practice of individual 
doctors. The final outcome was a series of projects at divisional level that were 
targeted at improvements in GP infrastructure, such as training, and coordinating 
health service delivery at a systems, rather than a clinical level.  
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2.5.4 AHMAC National Working Party on Mental Health  
The National Mental Health Information Strategy Committee of the Australian Health 
Ministers Advisory Council National Working Group on Mental Health Policy 
commissioned a study of the development of consumer outcome measures that could 
be applied nationally (Andrews, Peters et al. 1994). The health outcome related 
objectives of the National Mental Health Policy were the;  
• regular reviews of outcomes of services provided to persons with serious mental 
health problems and mental disorders as a central component of mental health 
service delivery (objective 30), and  
• development of national outcome standards for mental health services, and 
systems for assessing whether services are meeting these standards (objective 
32). 
The outcomes project involved providers (psychiatrists and general practitioners) 
trialing a suite of health outcome measures to determine the feasibility of their 
application for specific mental disorders and a range of clinical practice settings. 
The result of the trial was that the researchers experienced difficulty with the 
processes of health outcomes data collection, rather than the actual instruments 
(Stedman, Yellowlees et al. 1997). For example, there were resource implications 
around the introduction of health outcome measures at the clinical level, such as time 
and reimbursement considerations for providers. The consumers did not believe that 
health outcomes data should be used to judge the quality of health service provision. 
Instead, they suggested that the evaluation of health service provision should be 
explicitly obtained. Consumers had difficulty completing the questionnaires if they 
were unwell. The researchers acknowledged that completion of the questionnaire 
might actually produce a negative impact on the consumer. Finally, the researchers 
reported difficulties attributing the change in health outcomes to the intervention.  
The recommendations arising from the report were that health outcomes assessment 
should form a routine part of health service delivery and that outcomes assessment 
should be a goal in itself. However, the attempt to introduce a national consumer 
outcome measure that could assess service standards should not be the primary focus 
at this stage. 
The researchers identified that the information collected at the “grass roots” level 
could not currently be translated into relevant information for higher level 
management and further investigation of this approach was required. 
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This project has demonstrated barriers around the collection of health outcomes data 
on a routine basis in a clinical setting. The issues included the resource requirements, 
attribution of the outcome to the intervention, the uses of the data outside of the 
clinical intervention and the potential impact of the administration of the instrument 
on the health outcomes of the patient. Outcome measures were proposed as a tool 
through which standards could be set but could not be applied in this way. 
2.5.5 Department of Veterans' Affairs: Community Nursing 
The Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA), in line with the changing emphasis from 
funding health service throughput to health service quality, undertook a large project 
to investigate health outcomes for community nursing (Emerson 1999). The project 
was prompted, in part, because of the large interstate variations in the costs and 
volume of services delivered. At the time of the introduction of the project, there 
were no other models on which DVA could base their service changes and under the 
previous approach to purchasing nursing services, there had been no systems of 
accountability for community nursing. 
The outcomes model developed by DVA involved a multifaceted approach which 
included provider accreditation, adherence to best practice clinical processes and the 
documentation of health outcomes by nurses. The nursing agencies had to be 
accredited according to standards defined by DVA, and DVA took on the role of 
monitoring the accreditation systems. All veteran files were required to include a 
completed care plan, and the veteran was expected be given a copy. Providers were 
required to measure and document the health outcomes for all veterans in the veteran 
file. 
DVA described a number of policy and technical barriers to the implementation of 
the health outcomes approach. They found that the notion of ‘purchasing health 
outcomes’ was incompatible with their current payment structure, and the 
expectations of providers who were used to time based payment. The new model 
attempted to focus on episodes of clinical care, rather than single occasions of 
service. DVA found that this was also incongruent with the provider expectations of a 
time-based payment. Community nurses had difficulty defining both the services that 
they delivered and the outcomes arising from these. The role of DVA changed from a 
purchasing function to a monitoring function, which was highly resource intensive. 
There were a number of technical issues around the introduction of the new model. 
DVA required far more information from providers than they had previously received 
on their billing vouchers. Few of their providers had the information technology 
infrastructure necessary to produce this information electronically, which meant that 
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DVA received 65% of minimum dataset input on paper. The quality of the data were 
poor, and up to one third of paper records required manual correction. Where data 
were provided electronically, they came in a variety of formats that were not 
necessarily compatible with the DVA information system. Providers were also found 
to lack the technological knowledge and skills necessary to comply with the 
minimum information requirements.  
At the clinical level, there were few validated, accessible community based clinical 
pathways that were appropriate for nursing interventions. This led DVA to invest in 
the development of clinical pathways for areas of high resource use. DVA invested 
resources in the development of clinical pathways for their most common, or most 
costly interventions, such as wound management, incontinence and aged care. A 
number of providers lacked the skills or commitment to undertake client care 
planning and incorporate clinical pathways into their routine care. 
The Department of Veterans' Affairs has developed a high standard for community 
nursing providers, based on accreditation systems which they monitor and enforce. 
The outcomes and accreditation system is expensive to implement, and there is still 
no published data about the variations in cost and service delivery between different 
state providers. DVA set out to monitor health outcomes, but have developed systems 
that monitor provider adherence to processes, not health outcomes.  
2.5.6 Commonwealth Numeracy and Literacy Program 
Attempts to use health outcomes as a method of resource allocation are not isolated to 
health. The Commonwealth Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs 
commissioned a report on the possibility of allocating resources for the 
Commonwealth Literacy and Numeracy Program on the basis of outcomes, rather 
than their historic basis for funding, socio-economic status.  
“Outcomes have been a key feature of reporting and accountability 
processes, and have been incorporated into programme evaluation, but 
they are not usually incorporated into resource allocation procedures” 
(Ainley 1999:15).  
The author concludes in the report that resources should be allocated on the basis of 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity, and that “a focus on outcomes would imply that 
the index used ought to have the highest correlation with the achievement in 
numeracy and literacy” (Ainley 1999). Instead, he proposes that outcomes data 
should be used as part of the internal monitoring and review processes of the 
individual schools. The limitations of outcomes based resource allocation are the 
difficulties comparing schools, identifying appropriate measures of numeracy and 
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literacy, variations in school structures and incorporating socio-economic status into 
these measures (Ainley 1999). 
2.6 Summary   
Despite using different approaches, each of these projects has demonstrated some 
deviation from the ideal of the measurement and aggregation of outcomes data for the 
purpose of reporting on the effectiveness of different levels of the health (and 
education) system. However, a number of common themes have emerged across the 
projects. These can be clustered broadly under three headings. The first is the lack of 
a clear description of the accountability structures under which the health outcomes 
approach was applied. The second issue is the lack of appropriate technology to apply 
or extract the health outcomes data. Finally, each project had problems identifying 
appropriate outcome measures or indicators that could be used.  
The locus, domains and procedures of accountability were not made explicit in any of 
these examples. Thus, in the outcomes based funding of the Divisions of General 
Practice, it was unclear whether the Divisions or the GPs were responsible for the 
improved outcomes, and whose outcomes they were trying to improve. The 
responsibility for meeting the National Health Goals and Targets is not clear. 
Similarly, there are questions as to whether the Department of Veterans' Affairs 
should take on the role of monitoring the organisations whose services they are 
purchasing. The questions of who is accountable for what, and to whom need to be 
addressed before the blanket answer of ‘health outcomes’ can be applied within a 
health service management setting. 
Table 2.3 summarises the key points arising from the examples that both influence 
and result from the organisation’s application of health outcomes.  
 
Table 2.3 Summary of the barriers experienced by organisations in their attempts to introduce the health outcomes approach  
Organisation 
National goals and targets NSW health outcomes 
initiative 
DGP AHMAC mental health DVA community nursing Education 
Purpose 
National goal setting State based goals setting 
for hospital services 
Determine effectiveness of 
divisions 
Determine whether 
services are meeting 
standards. 
Linking costs to outcomes 
for nursing services 
Aim to use outcomes as 
basis of distributing 
funding resources 
      
Only used indicators where 
substantial data already 
available 
Lack of baseline data to 
use to set goals 
Difficulty attributing the 
outcome to the 
intervention issues 
Resource implications for 
data collection 
Use of clinical pathways to 
define the processes of 
care 
Difficulty identifying 
outcome measures 
Difficulty monitoring 
outcomes 
Focus on producing data 
instead of setting targets 
Barriers to data collection 
– lack of IT infrastructure 
Outcomes as a goal in 
themselves 
Lack of measures Unable to attribute 
outcomes  
Lack of useful outcome 
measures 
Results were better data 
and quality systems 
Focus on measurable and 
easily definable 
Use of instrument might 
impact on the patient 
Lack of IT infrastructure Problems linking funding 
to outcomes 
Lack of available data  Indicators used as proxies 
for outcomes 
Difficulty attributing 
outcome to intervention 
Poor quality data  
Accountability 
relationships not 
articulated 
 Difficulty identifying 
appropriate indicators 
Realisation that outcomes 
should not be used to set 
service standards 
Role of the purchaser 
changed – became 
monitoring body 
 
Difficulty to relate 
outcomes to impact on 
health service 
 Difficulties with GP 
uptake and monitoring of 
guidelines 
Can’t translate outcomes 
information into 
management information 
Time based payment, 
difficult to transfer to 
outcomes based payment 
 
  Accountabilities not clear Unwell service users have 
difficulty completing 
outcome measures 
Expensive to implement 
system – no way of linking 
variations in outcomes to 
funding 
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The examples highlight a number of technical and practical barriers to the use of 
health outcomes, or outcome related performance indicator data. The enthusiasm 
for the collection of health outcomes data appears to have preceded the information 
systems and technical skills necessary to facilitate the routine collection of 
outcome or process related information. The National Health Goals and Targets, 
NSW Health Outcomes Initiative, Divisions of General Practice, AHMAC 
National Working Party on Mental Health and DVA projects all specifically 
identified a lack of information technology infrastructure as a barrier to 
implementing the health outcomes approach. The additional time, and therefore 
cost of collecting outcomes data is acknowledged in a number of cases. The quality 
of the data that is provided is also questioned in a number of these examples.  
Finally, there are issues around the measurement of health outcomes. There is a 
perception that there are a large number of clinical practice guidelines and related 
performance indicators. However, the reality of implementing, monitoring and then 
making sense of these data substantially reduces the number of indicators with real-
life practical applications in the clinical setting. At a population level, the Health 
for All Australians found deficiencies in data sources to facilitate the accurate 
measurement of population changes in health outcomes and difficulties attributing 
these changes to the delivery of health services. Even at the service level, the 
services identified difficulties with the attribution of the health outcomes approach. 
The early attempt by Health for All Australians to incorporate health outcomes 
focused on those outcomes that already had well-established statistics. Later 
approaches tended to measure what could be easily measured such as service 
throughput, rather than their impact on the outcomes of care.  
Should resource allocation be tied to outcome measures? As the education example 
illustrates, it is those schools that have the smallest improvement in numeracy and 
literacy that will actually require the greatest injection of funding. To reward health 
services for greatest improvements in outcomes is counter-intuitive. Changes in 
health status can sometimes be attributed to an intervention, however all of these 
projects acknowledged the difficulties making this link. Linking funding to 
outcomes was identified by DVA as a problem both due to difficulties defining the 
interventions and an historical basis of time based payment, rather than outcomes 
based reimbursement. Rewarding health services for the provision of good health 
outcomes will shift funding from areas of high need to areas of low need.  
The focus on health outcomes has, in most cases, changed the emphasis of health 
care delivery. Health service funding is more likely to be based on nationally and 
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locally determined health priority areas, not solely through service driven demand. 
The drive for outcomes has led purchasers and funders to investigate models of 
best practice care which have largely become a substitute for health outcomes 
measurement when the outcomes cannot be measured. Few authors have 
recommended that health outcomes should not be measured, however most have 
acknowledged the difficulties linking funding to any form of outcome 
measurement. 
The health outcomes approach has obvious appeal at all levels of health funding, 
policy development and delivery. However, the reality of implementing the ideals 
of the health outcomes model is somewhat removed from the expectations of those 
who have attempted to apply it. To date, there has been no systematic analysis of 
the application of health outcomes to health service accountability. As a result, the 
expectation that health outcomes can and will form a basis for health service 
accountability has continued to grow. The remainder of this thesis explores, in 
depth the experiences of two organisations that attempted to use health outcomes 
within a purchaser/funder – provider relationship by exploring their applications of 
the outcomes approach and the accountability relationships within which they were 
applied.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the complex array of variables that form the 
apparently scientific application of the health outcomes approach to health service 
accountability.  
The services to which the outcomes approach is being applied, in this case, 
community and allied health services, represent a potentially infinite arrangement 
of different workers who can provide care from a range of settings to an equally 
diverse group of service users. Contextual and organisational differences in the 
structure of health service delivery means that the providers that form this group 
can range from ‘traditional’ allied health services, such as physiotherapy and 
podiatry to specialised services such as aboriginal health workers. The uniting 
factor for these types of services is often their relatively small size, forcing them 
together under collective management structures or for the mutual benefit of 
collective lobbying power (The Coalition of Health Professionals 2001). 
The modern approaches to accountability attempt to simplify the complex 
interactions of patient care to a small number of simple indicators. However, 
attempts to identify meaningful indicators that accurately reflect the processes or 
outcomes of care have proven challenging across the whole spectrum of health 
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service delivery from primary to acute care. Additionally, the value of the 
indicators is driven by the social values that underpin the delivery of health care. 
As societies’ values change, so must the indicators to reflect the benefits of care to 
the recipients or stakeholders. Thus, the search for a ‘perfect’ indicator is likely to 
be an elusive holy grail.  
A number of organizations have attempted to introduce the health outcomes 
approach, ranging from a national and state perspective to drive resource 
allocation, to a measure of health service effectiveness. However, all of these 
organizations have had to compromise in their approaches. Where health outcomes 
are used, they tend to focus on the crudest outcomes, such as mortality and 
morbidity. All projects acknowledged the difficulties attributing outcomes to the 
intervention. This approach is likely to be confounded when the services cannot be 
clearly defined, as is often the case in the community and allied health setting.  
The lack of a critical review of the application of health outcomes continues to 
propagate the perception that health outcomes are an appropriate tool for health 
service accountability. The result is that managers and purchasers continue to 
expend resources to attempt to apply health outcomes but have difficulty doing so 
in a way that is meaningful or valuable as the previous examples and the following 
case studies illustrate. The in-depth examination of the two organizations with 
which I was involved provided an opportunity to obtain insights to inform the 
theory of the health outcomes approach and provide an understanding of the 
application of outcomes in health service accountability structures. The remainder 
of this thesis systematically investigates the attempts by two organisations, ACT 
Community Care and the Department of Veterans' Affairs to implement health 
outcomes as a management tool to provide some understanding of the barriers to 
the application of the outcomes approach to health service accountability.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two highlighted the complexity of community and allied health services, 
the dynamic and culturally dependent nature of the new accountability systems and 
the perceived role of health outcomes in these new accountability structures. 
Chapter two also provided examples of a number of organizations that attempted to 
adopt the health outcomes approach to health service accountability, but were 
unable to do so. The examples illustrate a number of barriers to the application of 
the outcomes approach, but do not provide the reasons why the outcomes approach 
was unsuccessful. Despite the lack of success by these organisations, the outcomes 
rhetoric continues to infiltrate accountability culture. The use of outcome measures 
continues to be widely promoted, with significant resource implications, however 
the benefits of their use as an accountability tool remain unclear. Importantly, there 
has been no in-depth analysis of why health outcomes, which have such intuitive 
appeal to purchasers, managers and even clinicians, cannot be used to allocate 
resources or, necessarily, even to demonstrate health service effectiveness outside a 
controlled environment.  
I was involved with two community and allied health organizations that attempted 
to use health outcomes in purchasing contracts. These organisations also 
experienced difficulties implementing the approach. It was not until some way 
through my involvement in each organization that it became apparent that they 
would not be able to use health outcomes as they had intended. Because of the 
level of my involvement with both organizations, they presented a unique 
opportunity to explore, in depth, the barriers to the application of the outcomes 
approach to health service accountability and contribute to the limited, existing 
body of research in this field.  
The two organizations are ACT Community Care and the Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs. A full description of each organization is presented in the Chapters Four 
and Five respectively. Each organization is unique in its structure and its approach 
to the use of health outcomes, thus there is intrinsic value in the examination and 
description of each as a stand-alone case study (Stake 2000). However the ability to 
juxtapose the issues arising from both organizations in the context of the existing 
literature presents a further opportunity to develop theory that may have relevance 
to other managers, purchasers and providers contemplating the development of 
their accountability structures.  
The research required a methodology that would fulfil the following criteria;  
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• Theory generating, to obtain an understanding of why the outcomes approach 
did not work; and 
• Naturalistic, so it could draw from the actual settings, context and available 
data. 
A qualitative research approach was required to address these criteria. Where 
quantitative research emphasises measurement and the statistical relationship 
between variables and aims to be ‘value-free’, qualitative research explores the 
“qualities of entities and processes and meanings that are not experimentally 
examined or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency” 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Qualitative research aims to examine social 
experiences within their situational constraints whilst acknowledging the 
relationship between the researcher and what is being studied. It is the ability of 
qualitative research to explore the context and setting of events, in depth, that 
enables an examination of the reasons why the organizations were unable to apply 
the health outcomes approach within their organisational context. Quantitative 
research would not have supported the exploratory nature of the research question 
or provided the depth of understanding required to examine the barriers to the 
application of the outcomes approach. 
Each organization is presented and examined as a case study of the implementation 
of the health outcomes approach. Case studies enables the researcher to focus on 
the whole case, not just specific variables, to emphasise an understanding of the 
case within its wider context (de Vaus 2001). Stake argues that case study is not a 
method but a choice of what is to be studied. A case study is a “process of inquiry 
about the case and a product of that inquiry” (Stake 2000). The term ‘case study’ 
highlights the importance of the learning that can be derived from a particular case, 
but says little about the methods used to analyse it.  
The defining features of a case are (Merriam 1998; Stake 2000); 
• It is a bounded system such as an organization, institution, team or social 
group . 
• The case itself has working parts  
• The case is an integrated system 
• The case will have a particular pattern of behaviour 
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• They need to be seen and described in the context of a wider system, or other 
cases. 
Case study research is widely used in, and has made a valuable contribution to 
management, public administration and health services research (Yin 1994). They 
typically use interview, observation, archival or other data to describe a situation or 
events that lead to a decision or outcome (Yeager 1998), however any methods of 
data collection can be used (Merriam 1998). Consequently, they have the 
advantage that they allow the researcher to reflect on the context and time frame in 
which activities take place, using multiple sources of data (Yin 1989). Case study 
analysis is designed to achieve a logical flow of how events unfold and how they 
are linked to one another. It does not aim to produce findings that are universally 
accepted. Rather, it focuses on depth of understanding of a situation or issue (Yin 
1983). Case studies allow ‘the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events’ such as organisational and managerial processes to be explored by the 
investigator (Yin 1994).  
Case studies are often used for theory generating, however there has been a lack of 
clarity about how to use case studies in this way (Eisenhardt 2002). Eisenhardt has 
developed a ‘road map’ that integrates the principles of grounded theory with case 
study methodology for the purpose of theory building. Grounded theory uses an 
iterative approach to explore a problem or question to develop emerging theories 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). Data (interviews, archival information, focus group 
data) are collected and examined, the problem is further analysed, until a theory is 
developed. Both tools have been used in management and health service research 
(Parker and Roffey 1996). I have drawn on this approach in examining the two 
case studies. 
The following table summarises the process of investigation of case studies for 
theory building, and the adaptation of the approach for this thesis (Adapted from 
Eisenhardt 2002). 
 76
Table 3.1 Eisenhardt’s case study road map as it is applied in this thesis 
(Eisenhardt 2002) 
Step Activity Purpose  Approach  
Define the 
research 
problem 
Define question 
A priori constructs 
Neither theory nor 
hypotheses 
Focus research  
Provide grounding of 
construct measures 
Retain theoretical 
flexibility 
Barriers to the application 
of the health outcomes 
approach. 
Conditions that need to be 
met in order to use health 
outcomes. 
Select cases Specified population 
Theoretical, not random 
sampling 
Constrain extraneous 
variation and sharpen 
external validity 
Focus efforts on 
theoretically useful cases 
“Revelatory” cases were 
selected because they 
allowed an in-depth 
understanding of the 
research problem 
Collect data; 
develop 
instruments 
and protocols 
Multiple data collection 
methods 
Combine qualitative and 
quantitative data 
Ideally, multiple 
investigators 
Strengthen grounding of 
theory by triangulation of 
evidence  
Foster divergent 
perspectives  
Speeds analyses and 
reveals helpful 
adjustments to data 
collection 
Multiple data collection 
methods used across both 
case study sites. 
Analysis of 
data 
Within-case analysis 
Cross case pattern search 
using divergent 
techniques 
Gain familiarity with data 
and preliminary theory 
generation 
To forces investigator to 
look beyond initial 
impressions and see 
evidence through multiple 
lenses 
Within case analysis – 
presented as an analysis 
at the end of each chapter 
Cross case analysis – 
presented in chapter 6. 
Shaping 
propositions 
Iterative development of 
evidence for each 
construct 
Replication, not sampling, 
logic across cases 
Search for evidence for 
‘why’ behind cases 
Comparison with similar 
and conflicting literature 
Sharpen construct 
definition, validity and 
measurability 
Confirms, extends and 
sharpens theory 
Builds internal validity, 
raises theoretical level 
and sharpens construct 
definitions 
Sharpens generalisability 
and raises theoretical 
level 
Propositions arising from 
the cross- case analysis of 
the two case studies  
Verified against existing 
literature described in 
Chapter 2. 
3.1.1 Define the research problem 
The research problem was stimulated by the inability of two organizations to 
include measures of health outcome in purchasing contracts with individual 
providers or with the providing organization. My involvement with each 
organization was slightly different. In ACT Community Care, I was employed to 
identify health outcomes that could be incorporated into purchasing contracts. 
Within the Department of Veterans' Affairs, I was employed to evaluate an 
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approach to health outcomes measurement that was developed by researchers from 
another university. Both organizations were attempting to use health outcomes as a 
way to ensure health service provider accountability. The health outcomes 
approach being adopted by both organizations, whilst challenging, was in line with 
what current political and health care systems demanded. It was not until some way 
into both pieces of work that the barriers, and a number of similarities to the 
application of the outcomes approach became apparent.  
Because the question arose during the course of my involvement with the two 
organizations, I did not collect data with a particular theoretical orientation in 
mind. Whilst prior specification of a theory or approach may have facilitated more 
directed data collection techniques, Eisenhardt (2002) highlights the tentative 
nature of a priori constructs in theory building research.   
I have examined the organizations from two perspectives. The first is to examine 
the accountability relationships within each organization; what the stakeholders 
were being held accountable for, and where health outcomes fit within the 
accountability relationships. The second approach was to unpack the factors around 
the application of health outcomes that limits their application for the purpose of 
ensuring contractual accountability. It may have been possible to use an alternative 
theoretical framework to examine the barriers to the applications of health 
outcomes. However, as health outcomes have evolved through the growth of 
accountability systems arising from neo-liberal governmentality, and this is the 
environment in which they are being applied and failing, this was the most 
appropriate context in which to examine them.  
Thus, the two broad questions that shaped the analysis are; 
1. What are the barriers to the application of the health outcomes approach to   
health service accountability for community and allied health services? 
2. What conditions must be met before health outcomes can be used as an 
accountability tool in purchasing contracts for allied health? 
3.1.2 Selecting cases 
Case studies are used for theoretical rather than statistical generalization, therefore 
cases do not necessarily need to be selected on the basis that they are typical of a 
wider population (de Vaus 2001). Nor do cases need to be ‘typical’ of a wider 
population (de Vaus 2001). Indeed in the instance of community and allied health 
services, a typical case study site would be difficult to find given the diversity of 
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models and approaches to care. Sampling should ensure the selection of 
illuminating examples of a case. Glaser and Strauss use the term ‘theoretical 
sampling’ whilst Hakim uses the term ‘focused sampling’ to refer to the process of 
selecting cases on this basis (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Hakim 2000). 
Few standard methodologies are equipped to examine the reasons why an 
organisational intervention did not work. Unless an evaluation of the approach was 
undertaken as part of its introduction, such research will be retrospective and can 
involve a complex range of interactions that many of the actors may be unaware of 
or may not recollect after the event. It may be possible to identify other case study 
sites to explore the same issues prospectively, however, there are resource and 
ethical considerations of proceeding with a prospective study of an approach that 
has been shown to be flawed elsewhere, without intervening. Few organizations set 
out to introduce an approach that they believe will fail. The examination of other 
organizations that were unable to introduce the outcomes approach as they 
intended, presented in chapter two, reinforces the nature of the problems and may 
highlight idiosyncrasies that are unique to specific sites, but does not present the 
solutions. Identifying an appropriate theoretical framework to examine such an 
intervention retrospectively can also be challenging.  
Despite these difficulties, it makes practical sense to derive as much learning from 
the failed approaches to inform further service development and provide a 
theoretical framework for analysis. As a result, this research aims to draw the 
learning from the two organisations with which I was involved, as well from as the 
published examples in the literature, to identify lessons which may be relevant for 
other services that attempt to introduce new accountability structures that include 
health outcomes. Yin (1989) has labelled this type of approach a ‘revelatory case’, 
where the investigator has the opportunity to explore problems or issues that have 
previously been inaccessible to researchers. Other research, most notably that by 
Flynn et al in the UK community health service, have identified a number of 
barriers to the application of health outcomes in health service accountability in the 
community health sector. However, my involvement with ACT Community Care 
and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, presented the opportunity to explore the 
application of the outcomes approach in situ, drawing on my own experiences 
within each organisation, providing an in-depth understanding of the organisational 
culture and to examine the application of the health outcomes approach in a way 
that has not previously been described in Australian literature.  
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The study of each organization highlights their individual difficulties with the 
application of the outcomes approach. The contrast between the two organizations 
provides the analytical advantage of comparison. Some of the differences include; 
the purchaser versus provider perspective in implementing the outcomes approach; 
the geographic dispersion of private providers as opposed to the co-location of 
providers under a single management structure; the direct contracting of services 
from individual providers in contrast to the providers being employed on a salaried 
basis and; a comparison of the ‘community health service’ model of health service 
delivery with a veteran, or individual focus on health service receipt.  
There are some similarities between the two organizations. Both attempted to 
utilise health outcomes in community and allied health service accountability. Both 
were under-prepared for the application of the approach in terms of data collection, 
audit procedures, and the use of supporting management and information 
technology infrastructure.  
The different organisational structures are described at the start of each case study 
and the way that they impact on the outcomes approach is described within each 
case study and compared in the cross-case comparison within the analysis.  
My involvement within each of the organizations gave me the ability to engage in 
the organisational culture, observe, participate and access information relevant to 
the research questions, giving me a unique, and in-depth perspective of the barriers 
to the application of the health outcomes approach that I could not have had as an 
outside observer.  
As stated previously, it would have been difficult to identify other organizations in 
which to ask the same research questions prospectively. The literature review 
includes the summaries of six other attempts to introduce health outcomes, which 
provides a valuable basis for comparison, theory building and verification of the 
findings.  
3.1.3 Data collection, developing instruments and protocols 
The development of ‘instruments and protocols’ refers to the approaches to 
accessing data within the case study organizations. Case study research is 
sometimes cited as a prime example of qualitative research. Yin disputes this claim 
on the basis that the qualitative / quantitative distinction is irrelevant and that case 
studies can embrace any form of data collection (Yin 1983). Marsh reinforces the 
limitations of relying on a single type of data, whether it be qualitative or 
quantitative, to explain social action (Marsh 1982). Rather, she argues that social 
research should involve ‘collecting a sufficiently complete picture of the context in 
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which the actor finds herself that a team of outsiders may read off the meaningful 
dimensions’ (Marsh, 1982:123-4). Eisenhardt promotes the combining of 
qualitative and quantitative evidence within case studies to facilitate the 
triangulation of multiple data sources (Eisenhardt 2002). 
Each case study incorporates a wide range of evidence sources, including survey 
results, observation, file audit and archival information such as reports. The case 
studies are drawn from the final reports presented to ACT Community Care and the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs which have been endorsed by the relevant 
committees in both cases (ACT Quality and Safety Forum, 2001; Department of 
Veterans' Affairs Health Outcomes Steering Committee, 2001). 
Eisenhardt recommends the use of multiple investigators to both enhance the 
creative potential of the study and increase the convergence of observations which 
will increase confidence in the findings. The retrospective nature of this analysis 
means that it was not possible to recruit other researchers during the data collection 
phase. 
Theory building research often builds in concurrent data collection and analysis to 
promote flexibility in the approaches to data collection. Theory building research 
often uncovers new areas that need further investigation to support development of 
the theory. Case study research allows the introduction of additional data sources 
and new methodologies can be introduced to provide the depth required to 
investigate the research question (Harris and Sutton 1986). 
A limitation of my study is the retrospective nature of the research, which 
precluded analysis during the data collection phase of the research and limited my 
ability to access new sources of information that may have supported the 
development of the theory. Instead, my involvement in both case study sites 
allowed me to access a diverse range of information which has been incorporated 
as required to address the research question. This “controlled opportunism” is 
supported by Eisenhardt as a way of taking advantage of the uniqueness of the case 
whilst examining emerging themes to support the development of the theory 
(Eisenhardt 2002). 
3.1.4 Analysing the data 
Case study research has been criticised on the basis that the analytical techniques 
are often not presented in a way that leads the audience to understand how the 
conclusions are derived from the data because few authors clearly describe the 
analytical techniques they employed (Miles and Huberman 1994). The methods of 
analysing qualitative case study data are not as well developed as methods used for 
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other types of analysis and rely largely on the recognition of patterns within each 
case to test theories or propositions (Yin 1989; de Vaus 2001).  
Within theory building case studies, analytic induction is required. Denzin 
describes analytic induction as “a strategy of analysis that directs the investigator to 
formulate generalisations that apply to all instances of the problem" (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1994). Case studies produce an enormous volume of data, which can make 
systematic analysis cumbersome. Within-case analysis and then subsequent 
searching for cross-case patterns are valuable approaches to managing large 
volumes of data in a systematic way (Eisenhardt 2002). 
Within-case analysis involves a detailed description of each case study to enable 
the researcher to obtain in-depth familiarity with each case and to examine the 
insights emerging from each site. A number of different approaches have been 
employed for within-case analysis, the presentation of which is often driven by the 
types of data that have been collected within the case study sites. For instance, 
graphical or survey data can be presented with a narrative description of the site. 
Other authors have organised data into tables (Leonard-Barton 1988). There is no 
‘correct’ way of undertaking within-case analysis.  
Cases need to be presented in a way that enables the reader to follow the events 
that unfolded within the setting to derive the learning specific to that study (Stake 
2000). They also need to be framed in a context that recognises the understanding 
or experience of the audience for the research (Stake 2000). 
For the purpose of this study, each case is presented as a stand-alone chapter that 
describes the organisational structure; the reasons behind the adoption of the 
outcomes approach; the actual approach that was adopted; and the results of that 
approach.  
Case study research emphasises the uniqueness of each case and the learning that 
can be derived from individual case study sites (Stake 2000). To emphasise the 
learning derived from each case study site, each organization has been presented as 
a narrative summary of the pertinent issues around the introduction of the health 
outcomes approach in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The within-case analyses 
conclude the corresponding chapters by exploring the barriers to the 
implementation of the outcomes systems. The supporting data, such as reports, for 
each case study is presented in the Appendices. Because of the contrasting settings 
and approaches, each case study emphasises different aspects of the application of 
the health outcomes approach. The within-case analyses examine the issues that are 
specific to each organization.  
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In order to examine the issues that are common to both organizations, and the 
learning from their approaches generally, cross-case analysis is undertaken in 
Chapter Six. Cross-case analysis utilises a systematic framework to search for 
patterns that emerge from the data (Eisenhardt 2002). The purpose of cross-case 
analysis is to prevent the researcher from drawing false conclusions that are based 
on limited data, or on responses that are more noticeable or from more influential 
respondents. Again, there are a number of approaches, but no correct way, to 
examine the cases.  
Eisenhardt suggests three strategies for cross-case analysis. The first is to identify 
categories and then examine each case study for within-group similarities and 
inter-group differences. The categories can be determined by the literature or may 
arise from the research question. A matrix can be used to organise and compare the 
themes arising from the cases according to each category.  
The second method uses forced comparisons of cases by searching for similarities 
and differences within each case study. This can be undertaken by comparing pairs 
of case studies, or may use groups of case studies with three or four cases in each 
cluster. 
The third approach is based on the examination of data by data source. Data are 
separated according to the method by which it was obtained, for instance 
observations, interviews, surveys and archival sources are analysed separately.  
To achieve within-case and cross-case comparison for the purpose of identifying 
the emergent themes within the two case studies, I have tabulated the key themes 
emerging from each case study. The cross case analysis examines the findings from 
the two case studies under the headings of ‘accountability’ and ‘outcomes’  
Two levels of analysis were required in this research. The first was an 
understanding of ‘what’ is happening within each case study, which relies on the 
documentation of the barriers to the application of the health outcomes approach 
within each organization. The second level of analysis is an interpretation of ‘why’ 
these barriers were occurring, which relies on the theoretical data available in the 
literature review and my own theory building. 
3.1.5 Shaping propositions 
The review of the literature and within and cross-case analyses leads to the 
emergence of a number of themes. Hypothesis development is an iterative process 
that examines the ‘fit’ of the emergent themes to the case study data. Unlike 
quantitative techniques which allow statistical verification of the relationship 
between variables, qualitative hypothesis development involves developing 
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constructs and verifying relationships (Eisenhardt 2002). Empirically valid theory 
depends on a close fit between the theory or hypotheses and the available data.  
This research has relied on two approaches to the development of propositions. In 
the first instance, I have used a simple juxtaposition of the cross-case and within-
case analysis to identify the key barriers to the introduction of the health outcomes 
approach. This addresses the ‘what’ question, but does not address the issue as to 
why health outcomes do not work. This summary is presented in chapter six in the 
form of a matrix which separates the ‘accountability’ issues from the ‘health 
outcomes’ issues to highlight the themes that have emerged within each site. To 
increase the validity of these findings, I have incorporated the barriers identified in 
the six examples presented in chapter two. However, as stated previously, these 
findings reinforce the extent of the barriers to the approach and provide some 
suggestion as to the reasons that these barriers have arisen, but they do not suggest 
a solution. Therefore I have drawn on the detail available from the two case studies 
to explore the two major themes, ‘accountability’ and ‘health outcomes’ in depth to 
obtain greater understanding of the barriers and to identify a solution to the health 
outcomes problem. The in-depth analysis draws from the review of the literature to 
help contextualise, explain and develop the relationships, to begin to address the 
‘why’ issues.   
The outputs of the research are both an in-depth examination and understanding of 
the types of barriers that similar types of organizations are likely to face when they 
attempt to introduce the health outcomes approach and a break-down of the 
accountability structures within organizations that can be used to identify more 
appropriate accountability mechanisms.  
3.1.6 Validity of the results. 
The concept of validity in qualitative research has been the subject of a great deal 
of debate. Whilst some argue that validity is a useful concept in qualitative research 
(Kvale 1989; Maxwell 2002) others view it as a “positivist” notion that is applied 
inappropriately in qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln 1989; Wolcott 1990). 
Much of this criticism arises from the positivist assumptions that underpin the 
dominant models of validity, such as the concepts of predictive validity, 
convergent validity, concurrent validity and internal / external validity (Yin 1989; 
Stake 2000). However, there have been few alternative models that can be adopted 
by qualitative researchers.  
As one purpose of this research was to explore a commonly occurring phenomenon 
(the organisational difficulties implementing the health outcomes approach) so that 
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other organizations could learn from these examples, the results must be presented 
in a way that has value in other settings. However, few organizations would wish to 
replicate this research for the reasons described earlier, nor will any setting be 
identical to the services described. Thus the value of the studies will depend, in 
part, on the interpretation of the information by the reader and the relevance of the 
findings to their own setting (Stake 2000). Therefore, the cases need to be 
presented in sufficient detail that the reader has the ability to understand the 
similarities and the differences between the services described and the setting in 
which the results may be applied. It is important in this research that the findings 
have relevance to a wider audience, and validity so that the relevant audience will 
place some store in the results. 
The question of relevance has been addressed by the data presented in the literature 
review, including the six examples of other organizations that attempted to 
introduce the health outcomes approach. The new systems of accountability are 
being utilised internationally, by a range of stakeholders for different purposes, and 
are not isolated to the health care setting. The results are potentially relevant to any 
organization attempting to use outcomes as a tool for accountability. However, 
their ability to use and apply the results is likely to come from their credibility, 
which can be addressed by overcoming the issues of validity.  
Where positivist research attempts to identify the underlying “truth” about a 
situation, much qualitative research is about interpretations and accounts of events 
(Maxwell 2002). This means that there is no absolute truth or reality to which the 
accounts observed can be compared in order to validate them. However, within 
qualitative research, there are ways of assessing the accounts that are not dependent 
on the account itself, but relate to things that the account is about. There are a 
number of categories of validity that are relevant to qualitative researchers; 
descriptive validity, interpretive validity, theoretical validity and generalisability 
(Maxwell 2002). Whilst these categories are not mutually exclusive, and are 
themselves open to interpretation, they do provide a framework in which the 
validity of the research can be considered.  
Descriptive validity  
Descriptive validity refers to the accuracy of the reporting of accounts or events 
involved in the research. At this level, the researcher is concerned with the 
accuracy of the reporting of the actions, rather than interpreting these events. 
Where possible, accounts will be verifiable with access to the appropriate data. For 
instance, a tape recording of an interview can provide evidence for a particular 
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quote. Where questions of definition arise, Maxwell argues that this changes the 
type of validity from descriptive to theoretical validity (Maxwell 2002).  
Descriptive validity is upheld in this study through the endorsement of the final 
reports presented to the relevant committees at both ACT Community Care and the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs (ACT Quality and Safety Forum, 2001; 
Department of Veterans' Affairs Health Outcomes Steering Committee, 2001). 
Interpretive validity 
Interpretive validity is an important component of qualitative research because it is 
concerned with what events, behaviours or actions mean to the people who engage 
with them. Interpretive validity must be constructed in the terms of the people to 
whom it has meaning, by for instance, using the language of those people. 
However there is no way of externally verifying that the interpretation is ‘true’.  
I have attempted to ensure interpretive validity by presenting the views of a range 
of stakeholders within the two case studies, including purchasers, managers, 
providers and service users. Both case studies draw on diverse data sources 
including survey results, observation, file audit and archival information to 
facilitate triangulation. The investigation of two case studies, rather than single 
case study design strengthens the analytical component of the research. 
Theoretical validity 
Theoretical validity goes beyond describing events or situations, and adds the 
dimension of explanation and interpretation, or theory development, to the cases. 
This includes the concepts or categories used to describe the components of the 
cases as well as the relationships that are perceived to exist between these 
components (Maxwell 2002). Theoretical validity considers the validity of the 
concepts employed and the validity of the way that the relationships are described 
or interpreted. These concepts have also been called “construct validity” and 
“internal or causal validity” (Yin 1994).  
Different approaches have been suggested to ensure theoretical validity. Maxwell 
suggests that theoretical validity can be addressed by relying on the consensus of 
the descriptions or interpretations amongst the community concerned with the 
research. Yin (1994) supports this approach for construct validity by proposing that 
key informants review the draft case study. Yin also proposes the use of multiple 
sources of evidence, or a chain of evidence to lead to the suggested findings. 
Internal validity can be addressed through different types of analytic approaches, 
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such as ‘pattern-matching’, ‘convergent evidence’ and consideration of rival 
explanations. 
Within this thesis, I have used the concepts of accountability and health outcomes 
as the units of description, and then examined the relationships that exist within 
and across these components within the two case studies. Reports arising from each 
case study were presented to the key stakeholders in both organizations for 
verification. Internal validity is less easily addressed in the context of this research. 
I have used the supporting literature with examples from other organizations to 
look at convergent evidence. 
Generalisablity  
One of the most common criticisms of case study methodology is the difficulty 
generalising the results to other settings (Punch 1994; Yin 1994). Quantitative 
research uses large samples and probabilistic generalisability, however qualitative 
research rarely has these tools available (Schofield 2002). Qualitative researchers 
are divided about the need for generalisability of case study research. Stake argues 
that in case study research “the search for particularity competes with the search 
for generalisability” (p439), in that the unique components intrinsic in each case 
are in themselves worthy of study (Stake 2000). Indeed, some qualitative 
researchers reject the goal of generalisability, believing that every topic has its own 
“logic, sense of order, structure and meaning” (Denzin 1983). Cronbach argues that 
attempts to produce laws that are universally applicable is not a useful goal for any 
type of research (Schofield 2002). 
The classic interpretation of generalisability is the extent to which an effect or 
outcome can be applied to a range of “populations, settings, treatment variables, 
and measurement variables” (Campbell and Stanley 1963 in (Schofield 2002). 
Within this is the notion of replicability, which considers whether the results of the 
research would be reproducible in the targets to which one wants to generalise 
(Schofield 2002). Case studies generally involve unique and non-recurring 
phenomena, hence they cannot be verified through replication (Yeager 1998). 
Replication of this research is not necessary to validate the findings. This thesis 
generates theory around the application of health outcomes to health service 
accountability which can be tested in other settings without those organisations 
necessarily having to apply the same research approach, nor draw the same 
conclusions.  
Becker in (Maxwell 2002) suggests that “generalisation in qualitative research 
usually takes place through the development of a theory that not only makes sense 
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of the particular persons or situations studies, but also shows how the same 
process, in different situations, can lead to different results p240”. Thus 
generalisability in this case is an assumption that theory will be useful to make 
sense of similar events, “rather than on an explicit sampling process and the 
drawing of conclusions about a specified person through statistical inference”.  
The dual approach taken within the analysis supports the theoretical 
generalisability of the results. The comparison of the two case study sites with the 
six published examples highlights barriers that are likely to emerge across a range 
of different settings in which the health outcomes approach is employed. Similarly, 
the learning from the two case study sites is likely to be of relevance to other 
organizations attempting to implement the approach.  
The factors that may limit the ability to apply these results in other settings include 
variations in the management and funding structures of particular organisations, the 
types of staff employed, the information systems used by other organizations and 
possibly, the type of population served.  
3.1.7 Limitations of the methodology 
Case study methodology has been criticised from a number of perspectives. 
However many critics attempt to apply the parameters of quantitative research to 
qualitative studies, including the limited ability to generalise from the results, the 
use of qualitative data, the inability to replicate a case study and the potential for 
researcher bias.  
Researcher subjectivity has the potential to introduce bias . Both the strengths and 
weaknesses of this research arise from my roles as both a researcher and participant 
observer. Case study methodology employs the researcher as a tool, hence is a 
description of the researcher’s interpretation of events. The very act of undertaking 
case study analysis can influence the results of a subject under study. However, 
researcher reflexivity is acknowledged as a valuable component of qualitative 
research as encapsulated by Stake 
“Qualitative case study is characterised by researchers spending extended 
time, on site, personally in contact with activities and operations of the 
case, reflecting, revising meanings of what is going on” (Stake 2000).  
Where possible, I have aimed to reduce the introduction of my own bias by 
verifying reports with key personnel within each organisation. The limitation of 
this approach has potentially been my inability to distance myself from the subjects 
of the research. I have also been aware of the risks of reporting information that 
may be sensitive or damaging to either organisation, or myself. No information has 
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knowingly been withheld because of its sensitive nature. A further strength of the 
comparison of the two case study sites is the differences in my involvement with 
each. Within ACT Community Care, I was employed to introduce the health 
outcomes approach, in which I obviously had some influence over the result. The 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs employed the University of South Australia to 
implement their health outcomes approach. I had no influence over the model they 
chose to employ, but was involved instead in its evaluation.  
The information I chose to include to describe each ‘case’ obviously represents 
only a small component of each organization. However I have selected the 
information that I perceived to be most pertinent to the understanding of the health 
outcomes approach in each case. The selection of that information was guided by 
my direct involvement within each organization. A different researcher may have 
represented different information and in different ways.  
3.2 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the case study research approach used to examine the 
use of health outcomes by ACT Community Care and the Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs. The details of the methods employed by each case are included within the 
case studies in the subsequent chapters.    
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first of two case studies, describing the move by ACT 
Community Care, a health service providing organisation, to identify health 
outcomes that could be used in purchasing contracts with the ACT Department of 
Health and Community Care (the purchaser).  
I introduce the case study with a discussion of the organisational structure of ACT 
Community Care. This section illustrates both the internal accountability hierarchy 
of ACT Community Care as well as the purchasing relationship between ACT 
Community Care and the ACT Health and Community Care Services Board. To 
avoid future confusion between the titles of ACT Community Care and the 
purchaser, the ACT Department of Health and Community Care, I will use the 
acronym DHCC to describe the latter.  
The second part of the chapter describes the investigation of a health outcomes 
approach that could be used by ACT Community Care to address the needs of the 
purchaser. The resulting model proposed that health service processes, not 
outcomes should be used for provider accountability. Ideally, process indicators 
would serve as a proxy for the health outcomes of patients. A suite of health 
outcomes projects from across the organisation were investigated to trial the model. 
Vignettes from six of these projects are used to illustrate specific issues around the 
implementation of the outcomes approach within ACT Community Care.  
Two key documents form the basis of this case study. The first is An Outcomes 
Framework for ACT Community Care, which was my original proposal for the 
implementation of the outcomes approach by ACT Community Care. The second is 
my final report to ACT Community Care, which describes in detail the 
methodology and results of each of the health outcomes projects. The two 
documents form Appendices A and B respectively. For the purpose of this chapter, 
I have synthesised what I perceived to be the most important components of the 
two documents to address the research problem.  
This case study highlights two key points about the use of health outcomes in 
health service accountability. First, organisational systems are vital to the 
collection and reporting of health outcomes data. Secondly, it illustrates a number 
of practical considerations around the implementation of the outcomes approach at 
the clinical level, such as the selection of an appropriate outcome measures and the 
responses of clinicians to the use of measurement tools.  
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4.2 The organisational structure of ACT Community Care 
ACT Community Care is the major provider of community based health and 
disability services within the ACT (ACT Community Care 1999). It provides 
services to people of the ACT and surrounding regions through six programs; 
Alcohol and Drug, Child, Youth and Women’s Health Program, Dental Health 
Program, Disability Program, Integrated Health Care Program and the 
Rehabilitation Program. Additionally, ACT Community Care provides services to 
Lower Jindalee nursing home and Corrections Health. The latter two services were 
not included in the health outcomes project because they represent a relatively 
small component of the overall service provision by ACT Community Care. The 
diversity of programs, and therefore health service providers underpins the 
difficulty using the classification ‘allied health’ to describe all of the health service 
providers. The services delivered by each health service program are summarised 
in Table 4.1. Over 1000 staff deliver services from approximately seventy different 
sites across the ACT. A more detailed break down of the types of services and the 
service providers employed within each program is presented in Appendix B. 
Each program employs a range of health service providers who deliver a variety of 
services to defined target groups. For example, the Alcohol and Drug Program 
employs doctors, case workers and nurses to deliver interventions designed to 
minimise the potential harm arising from alcohol and drug use. The interventions 
include methadone dispensing, withdrawal services, medical services, counseling 
and case management. As well, the Alcohol and Drug program is responsible for 
the provision of information and support for other service providers in the 
community whose clients may be at some form of risk from alcohol or drug use. In 
contrast, the staff employed by the Rehabilitation Program includes 
physiotherapists, speech pathologists, psychologists, occupational therapists and 
exercise physiologists. They provide intensive rehabilitative services within the 
hospital, some outpatient care, including vocational rehabilitation and driver 
retraining and, the provision of equipment and aids. I have used these two 
examples to highlight the widely varied roles of the health service programs, and 
the difficulty classifying all of these providers under the single label of allied 
health. 
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Table 4.1: ACT Community Care programs and service descriptions (ACT 
Community Care 1999) 
Program Description 
Alcohol and Drug 
Program (ADP) 
The Alcohol and Drug Program aims to minimise the harm 
related to alcohol and other drug use in the community through 
information provision, assessment, brief intervention, 
counselling, referral, education, training, community projects, 
professional projects, a help line, supervised withdrawal and 
public methadone treatment. 
Child, Youth and 
Women’s Program (CYF) 
Early identification and prevention of health problems, 
assessment and interventions, monitoring of children’s growth 
and development, health promotion and education. Services 
include immunisation, breast and cervical screening, women’s 
health service and new parent support groups. 
Dental Health Program Promotes oral health, prevention and treatment of oral disease 
and provision of dental prostheses. Services are provided in 
health centres, primary schools and The Canberra Hospital. 
Disability Program Aims to increase the quality of life and inclusion of people with 
disabilities in the ACT through the provision of four main 
service types; accommodation support, respite care, allied 
health and recreation services. Services are underpinned by a 
comprehensive ‘Individual Planning’ process which is 
developed with client and family collaboration with a key-
worker from the Disability Program. 
Integrated Health Care 
Program (IHCP) 
Multidisciplinary services provided in the home, hospital and 
community based clinical settings for people with acute, post-
acute, chronic and terminal health problems associated with 
disability and aging. The emphasis of care provision is on 
customer education and rehabilitation to encourage customers 
to take responsibility for managing their own health problems. 
A single point of entry is available through the Intake and 
Assessment Unit and Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) 
functions. The IHCP coordinates the ACT Diabetes Service. 
Rehabilitation Program The rehabilitation program provides a range of allied health 
and vocational support services to inpatients in The Canberra 
Hospital and community based outpatients. The aim of the 
program is to optimise the functional status of clients following 
an acute episode of care in The Canberra Hospital.  
ACT Community Care was established in its current form as a result of reforms to 
the ACT Public Service Act in 1996, which saw the administrative separation of 
ACT Community Care (a health service provider), from the purchaser, the DHCC. 
ACT Community Care and The Canberra Hospital became part of a statutory 
authority known as the ACT Health and Community Care Services Board 
(established under the Health Services Act 1996). The Board employs a chief 
executive officer to manage ACT Community Care. 
The DHCC is the major purchaser of services from ACT Community Care, 
accounting for 87% of total revenue in 1998-99 financial year (ACT Community 
Care 1999). Therefore, most of the activities of ACT Community Care as a health 
care providing organisation are stipulated by the contractual agreements with the 
DHCC through the ACT Community Care Services Board.  
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The accountability structure of ACT Community Care is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Health service providers from each program deliver health or disability services to 
their clients. Providers are in turn responsible directly to their team leader. Each 
allied health discipline also has a professional leader. Team leaders are responsible 
for health service providers across a range of disciplines, whereas professional 
leaders manage professional issues for their discipline only. For instance, in the 
Integrated Health Care Program, a multi-disciplinary team leader will be 
responsible for a wide range of allied health professionals (podiatrists, social 
workers, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, aged day care workers) and 
nurses. Professional leaders, on the other hand, deal with discipline specific issues 
such as the clinical management of particular conditions and best practice within 
their discipline.  
Figure 4.1: The accountability relationships within ACT Community Care 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The team leaders are the key individuals in the hierarchical reporting to the 
purchaser. Each program could have a number of teams and therefore a number of 
team leaders. Most teams are organised according to geographic regions. For 
example, the Alcohol and Drug Program has two regional teams, central (based in 
Canberra City) and Woden, (based at The Canberra Hospital).  
The team leaders are directly responsible to their program directors. All the 
directors, with the exception of the Disability director, report to the Director for 
Primary Health Care. The Director of Community Care then reports to the Chief 
Executive Officer on program issues. The Disability Program is accountable 
directly to the Chief Executive Officer, as they do not fall under the domain of 
Purchaser – ACT Department of Health and Community Care 
ACT Community Care – Chief Executive Officer 
Director–Community Health Care 
Alcohol and Drug Dental CYW Integrated Rehabilitation Disability 
Team Leaders 
Providers 
Patients 
Purchasing 
contract 
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primary health care. The Chief Executive Officer is responsible to the ACT Health 
and Community Care Services Board for delivery of the contracted outputs and 
outcomes across all the programs. Figure 4.1 uses the example of the Integrated 
Health Care Program to illustrate the responsibility of the provider to team leader 
and then patient or client level. However all the programs of ACT Community 
Care employ similar organisational structures.  
4.3 The proposed adoption of health outcomes  
The following quote is from Setting the Agenda, which outlines the vision for 
health service delivery in the ACT. 
Increasingly the Department should be purchasing services only 
where there is evidence of good clinical outcomes and should be 
looking to cease purchasing services where there is little or no 
evidence of better health outcomes (ACT Health 1998:36) 
So, rather than the historical focus on throughput as a measure of health service 
accountability, ACT Community Care was required to move towards the inclusion 
of health outcomes in their purchasing contracts. This requirement is reflected in 
the purchase contract; 
This contract… Seeks to support a change of focus in purchasing 
and accountability processes towards the achievement of agreed 
service outputs at nationally comparable prices and, most 
importantly, agreed customer outcomes. (p1 purchase contract 
between ACT Community Care and the Department (ACT 
Department of Health and Community Care 2000). 
These statements set out to change the entire basis of health service accountability 
in the ACT. However, there was no guidance as to what health outcomes were 
important or how they were to be measured or reported. The purchaser relied on 
the knowledge within ACT Community Care of their services and health service 
structures for the identification of health outcomes that could be used in purchasing 
contracts. 
4.4 The health outcomes approach  
My involvement with the project started in November, 1998 when I was employed 
by ACT Community Care to identify health outcome measures that could be 
incorporated into the purchasing contract. The project was overseen by the ACT 
Community Care Quality Improvement Council (QIC). Membership of the council 
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included the chief executive officer (chair), executives, program directors and 
representatives of each health service program. The QIC meets monthly.  
After six months to develop a framework for the collection of health outcomes 
data, the project was extended for two years to trial the framework. The project 
ended in July 2001. 
The action research approach to the development and testing of the framework is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2: Approach to the health outcomes project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Consultation phase 
The consultation phase included a review of the literature (which revealed few 
existing applications of health outcomes in community health settings), discussions 
with other agencies, and formal meetings with health service managers and providers 
from ACT Community Care. The main points arising from the consultation phase are 
discussed below and summarised in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Summary of the main points arising from the consultation phase 
 There has been little research into the use of health outcomes within Australian community 
health services  
 Community health service providers are interested in pursuing the concepts of health 
outcomes measurement and believe that outcomes research is important to justify their 
ongoing sustainability.  
 Some allied health disciplines do use outcome measures within their clinical consultation, 
but the results are not aggregated and they are not used for reporting. 
 Each health service program and each discipline delivers a wide range of services with very 
different goals and benefits for the clients. Thus no uniform measure of outcome is likely to be 
applicable either for an entire program, let alone a single discipline. 
 A number of clients receive services from multi-disciplinary teams, rather than single 
providers. It was unclear whether to focus on the outcomes of the care provided by each 
discipline, or the outcomes for the client as a whole. 
 There are a variety of service types delivered within ACT Community Care. Some disciplines 
have clear definitions of their service type and clearly mapped processes in the form of 
‘pathways’ or ‘standardised care plans’ (eg most allied health except social work), others do 
not (Disability and Alcohol and Drug). 
Stakeholder 
consultation phase 
Proposed outcomes 
framework (Appendix A) 
Stakeholder 
feedback 
Outcomes framework 
modified 
Trial of outcomes 
framework – six projects 
Trial results and 
recommendations based 
on model (Appendix B) 
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I contacted a number of Australian agencies about their proposed or actual use of 
health outcomes, including New South Wales Health, VicHealth, Queensland 
Health, NT Health, allied health professional associations and the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs. I also contacted Mrs Jan Sansoni at the Australian Health 
Outcomes Collaboration (AHOC). The Australian Health Outcomes Collaboration 
provides resources about health outcome instruments to health service researchers 
and clinicians as well as a database that records a range of Australia health 
outcomes projects.  
The feedback from other organisations indicated that there was no precedent to 
follow in the implementation of the outcomes approach. None of these 
organisations had a framework for the collection of health outcomes data. In fact, a 
result of these contacts was that in many cases I was perceived to be an expert on 
community health outcomes and was asked to deliver workshops on the work that I 
had undertaken to date. For instance, the work with the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs arose as a result of my contacting them to ask for information about their 
nursing health outcomes project. My contact with AHOC resulted in the 
collaborative delivery of a number workshops on health outcomes in community 
health services workshops in Canberra and Melbourne for many of the 
organisations listed above. The workshops, in turn, provided me with the benefit of 
extensive consultation with health service providers from a range of public and 
private agencies in clinical and managerial roles. Still, no one appeared to have a 
solution to the ‘health outcomes problem’, although there was considerable interest 
in the area. 
Consultation within ACT Community Care included liaison with the health 
program directors, team managers, senior health professionals and health service 
providers. The health service providers included physiotherapists, occupational 
therapists, psychologists, nurses, social workers, podiatrists, psychologists, speech 
pathologists, alcohol and drug case managers, managers from the disability 
program and dieticians from both ACT Community Care and the Canberra 
Hospital. The consultation was undertaken in a variety of forms, but always 
included discussions with the program director, generally with their team leaders 
and/or senior health professionals. The team leaders and senior health professionals 
discussed the concepts with their own staff. I then undertook a brief presentation to 
groups of health service providers who, in turn, provided feedback about the issues 
arising around health outcomes in their own areas.  
In the discussions, many providers were unfamiliar with the concept of health 
outcomes. A few were aware that they were expected to be accountable on the 
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basis of the health outcomes of their clients, although none knew how this could be 
achieved. Some providers had the expectation that if they could not demonstrate 
the effectiveness of their health service, it would threaten the sustainability of their 
discipline.  
Health service providers from a range of disciplines were asked what, if any, health 
outcome measures they currently used. Only physiotherapists and nurses routinely 
incorporated health outcomes into aspects of their care. Physiotherapists have a 
range of functional status measures, such as ‘timed 10 metre walk’ and ‘time to up 
and go’ which they use before, and then at various stages during an intervention to 
determine the patient’s progress over time (van Herk, Arendzen et al. 1998). 
Nurses are required to report in the client file on a series of educational and self-
care goals for most patients across a variety of interventions. However, as later 
results demonstrate, adherence to these requirements is limited. Where outcomes 
data were collected, they were used as an indicator of the effectiveness of care for 
each individual client by the health service provider. The information normally 
remained in the client file and was not aggregated. The lack of aggregation of data 
meant that no systematic health outcomes reporting took place.  
Whilst there were a number of quantifiable outcome measures used by nurses and 
physiotherapists, each intervention had a different outcome - and there were 
numerous interventions within each discipline. The physiotherapists and nurses 
identified twenty and thirty-four common interventions within each discipline 
respectively. This meant that no single outcome measure was likely to be useful 
within a single discipline, let alone across programs. For example, the outcomes of 
neck pain management are quite different to the outcomes of continence therapy, 
but both are undertaken by physiotherapists. Nursing interventions include 
inserting eye-drops, post-operative breast care and giving insulin injections, none 
of which have common outcomes. Even programs with a relatively narrow focus, 
such as the Dental Program deliver a wide range of services from school based oral 
health education and health promotion to dental surgery and dentures. The diversity 
of health service types highlighted the difficulty identifying a single outcome 
measure within disciplines or programs. It also flagged the importance of being 
able to define exactly what health service was being delivered so that the outcomes 
can be recorded against an intervention.   
Many clients receive services from multi-disciplinary teams. For example, 
someone who is recently released from hospital after a fall may require 
occupational therapy for home modifications, physiotherapy to improve their 
mobility, podiatry if they are unable to reach their feet, home nursing to dress a 
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post-operative wound, personal care to help with showering and dressing as well as 
Meals on Wheels. These services could be seen to have two goals overall; to 
improve the physical function of the client so they are more independent in their 
home, and secondly, to support them until they become physically independent. 
However, each component of the intervention will contribute to the achievement of 
these goals in a unique way.  
Health service providers are interested in knowing whether their own intervention 
is effective at, say, improving the hip range of motion of the client, or preventing 
further falls. But it is also important that the overall client goals are achieved. In 
other words, each component of care will have distinct goals which will contribute 
to the overall outcomes for the client. Health service providers wanted to know 
whether they should report on the goals and outcomes of each component of the 
intervention or only the overall outcomes for the client. Each discipline delivers a 
wide range of services with different goals. One client may receive services from 
many disciplines that are designed to lead to a single goal. These issues raise 
complex questions about which outcomes should be reported, to whom and how.  
It did appear, however, that some interventions, such as wound management and 
continence management had clearly defined processes that could form the basis of 
measurement and monitoring. For example, the nurses, physiotherapists and 
podiatrists have developed ‘standard care plans’ that guide the health service 
provider through a set of clear processes that should lead to a desired outcome (an 
example of a wound care plan is included in Appendix B). The nurses have thirty-
four standard care plans, including diabetes management, wound care and post-
operative breast care. Podiatrists developed standard care plans for common 
interventions such as basic foot care, nail surgery and orthotic management.  
The consultation phase of the project provided few answers, and many questions 
about the introduction of the outcomes approach. It was clear at this stage that not 
one single outcome measure would be appropriate within a single discipline, or 
even across a program, let alone across the whole organisation.  
4.4.2 Development of a ‘best practice’ framework for the 
measurement of health outcomes 
Health outcomes are dependent on a number of factors, many that are external to 
the delivery of health services themselves. Therefore, holding the health service 
provider responsible for the production of health outcomes does not necessarily 
illustrate the effectiveness of the intervention. However, based on the principles of 
evidence based medicine, the allied health service provider should be accountable 
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for the delivery of the processes of care that are on best practice. The use of 
standard care plans and clinical pathways implied that some services had a ‘best 
practice’ way of delivering health care within ACT Community Care. This notion 
is reinforced by the growth of both the quality and the evidence based medicine 
movements which revolve around the adoption of processes that are based on 
rigorous research, and the minimising practice variations through clinical 
guidelines to optimise health outcomes (Grimshaw and Hutchinson 1995).  
The Health Outcomes Framework (Appendix B) that I proposed for ACT 
Community Care relied on the existence of systems of best practice for some health 
services, with the expectation that other health service providers would be able to 
identify similar standards for the delivery of their services. 
The framework was based on the Donabedian framework that links structures, 
processes and outcomes. The intention of the project was that processes could be 
standardised through the use of clinical pathways or standard care plans. 
Extrapolation from this notion was the belief that if standardised processes were 
adhered to, they would serve as a proxy for the achievement of the health outcome. 
Obviously, individual patient factors needed to be taken into account, such as 
comorbidities, client age and socio-demographic factors. I assumed that structural 
issues would remain relatively stable unless there were major management or 
policy changes.  
4.4.3 Provider feedback on the framework 
The framework was circulated to the programs for provider feedback. The 
framework was based on the identification of best practice processes for a range of 
health services. In reality, many health services could not actually develop best 
practice processes for health service delivery. For example, the Disability Program 
and the Alcohol and Drug program provide services whose primary roles are to 
optimise participation of their clients. The way the service is delivered is dependent 
on the needs of the individual patient, the available infrastructure to support that 
patient, and the capacity of the health service provider to address the needs of the 
patient. If there were reproducible processes, they were normally based on the 
assessment of the client, or the way they moved through the health service, rather 
than the way the treatment was delivered. For instance, all clients who enter the 
Alcohol and Drug Program undergo a common assessment which is used to 
identify their health service needs, current health status and the urgency of the 
treatment. As a result of this assessment, they may be referred to counseling. But 
what happens within the counseling intervention is dependent on the counsellor 
they are referred to and not guided by any formal protocols. 
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Where best practice processes did exist, there was little published evidence to 
support them, therefore it was not clear whether the intervention would actually 
lead to the desired outcome (Harvey 1996). Indeed, the providers reported that the 
care plans were based more on their own experience than the use of literature.  
Social workers had particular difficulty with the ‘reductionist’ nature of the 
framework. Additionally, the QIC members were concerned about the amount of 
information I was trying to access because of the logistical difficulties collecting 
such a large amount of data and the burden of data collection on providers. 
Obviously, all health service types were not the same. Health service processes 
may help define what happens in the intervention, but do not necessarily impact on 
the outcomes of the patient. So, instead of viewing health services homogeneously, 
I developed a list of the different types of services delivered by ACT Community 
Care and the likely processes and outcomes of each (Table 4.3).  
4.4.4 Development of a modified approach 
The following table was developed to encompass all of the health service types 
delivered by ACT Community Care and illustrate the variety of process and 
outcome indicators which would be likely for each. The framework was then re-
presented to each program in the context of the following flow chart. Breaking 
down the framework to acknowledge the continuum of health service types, rather 
than simply seeing all health services from within a homogeneous framework lead 
to widespread acceptance of the framework, and increased understanding of what 
the project was trying to achieve.  
The framework described in Table 4.3 was then used as the basis to identify 
interventions within ACT Community Care for the measurement of outcomes and 
processes. These fields have subsequently been amalgamated into four main 
groups; restorative services, rehabilitative, integrative and preventative. These 
groups are based on the International Classification of Impairment, Disability and 
Handicap (ICIDH alpha version) in which an impairment affects the organ or tissue 
level – for example, diabetes. The disability is the impact of the impairment on the 
ability of the individual to function. For example, the person with diabetes may 
have diabetic retinopathy, leading to the ‘disability’ of blindness. The handicap is 
the way that the blindness impacts on the functioning of the person within their 
environment, for instance, the prevention of driving1. 
                                                     
1
 The World Health Organisation has recently released the beta version of the ICIDH which 
eliminates the negative connotations associated with the terms ‘disability’ and ‘handicap’, replacing 
them with “limitations to activity and participation”. I have found this model less easily applicable to 
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Table 4.3: Continuum of health service types within ACT Community Care 
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Outcomes 
    
Prevention Oral hygiene  
Immunization 
Exposure to target 
group 
Reduced 
incidence of 
disease 
    
Screening Cervical screening Rates of screening Increased rates of 
detection 
    
Assessment Aged Care Assessment  
Comprehensive 
Assessment 
Appropriate referrals  Achievement of 
goals 
    
Restoration Dental 
Wound management 
Nail surgery 
Adherence to best 
practice (clinical 
pathway) 
Restoration of 
integrity 
    
Rehab-
ilitation 
Continence 
Physiotherapy 
Best practice, multi-
disciplinary contact 
Restoration of 
function 
    
Integration Disability services Identification of client 
goals / capacity 
Optimal client 
integration 
    
Maintenance 
/ Support 
Insulin injections 
Foot care 
Palliative care 
Adherence to pathway Maintenance of 
health state, 
prevention of 
complications 
    
Equipment / 
home 
modification 
Seating 
Orthoses 
Dentures 
Dispensing 
appropriate equipment 
Achievement of 
client goals 
    
Information 
distribution 
Brochures  
Phone services 
Provision of timely, 
appropriate and 
accurate information. 
Raised awareness  
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 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Care-
continuum 
clinical 
pathways 
Footpath 
Myocardial infarction  
Health service use Improved health 
status 
4.5 Testing the modified framework 
4.5.1 Data collection 
The data collection process involved identifying a project. I then consulted with 
providers and in some cases patients, to define what the processes and outcomes of 
care should be, and ways of measuring these. At least one key person was 
identified within each program to act as a contact point for staff queries, to raise 
participation rates in the projects and aid my understanding of the content area of 
the project. Staff were then trained in the outcomes approach that would apply to 
their service type. At the end of each project, I met with the staff involved to 
discuss the implications of the project on their practice.   
                                                                                                                                       
the continuum of health service types, so for the purpose of this thesis, have continued to use the 
concepts contained within the alpha version. The categories are defined in Appendix B. 
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I made a number of attempts to develop a standardised proforma for the collection 
of data needed to measure and report on health outcomes across all of the projects. 
The forms were designed to document client health status at admission and 
discharge, the intervention details and individual client information. The 
standardised proforma was not accepted in any format because managers were 
concerned either about the duplication which would occur (ie, the some providers 
already collected this information in another format), the inapplicability of certain 
items to their service (eg ICD-10 codes to social work) or the increased workload 
on providers.  
As a result of the difficulties accessing consistent information, I attempted to 
collect standard data from across the projects, but using different methods of data 
collection. Figure 4.3 provides an overview of the approach to collecting data. The 
data sources included file audit; telephone interviews; face to face interviews; 
mailed questionnaires; provider distributed questionnaires; focus groups; searches 
of databases for discharge data and service specific details (eg costs, occasions of 
service). Whilst this reduced the ability for me to make comparisons between 
different interventions, this approach enabled me to investigate a range of methods 
of accessing the outcomes data. Demographic data were collected using a 
standardised proforma across all projects except where file audit was the main 
source of data. The strengths and limitations of the approaches are discussed within 
the reports for each case study.  
The following steps were undertaken to collect the outcomes and process data. 
(a) At admission, and once the intervention or interventions have been determined, 
demographic data and baseline health outcomes data are collected for that 
client. 
(b) The intervention is defined and undertaken.  
(c) At completion of the intervention, the client is discharged from the service. 
Client discharge may precede achievement of health outcomes for some 
interventions. At discharge, the health service provider will report all ‘process 
indicators’ on the client discharge form.  
(d) Health outcomes are measured at a second point in time to enable measurement 
of change in health status. If the final outcome is not achieved at client 
discharge, the outcomes were determined by contacting the client after pre-
determined period of time has elapsed (by mail or telephone).  
Figure 4.3: Proposed approach to outcomes data collection 
 
 
 
Extraction, aggregation and reporting 
of results 
 103
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
The collection of consistent information from across the organisation was further 
hampered by the lack of an organisation wide, and in many cases, program wide, 
information system. This meant that it was not possible to determine at any time 
who was receiving particular services, the reasons for the client receiving services, 
the actual types of service/s provided, or the provider responsible for delivering the 
service. The computerised databases that did exist in each program provided highly 
variable levels of detail and quality of information.  
In order to be able to link a health outcome to a particular diagnosis or intervention, 
I investigated a range of allied and community health classification systems 
including International Classification of Disease, Version 10 (ICD-10); National 
Allied Health Casemix Committee Indicators for Intervention (IFIs); the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs item numbers; and the Community Health 
Information System. The DVA system did not contain sufficient detail, and the 
other systems were still in pre-introductory or developmental stages at the time of 
implementing the projects.   
4.5.2 The projects 
The priorities for the selection of projects within each program were determined by 
program directors in consultation with their own quality improvement teams or 
middle managers. Where possible a project was selected to represent each 
‘intervention type’ and each program, however this was not always possible.  
Table 4.4 summarises the projects that were considered, or commenced as part of 
the ACT Community Care health outcomes project. One of the projects (paediatric 
dental outcomes) was investigated, but did not commence for reasons that are 
described within the vignette. However as this project has relevance to the 
collection of outcomes data, it was included as vignette.  
A. Client 
Admission 
Collection of 
baseline 
demographic 
and outcomes 
data 
B. Intervention 
Standardised, 
where possible 
by agreed 
processes 
C. Discharge 
Report on 
number of 
occasions of 
service,  
variances 
D. Health Outcomes 
collection  
Collect follow-up 
outcomes data at pre-
determined period 
following intervention 
Client 
Process indicators = number of occasions of service, 
variance / adverse events: reported per intervention 
Health outcomes = difference between 
baseline and follow-up outcomes data 
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Table 4.4: Summary of health outcomes projects 
Project Status Service 
Type 
Data sources Processes Outcomes 
Paediatric 
dental 
outcomes 
Did not 
com-
mence 
Rehab-
ilitative 
N/A Treatment of dental 
caries under sedation 
or anaesthetic for 
children under the age 
of 5 years 
Could not be 
determined 
Innersole pilot 
study 
Complete  Rehab-
ilitative 
Patient completed 
questionnaire 
File audit 
Number of occasions 
of service Adherence 
to clinical pathway 
Change in foot 
health status 
Innersole specific 
questions 
Alcohol and 
Drug Program  
Complete Integrative  File audit Rates of adherence to 
Client Planning 
process 
Achievement of 
client goals 
IAU project Complete Integrative Interviewer 
completed 
questionnaire – 
phone and face to 
face 
File audit 
Focus groups 
% Receipt of services 
to which client was 
referred 
Achievement of 
client goals 
Health related 
quality of life using 
the Dartmouth 
COOP charts 
Nutrition 
Screening tool 
Complete Preventative Completion of 
nutrition screening 
tool by providers. 
File audit. 
Completion of the 
nutrition screening 
tool.  
Providing clients with 
an information booklet. 
Age of introduction 
of solids to infants. 
Texture and variety 
of food at six months 
Wound 
outcomes 
project 
Complete Restorative File audit of all 
clients discharged 
from wound care. 
 
Adherence to the DVA 
Wound Clinical 
Pathway. 
Duration of wound 
healing. 
Cost of dressings 
used. 
Footpath 
project 
Complete Preventative Patient completed 
questionnaire, file 
audit. 
Adherence to the 
Footpath clinical 
pathway. 
Foot health status, 
lower limb 
knowledge and self 
care practices. 
4.5.3 Project results  
Detailed reports of each project are included in the final report (Appendix C), so 
for the purpose of this chapter, I will present six of the projects as vignettes to 
highlight specific issues around the implementation of the outcomes approach. The 
appendices include copies of the questionnaires used and any statistical analyses 
undertaken. 
Every project that commenced or was attempted highlighted new issues for the 
collection of health outcomes data in a clinical setting. The lessons learnt from 
previous projects were applied to subsequent projects, only to highlight a new 
difficulty with the implementation of the model.  
At the same time that this project was being implemented, all of the ACT 
Community Care health service programs except the Dental and Disability 
Programs were undergoing some form of restructure. The restructures meant that 
many key personnel (directors and senior health professionals) changed positions 
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or left the organization. The types and methods of health service delivery were 
changing within some programs so that in some cases, projects were terminated 
because the service was no longer delivered by the same team within the 
organization. In other cases, projects were delayed by up to six months whilst staff 
were recruited and new systems were implemented. In one project (the Intake and 
Assessment Unit outcomes study) the coordinating staff member changed positions 
and the collection of outcomes data ceased almost immediately. This highlights the 
need for structural or organisational stability to introduce a health outcomes 
project. 
The six vignettes described are on the outcomes investigated for paediatric 
dentistry, podiatry innersoles, the Alcohol and Drug Program client planning 
process, wound management, the Intake and Assessment Unit comprehensive 
assessment tool and the nutrition screening tool. The results and implications of 
each project are discussed in the context of the vignette. 
Vignette One: Paediatric dental outcomes – Dental Program 
The paediatric dental outcome project did not commence. However the narrative 
illustrates some of the difficulties in both identifying appropriate health outcome 
measures, and determining a reasonable time frame in which the outcomes can be 
measured. 
Children under the age of five with dental caries generally require heavy sedation 
or a general anaesthetic for any oral procedure. This project was selected because 
the senior dentist was interested in the outcomes of the intervention for the 
children. From my perspective, it appeared to be a clearly defined intervention with 
relatively reproducible processes – oral surgery under sedation or anaesthesia, for 
which the outcome was the restoration of oral function through the treatment of 
dental caries. 
To identify the outcomes of the procedure, I consulted with the ACT Community 
Care dentist, the only paediatric dentist in Canberra and dentists at the New 
Children’s Hospital in Westmead, Sydney. I watched a number of dental 
procedures on children who were sedated or anaethsetised and spoke with dentists, 
children and parents about their experiences and expectations of the procedures.  
It became evident that there were no useful outcome measures that could be 
measured within the time period of the project. The obvious outcomes were the 
cessation of pain and restoration of oral function in the children. However, 
according to the dentists, few children actually report any pain with their caries. 
Oral function can be measured in adults using the Oral Health Impact Profile, an 
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instrument that asks about the impact of mouth problems on eating and 
swallowing, physical appearance, social activities and pain (Slade and Spencer 
1994). These concepts were largely inappropriate for children. Some literature 
links oral health status of children to growth percentiles, however the authors did 
not eliminate the confounding influence of social factors on dental caries (Acs, 
Shulman et al. 1999). Parents brought their children to the service for the treatment 
of dental caries, which were often asymptomatic. The dentists reported that the 
important outcomes of oral health status at age five were the oral functioning of the 
child once they had their secondary dentition at around the age of twelve. No 
prospective studies link dental interventions at age five with oral health outcomes 
at age twelve and this was certainly outside the scope of this project. Short term 
indicators, such as the recurrence of dental caries over a twelve month period, 
whilst useful for the dental service, relate more to dental education than the 
performance of dental surgery.  
The inability to determine, or measure appropriate outcomes meant that the project 
did not commence. 
This project highlighted the difficulty identifying clear health outcome measures 
specifically for this intervention. Psychometric concepts developed for adults are 
not appropriate for children, so these cannot be used for the evaluation of child 
dental health outcomes. As many of the children were asymptomatic, it may have 
been appropriate to ascertain the parent’s perspective, highlighting the question of 
‘whose outcomes’ are important. However, there were no consistent and 
meaningful outcomes that a parent could report in this case.  
Another point highlighted in this project was the difficulty identifying outcome 
measures that could be collected in a suitable time period for reporting. It is not 
feasible to wait until a five-year-old turns twelve to measure the health service 
outcomes of an intervention. 
Vignette Two: Innersole study – Integrated Health Care Program 
Innersoles are dispensed by podiatrists for people with pressure areas under their 
feet to reduce pain, improve function and ideally, reduce the amount of ongoing 
podiatric care required. The innersole project used a validated, disease specific, 
health status questionnaire to measure the health outcomes of the intervention 
(Nancarrow 2001). The innersole project was used to pilot study the system of 
health outcomes data collection and management and to test the relationship 
between process and outcome measures. This project was selected because it had 
well-defined processes through the use of a clinical pathway. Additionally it was a 
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relatively high volume intervention (approximately 30 people per month), 
indicating that there should be a reasonable response rate in a short period.  
Podiatrists were asked to give a Foot Health Status Questionnaire to all people 
requiring innersoles between October, 1999 and February 2000. All patients who 
received innersoles during the study period were eligible to participate. Clients 
were then followed up by mail three months later. A retrospective file audit was 
used to determine the numbers of occasions of service after the receipt of 
innersoles. There was no way of systematically identifying clients who receive 
specific interventions, such as innersoles. Thus, the senior podiatrist kept a paper 
record of clients who received innersoles during the intervention period. 
Only twenty-seven clients out of a potential 150 were recruited into the trial by 
podiatrists and post-intervention follow-up was achieved with 20 of those clients 
after extensive mail and telephone contact. No client refused to participate in the 
study, however podiatrists reported that they either forgot to ask the clients to 
participate or did not have enough time. In some cases, the podiatrists did not give 
the client a questionnaire because they felt that the client would not be able to 
answer the questions due to language or eyesight problems, creating the potential 
for selection bias. This was despite access to translation and interpreting services 
within ACT Community Care. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the change in FHSQ results for the sample. Higher scores 
indicate a better outcome. As the sample was not normally distributed and there 
were fewer than thirty participants, a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
test) was employed to determine whether the difference was significant (Bland 
1991). The only statistically significant improvement was in the domain of foot 
pain (Z=-3.59, p = 0.00). Foot function and general foot health also showed 
improvements, although these results did not reach statistical significance.  
 
Figure 4.4: Change in FHSQ Scores 
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The scores indicated an overall improvement in foot health status, as did the 
innersole specific questionnaire, however the changes in scores were difficult to 
interpret due to a lack of comparative or normative data.  
When I examined some of the individual cases, it became apparent that the changes 
should be interpreted with caution. For example, the Figure 4.5 illustrates the 
changes in FHSQ reported by Client Two. The changes are substantial in every 
domain, but she reported that she never actually wore her innersoles. During the 
intervention period, she had surgery to correct the foot problems caused by 
rheumatoid arthritis, which is more likely to have been responsible for her 
improved her foot health status.  
Figure 4.5: Change in FHSQ Scores for Client 2 
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Another patient wrote that getting the innersoles was the “best thing that has 
happened to me in years”, however this improvement was only reflected in the 
domain of foot pain on the FHSQ, the other areas did not show any change. 
The podiatrists did not find the quantitative data from the FHSQ useful, however 
they were able to respond to the qualitative feedback received from clients such as 
dissatisfaction or discomfort with the innersoles. Podiatrists do not normally 
receive this feedback given that many of the clients are already discharged within 
three months of the receipt of their innersoles. 
None of the podiatrists looked at the FHSQ questionnaires that were completed by 
the clients. This was in part because the FHSQ needs to be manipulated by 
customised software to provide summary scores and the podiatrists did not have the 
information system availability to facilitate this during the clinical intervention. 
The measurement of health service processes, such as the number of occasions of 
service and adherence to the ‘innersole care plan’ was dependent on an audit of 
patient files. The quality of the routine data reported in patient files varied greatly. 
For instance, to calculate the numbers of occasions of service per annum, the date 
of the intervention was required, but was not always recorded in the client file. The 
innersole care plan was present in only one file of the twenty-seven clients who 
received innersoles.  
There was a reduction in the number of occasions of service received by clients 
after receiving their innersoles. Fifty percent of the clients were discharged, and of 
those remaining, the number of occasions of service dropped from an average of 
5.75 to 3.2 per annum following receipt of the innersoles (p<0.05). Clients who 
were discharged had a greater improvement in FHSQ scores than those who 
continued to receive services did. However, given the poor rate of recruitment into 
the trial, and the potential bias in the recruitment of patients, it is difficult to know 
whether these results can be extrapolated to the rest of the population receiving 
innersoles within ACT Community Care. 
The results of this project were not reported to the purchaser, nor were any of the 
process indicators included in purchasing contracts. Instead, the results were used 
to improve the practice of the podiatrists by including client follow-up at three 
months as part of the episode of care.  
This project used a validated instrument to measure changes in foot health status. 
The instrument was sensitive to the changing nature of the patient’s foot 
conditions. However, the interpretation of the health outcomes data was dependent 
on contextual data received from the patient. The size and direction of the changes 
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did not necessarily reflect the narrative feedback from the patients about the 
effectiveness of the intervention. Nor could the changes necessarily be attributed to 
the intervention, as the example of the patient with rheumatoid arthritis illustrated.  
The podiatrists did not use the results of the FHSQ to inform their clinical practice, 
partly due to the time lag before the information was received. However they were 
able to respond to the qualitative feedback from patients, such as problems with the 
innersoles. This shows that if providers are expected to use additional 
questionnaires within their clinical time, the questionnaire must be of some value 
to the clinician. 
The instrument looks at four domains of foot health, however the use of innersoles 
did not lead to changes in all of these domains. This raises questions about how the 
results should be interpreted. There is no normative data about the use of the FHSQ 
(or any other scale) with the use of innersoles, therefore, there is no way of 
knowing what change in each domains actually constitutes a “good” outcome. 
There were practical issues around the use of the FHSQ as well. The podiatrists did 
not give the surveys to all eligible clients, creating the potential for selection bias, 
which could influence the results in favour of the podiatrists. The small sample size 
resulting from the poor rates of dissemination also create difficulties with analysis 
and interpretation. For instance, it is difficult to generalise these results to the 
remainder of the people who receive innersoles.  
The routine data required to measure health service processes was often missing, 
such as the date the patient was seen by the podiatrist. This highlights the need for 
controls on the quality of the data collected at the clinical level to facilitate 
reporting on outcomes or process.  
The next vignette, the Alcohol and Drug Program illustrates a project that focussed 
on the quality issues around data collection. 
Vignette Three: Client Planning - Alcohol and Drug Program 
The Alcohol and Drug Program, ‘client planning project’ implemented systems to 
facilitate the collection of health outcomes data by service providers. This project 
highlights some of the difficulties accessing patient data and the inability to follow-
up clients to obtain outcomes data. 
A new, standardised client planning process was introduced to the Alcohol and 
Drug Program (ADP) in October 1999. The client plan involved undertaking a 
detailed social, physical and psychological assessment, including the details and 
impact of their drug use. The new plan also required the completion of a ‘client 
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care plan’ that documents individual client goals and their achievement against 
these goals. This was to be the main source of outcomes information.  
I investigated the ADP Client Planning process to determine whether there was a 
relationship between the achievement of client goals (outcomes), the completion of 
the client planning process and the numbers of occasions of service (processes). 
This project involved three, three monthly retrospective file audits, of one-hundred 
consecutive client files. 
Providers received extensive training in the use of the new client planning system. 
They were informed of the file audit three months in advance and were given a list 
of the auditable items.  
At the first audit, client care plan was completed only 10% of the time. However, 
the physical, social and psychological assessments were completed between 80 – 
100% of the time. Managers fed these results back to the providers. The second 
audit took place three months later and the completion of the client plan increased 
to 30%. The lack of completed care plans meant that client goals and outcomes 
were reported in an ad hoc way, if at all, making data collection for this project 
difficult. Staff feedback indicated that the client planning forms required 
modification to facilitate their appropriate completion. Managers modified the 
forms in response to staff concerns, and they were re-introduced by the program 
managers. Staff reported that they did not like the modified forms.  
The third audit demonstrated no little improvement in key areas, such as the use of 
the care plan, and the results had actually declined in some fields.  
I attended a consultation session to determine what providers required from their 
client care plan forms. Some felt that completion of these forms was a waste of 
time. One provider said “what’s the point – who ever looks at them”. There were 
also provider differences in what they believed the role of the care plan should be. 
For example, the nursing staff working in withdrawal services (an inpatient service 
to support patients cease using a particular drug) felt that the goals of their care 
were obvious (ie withdrawal and harm minimisation) and the processes of 
achieving those outcomes were essentially the same for all clients. They felt that 
the client care plan was most necessary at the point of client discharge, because 
clients often had social needs, such as housing requirements. However, the nurses 
said that although they normally attempted to address the client’s social 
requirements at discharge, it was not their role to do this. The nurses felt that the 
documentation of these issues in the client care plan would formalise their changed 
nursing tasks, and this would create dispute over their roles. The nurses 
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acknowledged that inconsistent documentation at discharge meant that client needs 
were addressed in an ad-hoc way. 
Managers perceived that the client care plan would provide clients with clear goals 
and expectations of the care that they received from the service. This, in turn, 
would provide greater structure to the provision of client care by working towards 
and achieving client goals in a systematic way. My audit of many files indicated 
that only a small proportion of the ADP counsellors and case managers actually 
work this way. In some cases, there were many pages of narrative about the client, 
but little structure to the notes, no documented goals and no clear flags as to what 
was expected of either the client or the case manager. This lack of structure meant 
that if a client changed case managers, there was little possibility of continuity of 
care.   
It was difficult to define the interventions and quantify the outcomes of care. The 
ADP includes a wide range of services. Detoxification and methadone support are 
medically supported interventions with outcomes such as ‘harm minimisation’. 
Many clients receive interventions that provide a supportive role, such as 
improving self-esteem, developing coping skills, or dealing with abusive 
relationships for which the outcomes are difficult to objectify. In most cases, even 
when outcomes could be quantified, they were not, and the achievement of 
subjective client goals was reported in less than five percent of client files. 
Client files could not always be found using the client record database. The ADP 
counsellors reported that they do not always accurately report client details so that 
they can maintain client confidentiality and because of the possibility that client 
files can be subpoenaed for legal reasons.   
Client follow-up was difficult to ascertain. Fewer than half of all clients continued 
their treatment with the ADP, despite documented attempts by the provider to 
contact them. Whether the client planning process actually improves outcomes is 
not necessarily relevant in this case. The importance of a clearly structured 
assessment and planning process should form the minimum standard of 
documentation and guide the counsellor through the necessary steps to achieving 
(and documenting) client goals. Since starting this project, adherence to client care 
planning now forms part of the purchase contract for the ADP.  
This project highlights the need to formalise the systems of record keeping to 
facilitate the collection of health outcomes data. Neither process nor outcomes data 
can be ascertained if it is not documented in the client file. The project also 
illustrated a number of practical and political barriers to the collection of outcomes 
data, including the inaccessibility of files, the omission of data within files to 
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maintain client confidentiality, the difficulty with client follow-up, and that 
documentation in a file actually formalises tasks that may fall outside the domain 
of particular providers.  
Vignette Four: Intake and Assessment Comprehensive 
Assessment Project – Integrated Health Care Program 
The Intake and Assessment Unity Comprehensive Assessment Project was 
designed to follow-up the outcomes of an assessment and referral service. 
The Intake and Assessment Unit (IAU) undertakes a comprehensive assessment on 
any client requiring two or more services within the Integrated Health Care 
Program. The goals of the services are to increase client independence, prevent 
institutionalisation as well as provide some restorative and preventative care. The 
IAU also provides services for clients who have been discharged from hospital. 
Where clients do require institutionalisation, the IAU undertakes an Aged Care 
Assessment Team (ACAT) assessment to determine the residential needs. The 
ACAT assessment is one type of comprehensive assessment.  
IAU assessors expressed concern that they had no way of knowing the outcomes of 
their assessment process, such as whether the client received the services to which 
they were referred or achieved improved health status. The IAU Comprehensive 
Assessment Project was designed to look at the relationship between the rates of 
use of the health services to which the clients were referred (processes) and the 
rates of client achievement of goals and their self-reported health related quality of 
life (outcomes). Clients were recruited prospectively during February 2000 and 
followed-up by telephone or face-to-face interview three months later. 
Of 114 eligible clients, sixty-seven were recruited into the trial. Some assessors did 
not recruit any patients, however those who were involved with recruitment 
expressed no difficulty with the process. The major barrier to recruitment was the 
additional time (7 minutes, average) to administer the Dartmouth COOP chart. 
Additionally, the key contact person for this project (the team leader) changed jobs 
in the middle of the data collection period and the providers stopped recruiting 
patients.  
Three-monthly follow-up was possible for 38 (57%) of clients. The poor follow-up 
rate resulted from the death of some clients, and the high proportion of service 
users that moved into higher-level care as a result of the assessment. All but five of 
the 38 clients contacted had achieved their goals. The only unmet goals over which 
ACT Community Care had any influence were one couple that felt that their goals 
were not identified appropriately in the first place. All but four clients received all 
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the services to which they were referred. Some clients later declined those services 
(eg many clients chose not to use Meals on Wheels despite being referred to this 
service).  
There was no correlation between goal achievement or improvement in COOP 
scores (outcomes) and use of services (processes). Health related quality of life 
scores improved slightly for the cohort, however it is likely that the more infirm 
clients were those who moved into residential care. There was no correlation 
between goal achievement and the proportion of health services that the client was 
referred to and which they actually used (Pearson r = 0.26, p > 0.1). In other words, 
the processes of care (receipt of care to which the client was referred) was not 
associated with the health outcomes (goal achievement and COOP scores) of the 
client.   
One of the important outcomes of this project was the provision of increased or 
additional care to thirteen (34%) of the clients as a result of the three-month 
follow-up to determine the outcomes of care. During the three-month period, a 
number of clients’ health service needs changed, for instance one man had a 
myocardial infarction. Another was a carer whose partner had died. None knew 
how to access further care to meet their new needs. The follow-up facilitated 
contact with appropriate services.  
The age and infirmity of the clients who receive a comprehensive assessment 
means that their health is likely to be unstable. A result of one of the 
recommendations of this project, all clients now receive three-month telephone 
follow-up as part of the routine assessment process both to determine the 
achievement of client goals, and facilitate ongoing care if necessary.  
The COOP charts were well accepted by IAU staff. They liked the simple format 
and the relative ease of use of the questionnaire, although use of the charts stopped 
as soon as the project leader changed jobs. Additionally, there was a poor 
relationship between the COOP chart scores and the actual outcomes as reported by 
the clients. The instruments were not sensitive to the actual outcomes of the receipt 
of services and did not cover a wide enough spectrum of quality of life domains to 
be meaningful. For example, one client reported that security was important, which 
was managed by including a ‘peep-hole’ in her front door, and installing a security 
wire door. She was very satisfied with the outcome of care, but this was not 
reflected in her COOP scores.  
In this project, the measurement of outcomes became a part of the next process of 
care. The aim of contacting clients three months after the intervention was to 
determine whether they had achieved their goals and accessed the service to which 
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they were referred. The important outcome of this project was the identification of 
changed client needs and the ability to adapt the services to these changing needs. 
In this case, health outcomes were not a static measure with clear start and end 
points for this group of clients. Recognition of the rapidly declining health status of 
the clients was necessary to maintain their independence in the community. 
Where outcomes and processes could be compared, the delivery of best practice 
care (ie use of services to which the client was referred) was not associated with 
changes in health status or achievement of the client goals. This may be, in part, 
due to the insensitivity of the Dartmouth COOP chart at detecting changes that are 
specific to this intervention. The final small sample size may prohibit the detection 
of meaningful change, however there is no normative data to describe the size of 
the change that would be expected with this group of clients. Additionally, some of 
the variation in the health service process was due to client choice, not the systems 
of health service delivery. 
The poor rate of data collection after the key contact person left highlighted the 
need for some system of accountability for outcomes data collection within the 
program. 
Vignette Five: Wound outcomes project – Integrated Health Care 
Program 
The Wound Outcomes Project, like the Alcohol and Drug project, illustrates the 
need to implement systems that support the collection of health outcomes data and 
to monitor these systems on an ongoing basis.  
Wound management is undertaken by nurses within the Integrated Health Care 
Program (IHCP). Anecdotal evidence suggests that despite clear guidelines for 
wound management, there is still considerable variation in practice by nurses 
within ACT Community Care. Additionally, the budget for wound dressings was 
50% above the estimated amount for the 1999 - 2000 financial year. The aim of the 
wound outcomes project was to reduce practice variation and improve wound 
healing in the hope that this would reduce the cost of wound dressings to the IHCP. 
This project investigated the relationship between adherence to the Wound Clinical 
Pathway (process), the time for wound healing and the cost of dressings used for 
particular wound types (outcomes). Regular nursing care for wound management 
included reporting on processes and outcomes using an existing ‘standardised care 
plan’ for wound management. At the start of the project, I undertook a 
retrospective audit of the files of twenty discharged clients and found that much of 
this data was not, in fact, easily available. Despite the existence of a previous 
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standardised wound care plan, it was only present in twelve of the files. Where the 
care plans did exist, they did not all contain the same protocols. For instance, some 
contained pages that were updated in different years from the original record. 
Nurses who treated wounds in the ambulatory clinics used different forms to the 
nurses involved in the delivery of home based wound care which meant that the 
results could not be compared across different service settings.  
The care plan itself provided no mechanisms for the nurses to document wound 
progress over time (ie changes in wound size, exudate etc). Additionally, there was 
no way to know whether the wound was actually healed in the majority of cases, 
since wound status at discharge was only recorded in only six of the files audited.  
To obtain the patient perceptions of wound outcomes, thirty nurses piloted an 
additional wound-specific outcome measure on a sample of clients receiving 
wound care. The nurses found the instrument time consuming to administer. The 
questionnaire asked about the impact of the wound on the lifestyle of the patient. 
However, nurses reported that the instrument was not appropriate for patients with 
long-standing ulcers because these patients had adapted their lifestyle to 
accommodate for their wound. When this information was combined with the 
results of the file audit, the steering committee requested that we focus on the 
routinely collected data and omit the patient perceptions questionnaire. 
As a result of the initial file audit, new processes were introduced to improve the 
quality and rates of the routine reporting on wound processes and outcomes. The 
nurses adopted a wound care pathway that was developed for the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs (DVA). The DVA pathway solved the problem of standardised 
data collection between ambulatory and home based care, and provided the 
information necessary to determine the outcomes of care. An internal audit system 
was introduced in which an allocated team member reviews the files of 25 new 
clients admitted to the service for wound management every month to ensure that 
the wound care plans are used and completed.  
When the final audit was undertaken, the DVA wound care plan was used in only 
28%, or 21 of a total of 73 files of clients with wounds. Analysis of the results 
showed that clients with a care plan had almost twice the number of units of service 
(26 as opposed to 16) as clients who did not have a DVA care plan in their file 
(χ2(2) = 4.8, P<0.05). One unit of service equates to 15 minutes of service 
provision. There was no difference in wound healing rates between either of the 
groups. The discrepancy in numbers of units of service cannot be explained by the 
wound type as there is insufficient information in the files of clients without care 
plans to establish this. 
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In this project, there was a direct and significant relationship between adherence to 
‘best practice’ care and the amount of care the client received. Although this 
relationship was not in the direction expected. It is possible, but unlikely that use of 
the DVA care plan explains the increased amount of service provided to the 
patient. It is more feasible that the nurses selected specific types of patients on 
whom to use the care plan. However this cannot be confirmed in the absence of the 
completed care plan. There was no measurable difference in the actual outcomes of 
care for the clients.  
This project has highlighted the fact that even when clear processes of care are 
used, such as the standardised wound care plan, they are not necessarily 
appropriate to support the documentation and achievement of goals. Secondly, 
without mechanisms to monitor the adherence to the model, there is no way to 
ensure that the processes are being adhered to. Both ACT Community Care and 
DVA determined that the DVA care plan constitutes best practice for the 
documentation and delivery of care to their clients. Regardless of the impact on 
client outcomes, the specified processes of care were adhered to in less than 30% 
of cases, which prevented accurate data collection about health service processes 
and outcomes.  
Vignette Six: Nutrition Screening Tool – Child Youth Family and 
Women’s Program 
The Nutrition Screening Tool is slightly different to the other interventions, in that 
it evaluated a new intervention - a screening tool designed to ensure that parents do 
not introduce solids prematurely. The intervention had extensive resource 
implications and this project aimed to determine whether it was feasible to 
introduce it across the organisation. The results showed that that the initially 
perceived need for the service did not actually exist. However, subsequent to 
completing the evaluation of the service, the World Health Organisation changed 
their guidelines for the introduction of solids for infants. In other words, they 
changed the outcome that was being examined, highlighting the subjective and 
changing nature of some community health outcomes. 
In response to anecdotal feedback that parents were receiving conflicting 
information about the nutritional needs of new-born babies, a group of dieticians 
successfully applied for funding to develop an information booklet for parents 
called “From Milk to More” and a two-part “nutrition screening tool”. The goals of 
the booklet and screening tool were to ensure that parents did not introduce solids 
to their children before they reach four months of age, as specified by WHO 
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guidelines, and that when solids were introduced, the baby received an 
‘appropriate’ texture and variety of food. The nutrition screening tools were 
designed for opportunistic administration to coincide with the six-week and six-
month immunization schedules. Extensive piloting of the tools by the Maternal and 
Child Health (MACH) nurses found that an additional fifteen minutes was required 
to administer each of the screening tools. The cost of reprinting the booklet, 
combined with the relatively high resource burden of introducing the screening 
tools meant that the program wanted to ensure their effectiveness before their 
widespread implementation.  
The evaluation was to take two forms; qualitative feedback, using focus groups 
with parents and MACH nurses about the booklet and a controlled trial of the 
introduction of the screening tools by introducing the tool in one region and 
comparing the outcomes with the three other non-intervention (ACT) regions.  
The booklet was an overwhelming success with parents whose babies were old 
enough for them to consider introducing solids, however mothers with younger 
babies (three months and under) did not look at the book.  
The screening tools were introduced into the intervention region for a three-month 
period to collect baseline data on the actual and expected age of introduction of 
solids as well as to pilot the instruments more comprehensively.  
The three-month data collection period (n=150) found that almost 90% of parents 
introduce solids when the child is older than four months, and the few exceptions 
were often due to childhood allergies. This meant that the main goal of the project, 
that is, to increase the age of introduction of solids, was inappropriate for all but 
10% of the existing client group. The second outcome variable, the texture and 
variety of food, could not be accurately measured at the six-month screen, because 
in some cases parents had only just started to introduce solids to their child. 
Additionally, the ability of the nurses to judge the appropriateness of the texture 
and variety of foods introduced was highly subjective.  
The outcome of the project was to eliminate the second ‘screening tool’, and 
relabel them ‘guided nutritional questionnaires’ which could be used at the 
discretion of the MACH nurse. The feedback from the nurses was that the tools 
were useful to identify parental concerns and directing them to appropriate 
resources.  
The importance of this project for the collection of health outcomes data was the 
need to clearly identify the requirement for a new service and evaluate this service 
before investing in its development.  
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Just after completing this project, The World Health Organisation released new 
guidelines about the introduction of solids, which recommends that solids should 
not be introduced until after the child is six months old. The evolving nature of 
health and health research means that the ‘best’ outcomes of care can vary 
according to the latest research and / or policy decisions. 
Summary 
The implications of the health outcomes approach arising from each project are 
summarised in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Summary of the implications of each project for the collection of 
health outcomes data 
Projects Implications for collection of outcomes data 
Paediatric dental 
outcomes 
♦ Paucity of validated paediatric health outcome measures 
♦ Difficulty identifying clear outcomes of a dental intervention which can 
be measured in a timely way and attributed to the intervention. 
Innersole pilot 
study 
♦ Difficulty attributing the outcome to the intervention 
♦ Poor rates of recruitment into the project by podiatrists. 
♦ Poor availability of routine data for the collection of process information 
(eg date of service) 
Alcohol and Drug 
Program  
♦ Providers had poor rates of adherence to ‘client planning’ due to the 
layout and location of the documentation. The client planning process 
require revision to increase rates of adherence by providers. 
♦ Many clients did not complete their intervention, making goal 
determination obsolete in many cases. 
IAU project ♦ The Dartmouth COOP measured a narrow range of domains which did 
not reflect the broad range of client goals and needs.  
♦ Client needs had often changed after three months, which meant that 
following up on the outcomes also became a new process in the 
delivery of services. 
Nutrition 
screening tool 
♦ What was once a good outcome, may cease to be a good outcome 
when the parameters of the outcome change 
♦ The requirement for a needs analysis before introducing expensive 
changes to health service delivery. 
Wound outcomes 
project 
♦ The need to introduce monitoring systems to ensure that providers 
adhere with the minimum standards of documentation so that 
outcomes are recorded in the patient file. 
4.6 Recommendations and changes arising from the 
projects 
The recommendations to ACT Community Care proposed the introduction of 
systems to facilitate the documentation of health outcomes at the clinical level and 
the development of indicators of health service quality that could be reported to the 
QIC, and the purchaser if necessary. The recommendations focussed on three 
areas; file standards, process monitoring and outcomes monitoring as these were 
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the minimum requirements necessary to be able to access any meaningful 
information at a clinical level. 
File standards proposed the minimum criteria for recording in and access to client 
files. For instance, all files should have at least the details of the client, the name 
and signature of every provider, and the date the client was seen. At any point in 
time, at least 90% of all files should be able to be located. 
Process monitoring refers to the establishment of the minimum standards of 
reporting on information which is specific to the management of the client, such as 
goal setting, appropriateness of an intervention, client follow-up, reporting on 
outcomes and writing a discharge summary. Some of these issues will be generic 
across programs, however each program, or each discipline may identify issues that 
are specific to their own requirements, such as the use of clinical pathways or 
adherence to guidelines. Process monitoring is dependent on the achievement of 
minimum file standards.  
Outcomes monitoring is the collection of data that relates to a specific intervention 
to determine the effectiveness of that intervention. If the standards prescribed in 
process monitoring are met, outcomes information should be reported for every 
client, for every episode of care, making outcomes information accessible through 
a file audit. For the results to be meaningful the intervention must be clearly 
defined and there should be agreement on the method of reporting on outcomes 
within that intervention. Outcomes do not necessarily need to be quantified, 
although obviously this makes aggregation of data simpler. 
These recommendations were not implemented, however following this report, 
ACT Community Care made the completion of a client care plan compulsory for 
every client. No systems of monitoring were introduced to enforce this standard. 
ACT Community Care has a commitment to the introduction of an organisation 
wide information system. Their first investment in community based information 
technology development was in 1997 as part of an unsuccessful consortium with 
partners in New South Wales, South Australia and Queensland. In early 2001, they 
advertised for, and selected a tenderer to develop an information technology 
system.  
A number of smaller changes arose within the programs as a result of the 
individual outcomes projects; 
 The ACT Diabetes Service is implementing best practice protocols for lower 
limb care in the form of the Footpath clinical pathway. 
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 Wound management protocols and documentation have been standardised 
across the whole of the Integrated Health Care Program community nursing 
and internal auditing processes have been introduced to improve rates of 
adherence to the protocols.  
 Clients who undergo a comprehensive assessment within the Intake and 
Assessment Unit now have a three-month telephone follow-up to determine 
their achievement of goals or changed health service needs. 
 The Alcohol and Drug Program have modified their Client Planning protocol; 
 ‘Best practice’ processes have been identified for patients who receive denture 
relinement and replacement. 
 There has been extensive education of staff across ACT Community Care 
across most programs into the importance of quality documentation, 
identification of and adherence to set processes, and documentation of client 
outcomes. 
4.7 Within case analysis 
ACT Community Care and the ACT Department of Health and Community Care 
clearly specified their intention to include health outcomes in purchasing contracts. 
However, there were a number of barriers to translating this goal into practice. The 
vignettes illustrated some of the problems with the application of health outcomes 
at the clinical level. However, before the projects had even started, there were a 
number of structural issues that contributed to the difficulties.  
This case study demonstrates that information about health outcomes is not readily 
accessible to give to the purchaser. The measurement of health outcomes involves 
a number of stages including the documentation, collection and extraction of data 
for reporting purposes. In other words, the collection of health outcomes data 
requires both the implementation of systems at an organisational level as well as 
clearly specified criterion at a clinical level. To investigate the barriers to the use of 
health outcomes in this case study, I now revisit the organisational structure of 
ACT Community Care to examine the actors responsible for the provision of health 
outcomes information. The chapter goes on to explore each of the component steps 
involved in the collection and reporting of health outcomes data. 
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4.7.1 Who is responsible for the production of health outcomes 
data? 
The first barrier to the collection of health outcomes data was the identification of 
clear lines of responsibility for collecting and reporting the information. The 
purchasing contract was an agreement between the purchasing and providing 
organisations. In other words, the contract was the mechanism of accountability 
between ACT Community Care and the DHCC for which the chief executive 
officer was ultimately responsible. The chief executive officer is not directly 
involved in the production of health outcomes information, nor is the director of 
primary health care, the program managers or the team leaders. The production of 
health outcomes information comes from the interaction between health service 
providers and their patients. But there are no mechanisms through which the health 
service providers are held accountable for the production of health outcomes data. 
ACT Community Care is looking to be accountable to the purchaser on the basis of 
health outcomes information. However, in turn ACT Community Care does not 
hold health service providers responsible for the collection of this data in their 
clinical record keeping. As a result, many health service providers do not routinely 
document either the goals or the outcomes of their patient – provider interaction. 
This means that under current reporting and accountability structures, ACT 
Community Care will have difficulty producing the outcomes information to give 
to the purchaser.  
For an organisation to produce any product or outcome, the organisation must 
produce the components that go together to make that product. Health outcomes 
are dependent on the health service providers to document what they did. Whether 
or not the health service providers are actually contributing to the health outcomes 
of their patients, they do not currently provide sufficient information for the 
organisation to demonstrate that providers either document, or improve health 
outcomes.  
The lack of health service provider accountability for health outcomes data was 
illustrated in the vignettes of the Alcohol and Drug Program, the Innersole Project 
and the Wound Outcomes Project. Before any outcomes information could be 
obtained in either the Alcohol and Drug Program or the Wound Outcomes Project, 
systems had to be implemented to ensure that health outcomes were documented in 
the first place. For the Innersole project, where an additional questionnaire was 
used to measure the change in foot health status, data missing from the patient files 
meant that the frequency of visits could not be determined.  
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At an organisational level, health service provider accountability for producing 
outcomes data needs to be addressed before outcomes can be reported at any other 
level. Even if these structural issues are addressed, there are a number of other 
barriers to the use of health outcomes information in the clinical setting, and for 
reporting purposes.  
4.7.2 The collection and reporting on health outcomes data 
For health outcomes information to be produced, there needs to be an interaction 
between the patient and health service provider. Normally, the health service 
provider will deliver an intervention and there will (hopefully) be a result or 
outcome. However, unless the outcome is documented or reported in some way, 
there will be no health outcomes data produced. For reporting purposes, the health 
outcomes data then needs to be extracted, and aggregated. The approach to health 
outcomes data collection is reproduced in Figure 4.6 to highlight the issues that 
arose at each level of the proposed model. Each letter in the figure denotes a stage 
in the process of the collection of health outcomes data.  
Figure 4.6: Proposed approach to outcomes data collection 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
A. Client admission and collection of baseline demographic and health 
outcomes data. 
Most projects had poor rates of recruitment, which were subject to selection bias. 
The lack of an information system meant that there was no way of knowing what 
service the patient received (with the exception of the dental program). In cases 
where an additional questionnaire was being used, the staff member had to 
recognise that the client was receiving an intervention that was part of the 
outcomes trial, and then administer the baseline questionnaire. The Footpath, IAU 
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and Innersole Projects all had recruitment rates of less than 50% of eligible clients, 
creating potential sampling bias, which may ultimately skew the outcomes results. 
Where the collection of outcomes data was dependent on health service providers 
recruiting clients or giving out forms, the response rates were relatively low – even 
when additional time was built into the appointments. Some providers expressed 
concern about the ethical issues around the collection of health outcomes data and 
aggregating this for reporting purposes. 
B. Delivery of the intervention and adherence to standardised processes 
In many cases, the intervention could not be clearly defined, and the reproducible 
and measurable processes of care were poorly adhered to. 
The linking of the outcome to an intervention requires that the intervention can 
actually be defined. Assuming that the health outcomes data can be quantified, the 
numbers themselves are meaningless unless they are accompanied by a descriptive 
label. The consultation phase highlighted that there were few clear labels that could 
be used for health outcomes reporting. Few interventions are delivered specifically 
to treat a diagnosed condition. Part of the process of developing the outcomes 
framework involved the identification of a range of treatment types and the 
outcomes that might arise from these (Table 4.3). Each health service discipline 
delivers a range of health service types. Attempting to report on ‘health outcomes 
for nursing’ for example, would mean that information about breast care was 
included with stoma therapy and regular insulin injections. Not only are the goals 
of all these interventions quite different, but the outcomes have very little in 
common. There is no standardised classification system in place within ACT 
Community Care that would facilitate this type of labeling at present.  
This case study aimed to link the processes of care to the outcomes for the patient. 
As the consultation phase of the project demonstrated, not all interventions had 
reproducible processes. Where reproducible processes did exist, for example the 
wound care plan and the innersole care plan, the rates of adherence to these 
processes were poor. In many cases, systems had to be implemented to ensure that 
the processes of care were adhered to before the outcomes could be monitored, for 
instance the Alcohol and Drug Program and Wound Outcomes Project. 
C. Discharge documentation of number of occasions of service and variances 
Minimum data requirements were often missing from the client files when the file 
was accessed for audit. 
The original proposal was that the majority of the process and health outcome data 
could be reported on a standardised discharge summary. Provider and management 
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resistance to the increased reporting meant that a discharge summary was only 
included on the modified wound care plan. Instead, provider notes were audited to 
access much of the ‘process’ information. However, process data were poorly 
recorded. For instance, the dates were missing in many files, so that the number of 
occasions of service over a particular time period could not be calculated. Often it 
was not even clear that the client had been discharged from the service or it was 
unclear that an episode of care had ended. 
D. The collection of health outcomes data 
Despite the availability of numerous health outcome measures, there were 
difficulties introducing these into clinical practice. 
The early projects attempted to use psychometrically valid measures such as the 
Dartmouth COOP charts and the Foot Health Status Questionnaire. Poor rates of 
use of these measures by health service providers led to simpler methods of 
outcome measurement in later projects, including clinical measures such as the rate 
of wound healing, or goal achievement by clients. The quantifiable measures, such 
as the Dartmouth COOP chart had the disadvantage of a relatively generic scope of 
health domains, that did not necessarily reflect accurately the impact of the multi-
disciplinary community based intervention.  
The problems with choosing appropriate measurement instruments have already 
been covered. There was not always a clear point in time at which health outcomes 
could be measured. The outcomes of care often do not occur until after the client 
has been discharged from the service, for example, the Intake and Assessment 
Project, the Innersole Pilot study and paediatric dental outcomes. In the former 
cases, an arbitrary point in time was chosen, after the client received the 
intervention, at which the outcomes were measured. Most of the clients of the 
Intake and Assessment Project had received their interventions and achieved their 
goals, however the follow-up of outcomes often resulted in the delivery of new 
care due to the changing health of these clients. In this case, the measurement of 
health outcomes actually became part of the next health service process. It is 
possible that in some cases, the expectation of a finite outcome, or of an outcome at 
a particular point in time, may prevent the client from accessing appropriate health 
services when their health needs change. The expectation of an achievement of a 
particular outcome, or ‘end-point’ denies the possibility that for many clients, 
health is a dynamic process and whilst goal achievement is important, it does not 
necessarily imply the end of the health care requirements. It may in fact highlight a 
new need, as the IAU project demonstrated.   
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Whether or not health service providers are measuring health outcomes routinely, 
those that were involved in this project failed to document the outcomes of the 
patient care in their file. In some cases, the measurement of the outcomes was 
undertaken after the intervention had finished, so the providers were not involved 
in that step of data collection (IAU and FHSQ).  
The second structural problem was the lack of systems to extract the health 
outcomes data (assuming it was produced in the first place). The poor information 
technology infrastructure meant that often files could not be located, the client may 
have been deceased without this being documented in the file or on the 
computerised record. The lack of health intervention classification systems meant 
that it was not possible to electronically identify clients who were receiving a 
particular intervention.  
E. Reporting on process indicators 
The Donabedian concept of linking structures, processes and outcomes is 
dependent on the ability to define the processes and outcomes of care. As a number 
of these studies demonstrated, such as the Intake and Assessment Unit project, the 
Alcohol and Drug Client Planning project, not all health service interventions have 
reproducible processes. In cases where the intervention does have defined 
processes that are well documented (such as the wound project), it is unsafe to 
assume that providers will adhere to these processes. Even simple measures of 
process, such as the number of occasions of service during a particular time period, 
are unreliable when providers omit to document standard details such as the date of 
the intervention. Process measures, at face value, appear to be clearly objectifiable 
components of health service delivery. As this study has shown, they are subject to 
a number of questions of interpretation, accuracy, reliability and validity. Before 
health outcomes or process data can be collected, the systems of data collection 
must be standardised and adhered to. For the purpose of this project, internal 
monitoring systems were required to ensure that standard processes of 
documentation were adhered to. 
F. Calculation of the health outcome 
Assuming that the health status has been measured objectively and converted into 
some sort of score that can be used to compare the health outcomes before and 
after an intervention, this step involves someone to actually do the calculations.  
Health service providers did not always find the quantification of health outcomes 
data useful, and where the data required computer manipulation to obtain a score, 
they were not used at all in the clinical setting.  
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G. Extraction, aggregation of results and reporting 
Even before the project commenced, the purchaser and providing organisation 
acknowledged that health outcomes would not necessarily be a useful indicator of 
health service effectiveness. The reasons for this were the acknowledged time lag 
for the collection of outcome and the difficulty attributing the outcomes to the 
health intervention. The two organisations did, however accept the proposal to 
identify ‘processes’ of care that could serve as proxies for health outcomes. At the 
start of the project, a number of health service providers could identify specific 
interventions for which there were clear processes of care, such as documented 
clinical pathways. Therefore, the collection of ‘process’ and ‘outcomes’ data 
appeared to be relatively straightforward. As the case studies have demonstrated, 
however, the collection of process and outcome data was not at all straightforward. 
The extraction and aggregation of the health outcomes and process data is essential 
if these are to form the basis of reporting to the purchaser. However, as the 
previous steps have illustrated, providers introduce bias into the recruitment of 
patients and generally have low rates of recruitment. Where files are used as the 
primary source of information, they need to be located, and this was not always 
possible. The requisite data, such as the processes of health service delivery and the 
outcomes are not routinely reported. These are all practical barriers to the 
collection and extraction of health outcomes data. 
Once the data are collected, they need to be aggregated, and these results need to 
be interpreted. Not all health services lend themselves to the production of data that 
can be aggregated to form an outcome score. For instance in the Alcohol and Drug 
project, the desired outcomes were the achievement of goals. In many cases, the 
clients did not continue to attend the ADP until their goals were achieved.  
Even where there were quantifiable outcomes, such as in the IAU and Innersole 
projects, the results were not always easily interpreted nor necessarily an accurate 
reflection of the impact of the intervention. But probably the most important factor 
about the use of health outcomes was the example illustrated by the lady who 
received innersoles, never wore them and achieved a vast improvement in foot 
health status due to an external intervention. That is, the difficulties attributing any 
health outcome solely to the delivery of health care. If these results had been 
interpreted in the absence of the qualitative information received by the client, the 
intervention would have been judged as a success.  
In summary, the reporting of process or outcomes data is fraught with difficulties 
in a health setting. Without accountability systems to hold providers responsible for 
producing process or health outcomes data, the quality of information collected at a 
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clinical level is likely to be poor. Secondly, the lack of information infrastructure to 
facilitate the easy reporting and extraction of process and outcomes data means that 
it is often difficult to access this information where it does exist. 
My position within the organisation meant that change was difficult to initiate. I 
provided written and verbal reports which included recommendations to the 
program involved in each project, the QIC and to the executive. Some of the 
recommendations were implemented across the organisation, such as the need for 
care plans for all clients of ACT Community Care. This policy was implemented 
initially without any monitoring systems, which meant that providers still did not 
adhere to the care plans.   
In order for outcomes or process based reporting to be effective, the interventions 
would need to be defined, and if possible, a classification system adopted to enable 
this to take place. Ideally, there would be evidence to support the delivery of that 
intervention in the first place. Importantly, the process data would need to be 
accessible, and this would require accessible files and consistency in 
documentation and reporting.  
The project was based on the Donabedian notion that the structures and processes 
that go together to compile health care will predict the health outcome. The sample 
sizes were too small within most of these projects to refute this claim on statistical 
grounds. However in many of the projects, the reproducible processes that could be 
monitored, such as documented client planning in the Alcohol and Drug Program, 
would not actually be expected to directly impact on the therapeutic outcomes of 
the client. In other words, the specific processes of care that lead to the outcome 
are not clearly definable. This is the case for many of the interventions described in 
this case study, and likely to be the case for many multidisciplinary, community 
and allied health based interventions. 
The recommendations arising from this project to ACT Community Care included 
the development of internal monitoring and review systems, similar to those used 
by the Alcohol and Drug and Wound outcomes projects. A model similar to that 
proposed by Codman, in which providers document details of the client goals, the 
intervention that was undertaken, and some form of client follow-up at the end of 
the intervention. ACT Community Care implemented a separate incident 
monitoring system after the introduction of this project. 
In conclusion, this case study has highlighted a number of barriers to use of health 
outcomes in health service management. The use of health outcomes in purchasing 
contracts implies that the collection of health outcomes can be, and is undertaken at 
a clinical level. This is true in some cases, however, the extraction of health 
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outcomes data from the professional-patient interaction is fraught with difficulties. 
The assumption that health service providers measure, or at least document health 
outcomes routinely has proven to be incorrect within most of these studies. In the 
majority of cases, the collection of health outcomes data, and indeed the 
documentation of standardised process information such as the date of the occasion 
of service, took substantial training of staff. Presumably, before health service 
organisations can even attempt to include health outcomes in their purchasing, 
contracts, the more basic requirements of accurate and reliable data collection must 
be met. Whilst the focus of this project has been to address contractual 
accountability between the purchaser and provider, another tier of accountability 
must be addressed before contractual accountability can be met using clinically 
based indicators.  
The accessibility of the information, in this case, was limited by a number of 
factors. Firstly, the lack of clear mechanisms through which health service 
providers were held accountable for actually producing any outcomes data. The 
organisation was responsible for the production of information for which they do 
not hold the ‘gatekeepers’ of that information accountable. The quality of provider 
record keeping meant that in many cases the information was meaningless. The 
lack of classification of health service types meant that identifying a level at which 
to report outcomes was difficult, as was identifying clients who had received a 
particular intervention. Where additional questionnaires were used, providers had 
poor rates of compliance with their use. This is probably related to the fact that 
they are not held accountable for this information. 
However, assuming that all of these structural, or access issues could be addressed, 
there are still some major problems with the actual measurement of health 
outcomes at a clinical level. In a number of cases, it is difficult to identify objective 
outcomes of care. When outcome instruments were used, such as the Dartmouth 
COOP charts, they did not accurately reflect the effect of the intervention – 
particularly once the results were aggregated. Finally, and probably most 
importantly, is the difficulty identifying clear outcome measures that can be 
attributed to the intervention.  
In Chapter Five, I describe the proposed adoption of health outcomes as a 
management tool by the Department of Veterans' Affairs for allied health services. 
In contrast to ACT Community Care, which is a health service providing 
organisation attempting to meet purchaser requirements through the measurement 
of health outcomes, the Department of Veterans' Affairs is a health service 
purchasing organisation, or more correctly, a third-party payer. The Department of 
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Veterans' Affairs purchases services on behalf of Veterans and adopted the 
outcomes approach as a mechanism for allied health service provider 
accountability from the perspective of a purchaser of health services. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This case study illustrates an alternative approach to the same problem of health 
service provider accountability experienced by ACT Community Care. Again the 
chapter commences with the structural relationship between DVA and the allied 
health service providers. This relationship is one of the important differences 
between the two case studies and underpins the approach to health outcomes taken 
by DVA.  
Unlike ACT Community Care, where the onus was on the provider to identify 
health outcome measures that could be included in the purchase contract, DVA (the 
purchaser) took on the investigative role. They advertised for tenders to provide a 
suite of health outcome measures that could be included in purchasing contracts 
with allied health providers. The tender process, and the ensuing model, the “Allied 
Health Management System” are described in section Appendices D and E. 
I piloted the Allied Health Management System to determine its acceptability to 
providers, and whether it would fulfill the requirements of DVA. The trial 
methodology, results and the conclusions drawn by DVA are described in the 
second part of the chapter. 
The full report of the trial of the Allied Health Management System is presented in 
Appendix Two. To reduce duplication, only the components of the report that are 
relevant to address the research questions are included within this chapter.  
5.2 The organisational relationship between allied health 
and the Department of Veterans' Affairs  
The Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) purchases services from over 30 000 
allied health service providers across ten disciplines nationally, including 
physiotherapists, psychologists, orthotists and prosthesists, social workers, speech 
pathologists, podiatrists, occupational therapists, osteopaths, dieticians and 
chiropractors. Allied health providers enter into individual contracts with DVA for 
the provision of services to Veterans. The relationship between DVA and the 
providers is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1: Accountability structures between the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs and allied health service providers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Until recently, the provision and monitoring of allied health services had relied on 
the relatively resource intensive system of ‘prior approval’. In its simplest form, 
prior approval required the veteran to seek a referral to an allied health service 
provider from his or her Local Medical Officer (LMO). This then automatically 
entitled the veteran to a set, maximum amount of care by that provider. For 
example, veterans referred to a podiatrist would automatically receive eight 
occasions of service over a twelve-month period, regardless of the underlying 
condition or its severity. Any increase in this amount required the health service 
provider to contact an allied health advisor in the DVA state office for ‘prior 
approval’ before going ahead with the additional care. 
Allied health advisors are representatives of their discipline who are employed by 
the Department of Veterans' Affairs, normally on a part-time basis. Historically, 
their role has involved the monitoring and approval of requests for extended or 
additional care for veterans by members of their own discipline. Also, allied health 
advisors represent their discipline to DVA on any issues that are likely to impact on 
the care provided by the providers they represent. The number of advisors 
employed for any discipline is proportionate to the number of providers in each 
state. This means that most states have at least one physiotherapy, podiatry and 
occupational therapy advisor. However some disciplines, such as speech pathology, 
have only one representative nationally.   
The system of prior approval effectively established an artificial ceiling, and floor 
on care It imposed parameters around health service delivery which were 
historically based, rather than based on the requirements of the veteran or on the 
delivery of ‘best practice’ services. The Department proposed the removal of prior 
approval to increase the efficiency of allied health service delivery and improve 
veteran health outcomes. It was the emphasis on the latter that led the Department 
to embrace the concept of health outcomes as a management tool for the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs 
Provider 
Veterans 
Contract 
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monitoring of health service providers following the removal of prior approval 
(Kathy Vanduren, Director of Community Health, DVA, personal communication).  
5.3 The move to an outcomes approach by the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs 
In June, 1999, the Department of Veterans' Affairs advertised for tenders to 
identify health outcome measures that could be used for reporting by allied health 
providers. The tender was specifically aimed at the identification of measures of 
health outcomes which could be used for reporting and monitoring purposes for 
each allied health discipline (DVA 1999). The tender document stated that  
DVA is responsible for ensuring that health care services 
purchased for entitled veterans, war widow(er)s and dependents 
achieve optimal health outcomes” (Clause 3.10, p1) and “ To 
determine if this is being achieved, DVA is seeking an analysis 
on the most recent research into health outcome measures for 
the range of health care services currently purchased (Clause 
3.11, p1). 
DVA required the tenderer to identify and make recommendations of the most 
appropriate health outcome measures applicable to chiropractic / osteopathy, 
physiotherapy, dentistry, psychology, dietetics, podiatry, occupational therapy, 
social work, optometrical and speech pathology. They defined ‘most appropriate’ 
as; user friendly (compatible with existing data collection arrangements), cost 
effective (to collect, or to report on and to analyse), consistent with best practice, 
and consistent with the Australian health care environment (DVA 1999). 
The successful tenderer was Dr Karen Grimmer and her team from the Centre for 
Allied Health Research, University of South Australia. Their extensive literature 
review found that that whist there were numerous outcome measures, few if any 
complied with the points that DVA deemed as ‘most appropriate’ (Grimmer, 
Sheppard et al. 1999).  
Current information systems within DVA meant that it was difficult to find 
instruments that would comply with existing data collection arrangements. Before 
advertising for the tender, health outcomes were not explicitly used for reporting 
purposes at any level of DVA allied health service provision. The only data 
collected by DVA were health service codes on billing forms and the identification 
of the veteran and provider. Thus, existing information systems would need to be 
updated to collect the new health outcomes data. Alternatively, a different 
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mechanism for the collection of the data would be required. The research team 
proposed a system that would both rely on different mechanisms of data collection, 
but if implemented fully, would require enhanced information systems. 
The cost effectiveness of using health outcome measures could not be determined. 
This was because there were no existing studies of the use of health outcome 
measures by community health services on which the research team could base 
their estimations.  
It was difficult to identify measures that complied with ‘best practice’ due to the 
lack of evidence for the effectiveness of allied health services. Monitoring the 
effectiveness of health services on the basis of outcomes is dependent, amongst 
other things, on the ability to attribute the measured outcomes to the intervention 
(Harvey 1991). In the absence of evidence for the outcomes of the majority of 
allied health interventions, monitoring health services on the basis of health 
outcomes would not be possible.  
Finally, few of measures had been tested or validated in the Australian health care 
environment, let alone within an allied health setting.  
DVA appointed a steering committee, consisting of the Director of Community 
Health, the consultant who developed the AHMS , the Branch Head of Health 
Services, the Director of Health from the New South Wales State Office, and the 
contract manager.  
5.4 The approach: The Allied Health Management System 
The research team redefined the tender requirements in response to their inability 
to identify health outcome measures that could be used by DVA in health service 
monitoring (Grimmer, Sheppard et al. 1999). The new goals included; the 
introduction of a system that would lead to improvements in veteran outcomes 
through the removal of artificial limits to service provision, an increased onus on 
allied health practitioners to take responsibility for quality service provision and 
outcomes (ie increase provider accountability), improved partnerships between the 
stakeholders (veterans, allied health providers, DVA), increased efficiency for 
DVA by minimising the workload associated with prior approval, and the 
introduction of a system to support benchmarking for commonly treated conditions 
and enable monitoring of service provision.   
To address the newly defined requirements, the research team developed the Allied 
Health Management System (AHMS) (Grimmer 2002). The main features of the 
AHMS are listed in Table 5.1. 
 136
Table 5.1: The key components of the Allied Health Management System 
(Grimmer 2002) 
• Recognition of the veteran’s treatment record as the main auditable source 
of information 
• An algorithmic guide to the management of decisions 
• Longer-term, episodic, multi-disciplinary and consultative focus 
• Veteran, provider and  DVA partnerships sought on outcome measures and 
‘Best Practice’ management 
• Encouragement of providers to be overtly accountable for the amount and 
type of treatment / management they provide for veterans. 
• The use of ‘red and yellow flags’ that can be used to identify patients with 
problems that may not respond to treatment by a particular discipline.  
• The use of benchmarks based on the number of episodes of care for 
commonly treated veteran conditions. 
• The need for outcome measurement from the perspective of all 
stakeholders. 
In essence, the AHMS guides the health service provider through the development 
of a comprehensive care plan that emphasises the veteran goals and the achievable 
outcomes of care. The AHMS asks the provider to estimate the number of contacts 
they expect to provide to achieve these goals, and the maximum number of 
contacts they anticipate they will deliver before seeing any signs of improvement. 
It also requires the provider to quantify the outcomes where possible and the 
authors suggested this be undertaken by a modified version of the Patient 
Generated Index (Ruta, Garratt et al. 1994).  
The concepts of ‘red and yellow flags’ were included in the AHMS (Kendall 
1999). Red flags describe any condition which means that treatment by that 
provider is contra-indicated. For a chiropractor, cancer of the spine is a contra-
indication for back manipulation. Yellow flags are psycho-social factors which 
may impact on the outcomes of treatment. For example, a dietician should be 
alerted about a low income if the client needs special nutritional supplements. 
The AHMS was designed to reduce the workload on providers and advisors by 
removing prior approval. It proposed to do this by relying on the provider’s health 
records as the main source of information about the veteran – provider interaction. 
This means that the primary source of information about health service provider 
accountability would be physically located with the health service provider, with 
little information coming directly to the advisors or DVA. In other words, the 
AHMS helped define ‘clinical quality’, but direct mechanisms to ensure provider 
accountability to DVA were still required.  
To address the need for DVA to monitor providers, a system of benchmarking was 
proposed. It was based on the identification of common conditions or intervention 
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types undertaken by each discipline and developing parameters for ‘normal care’ 
based on the numbers of occasions of service for each one. Ideally, DVA preferred 
that clinical pathways or standard care plans would be developed for these 
interventions to reduce the amount of variation in practice and simplify the 
implementation of the AHMS. 
5.5 Implementation of the Allied Health Management 
System 
I was employed by DVA as an external evaluator to pilot the AHMS. They wanted 
to know whether providers would accept the model, and how it would be 
implemented. They were also concerned about how they could monitor the quality 
of provider care. The pilot study of AHMS was used to determine the acceptability 
of the model to health service providers, the training requirements of providers in 
the use of the AHMS, and to investigate possible systems for the ongoing, post-
payment monitoring of providers.  
The pilot study of the AHMS was undertaken from February to July, 2000. The full 
report on the trial is included in Appendix D.  
5.5.1 Trial method 
Two different approaches were required to address the aims of the pilot. Broadly, 
the first approach investigated provider acceptance of the AHMS. This was 
determined through qualitative feedback from a selection of providers across three 
different sites. The second part of the trial investigated methods of post-payment 
monitoring of the of services provided to veterans. The data needed to address the 
second part of the trial included the veteran conditions treated by providers, 
existing data collection systems and their capacity and finally, the needs of 
advisors. The initial proposal for ongoing monitoring was to identify five common 
interventions per discipline and establish a definition of an average ‘episode of 
care’ for each. This would form the basis of benchmarking for those disciplines, 
and help to identify interventions for which clinical pathways would be an 
appropriate tool. Data derived from the pilot study was to be used to help identify 
the common interventions, based on reported ‘conditions’ on the Intention to Treat 
forms and feedback from providers on their mid-term questionnaires.  
The practitioners included in the trial were chiropractors, osteopaths, occupational 
therapists, physiotherapists, dieticians, podiatrists, speech pathologists and 
psychologists. Social workers, optometrists and dentists were not included in the 
trial because social workers represent a very small proportion of allied health 
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services provided to veterans, so DVA felt that it was unnecessary to include them 
in the trial. Optometrists and dentists were excluded from the trial because the 
steering committee thought that long-term episodes of care are not common with 
these disciplines, and the outcomes are relatively straightforward. In contrast, the 
remaining providers do not have clearly defined outcomes and the length of their 
episodes of care can vary greatly and thus were included in the trial.  
Adelaide, Sydney and Coffs Harbour were chosen as pilot sites by DVA on the 
basis that rural and urban providers should be included in the study. Rural and 
urban providers were included to help identify any specific training requirements 
for providers in rural locations in the event that DVA did adopt the AHMS. 
Adelaide was selected because the Allied Health Management System was 
developed in South Australia and the chair of the steering committee believed that 
it would be beneficial for the original AHMS team to have some input into and 
receive some feedback from providers. Additionally, a number of providers who 
are based in Adelaide have outreach practices in rural areas, enabling the provision 
of a slightly different perspective to, say Sydney providers, who tend to work from 
a single location. Sydney was selected as a training site because of the high 
concentration of veterans and providers. Coffs Harbour was selected as the site to 
train rural providers by the NSW state office. Coffs Harbour was chosen because it 
is a large centre, accessible to a number of providers from surrounding rural areas 
and a number of veterans live on the north coast. 
The allied health advisors and administrative staff in the state offices were crucial 
to the implementation of the trial. The advisors had the in-depth knowledge about 
their own profession, so knew which providers would be most likely to participate 
and how to contact and recruit them. The administrative staff in the state officers 
were responsible for coordinating the mail-out to participating providers. The 
advisors in the New South Wales and South Australian state offices were asked to 
identify ten providers whom they thought would be willing to participate in the 
trial and access the training. The selection of specific providers brought with it the 
inevitable risk of selection bias. However, the advisors believed that the risk of 
undertaking a random selection of providers was likely to be non-response from 
less motivated providers. As a result, the feedback from the selected providers was 
considered to be ‘best case’ scenario. 
Training was multi-disciplinary and undertaken on one evening for two hours at 
each of the pilot sites. Providers were paid $100 each to attend the training. They 
did not receive any additional payment for their use of the AHMS.  
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The trial methodology is summarised in Figure 5.2. Each practitioner was asked to 
pilot the model on ten veterans. Any veteran attending that service provider was 
eligible to be recruited into the trial. Recruitment involved obtaining both verbal 
and written consent of the veteran to participate. The provider then completed an 
‘Intention to Treat’ form which documented the veteran’s name, contact details, 
conditions and the estimated number of contacts required to treat the condition/s. 
The veteran was also asked to sign the Intention to Treat form. The care of the 
veteran was managed according to the principles outlined in the Allied Health 
Management System. The Intention to Treat form was then forwarded to the trial 
coordinator in a pre-paid envelope. The project received ethics approval from the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs ethics committee. 
Figure 5.2: Summary of AHMS trial methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The AHMS trial objectives were evaluated using data derived from multiple 
sources. Provider feedback was elicited through the completion of an evaluation 
report at the end of each training session, a mid-term questionnaire, a telephone 
interview and a focus group with the Adelaide providers. The advisors audited all 
the files of veterans that were recruited into the trial to determine the rates of 
provider adherence to the model. The Intention to Treat forms were the main 
source of veteran treatment information. Veteran and LMO perceptions of the trial 
Advisors recruit 10 providers per discipline 
Providers attend training Training evaluation form completed 
Provider recruits 10 veterans 
Provider completes Intention to 
Treat form 
Intention to Treat form forwarded 
to trial coordinator 
Veteran consent received 
Provider adheres to AHMS with 
each veteran for 3 months 
Advisors audit the files of 
recruited veterans at the end of 
the trial 
Provider completes mid-term 
questionnaire, telephone 
interview, and attends focus 
group 
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were going to be elicited, however feedback from providers, veterans and one 
LMO described in the results section highlighted barriers to this approach. Finally, 
advisors from each state office participated in a workshop at the end of the trial to 
discuss the trial implications and implementation issues.  
Follow-up focus groups were planned for all training sites, however only one was 
held in Adelaide. Overlap with school holidays resulted in a poor response to the 
Sydney focus group and the small recruitment rate from Coffs Harbour providers 
meant that there was little value in obtaining provider feedback on a model they 
had not used. The focus group was used to address the main issues that arose 
during the trial including the time required to implement the AHMS in practice, 
barriers to veteran goal setting, interventions for which the AHMS would be 
inappropriate and methods of improving the training and dissemination of the 
model. Providers in Sydney were contacted individually by telephone and the 
issues, as well as the focus group responses were discussed with them. No new 
information arose from the final telephone interviews with Sydney providers, so it 
was unnecessary to run another focus group. Providers in Coffs Harbour were all 
contacted by telephone to identify any barriers to the use of the model, or clarify 
issues that may have led to confusion or prevented implementation of the model in 
the area.  
5.5.2 Results of the trial 
Seventy-six providers, across seven disciplines attended the training sessions, of 
whom fifty-six providers recruited 258 veterans over a three month period (Table 
5.2).  
There were a number of barriers to the recruitment of providers and veterans into 
the trial. Delayed communication between the national and state offices meant that 
providers had little notice of the training sessions and the training materials could 
not be sent to providers prior to the commencement of the trial. Two psychologists 
withdrew from the initial trial, primarily due to the relatively low rates of 
reimbursement by DVA relative to their private practice fees (they both responded 
in writing). The providers in Coffs Harbour received little notice of the trial and 
many were sent a letter either with the wrong name or incorrect address due to 
inaccuracies in the NSW state office database. This led many providers to question 
the credibility of the entire trial.  
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Table 5.2: The providers involved in the trial of the AHMS.  
Discipline Total providers 
who attended 
training 
Total 
providers 
involved in 
recruitment 
Total 
Veterans 
recruited 
Podiatry 13  10 69 
Physiotherapy 18 18 63 
Occupational Therapists 15 15 69 
Speech pathologists 3 2 4 
Chiropractors / Osteopaths 7 3 23 
Dieticians 8 5 15 
Orthotics and prosthetics 0 0 0 
Social workers 0 0 0 
Psychologists 12 3 15 
Total (including psychologists) 76 56 258 
Many providers reported difficulties recruiting veterans into the trial. Veterans had 
to give written consent to participate in the trial so that they could be contacted by 
telephone. The trial took some time to explain, and a number of veterans were 
suspicious of the collection of data by the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Some 
veterans were concerned that the AHMS would impact on their future entitlements 
to health services. 
Veteran perceptions were interviewed by telephone, however the first eight 
veterans contacted were confused about their participation in the trial, or had 
forgotten that they had participated in it in the first place. As a result, no more 
veterans were contacted. Providers were asked to comment on any feedback that 
they had received from veterans about the trial.  
Allied health advisors reported that the tool designed to audit the files of veterans 
recruited into the trial was easy to follow. However many providers did not 
structure their notes in a way that made the information easy to find. Access to the 
files was also limited by the geographic dispersion of providers. Providers from 
Coffs Harbour mailed their notes to their advisors. The advisors in Sydney 
physically visited the local providers to undertake the file audit taking an average 
of an hour and a half per provider. The cost of accessing the data for the file audit 
varied greatly. Country providers were asked to send an invoice to the trial 
coordinator for reimbursement of the costs associated with sending their files to the 
state advisors. One provider invoiced the project seventy-two dollars for eighteen 
pages of photocopying and faxing. Sixty dollars of that was to account for her time. 
Other invoices ranged from twelve to thirty-eight dollars. 
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5.5.3 Provider feedback on the AHMS 
Three themes arose around the use of health outcomes as a management tool based 
on the feedback received from providers in their questionnaires, focus group and 
telephone interview. These were; 
1. The difficulties identifying veteran goals and agreed goals of treatment and 
distinguishing between the two, 
2. The barriers to setting and quantifying goals experienced by some veterans, 
and  
3. The expectation of reimbursement for undertaking what many providers agreed 
formed ‘best practice’ standards of record keeping. 
Veteran goals versus agreed goals of treatment 
An important aspect of the use of health outcomes in a clinical setting is the ability 
of the health service provider to understand the goals of the patient. Without the 
identification of clear goals, it is difficult to claim that the outcomes have been 
achieved. The Allied Health Management System specifies the clear delineation of 
veteran goals of treatment from the agreed goals of care and where appropriate, the 
quantification of the outcomes of care. The responses by providers to the written 
questionnaires indicated that goal setting and the quantification of outcomes were 
familiar concepts. Sixty-one responses (94%) were received from the questionnaire 
submitted at the training session. Two thirds of providers (62%) reported that they 
document veteran goals in their health record; half (49%) indicated that they 
document the progress of veteran goals at each occasion of service; and 43% of 
providers reported that they quantify the outcomes of veteran care in some way. 
Two thirds (62%) of providers responding to the mid-term questionnaire reported 
that the AHMS had improved their goal setting (the remainder said that they 
already set goals with the veterans). The final audit of the files of veterans recruited 
into the trial demonstrated that veteran goals and agreed goals were documented 
more than 60% of the time by participating providers. However, the rates of 
quantification of veteran outcomes were poor, with podiatrists quantifying 
outcomes 70% of the time, but dieticians and occupational therapists quantified 
veteran outcomes less than 10% of the time. Chiropractors and physiotherapists 
quantified their goals in around 40% of their veteran files. 
Identifying quantifiable outcomes of care 
The qualitative feedback from telephone interviews and the focus groups with 
providers and advisors at the end of the trial indicated that in fact there was 
considerable difficulty with the concepts of veteran goal setting and quantifying 
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outcomes. Physiotherapists at a private hospital in Sydney had difficulty with the 
AHMS concepts of veteran goal setting because, when the veterans were asked 
about their goals of care after surgery, they identified factors such as “returning to 
golf” or “painting the house”. The role of the physiotherapists in this particular 
ward was primarily to prevent the veterans from developing a deep venous 
thrombosis whilst in hospital and would have little to do with improving the 
physical function of the veterans. They reported that by eliciting the veteran goals, 
they were leading the veteran to have unrealistic expectations of care, rather than 
clarifying with the veteran what would be the achievable outcomes of that 
component of care.  
Written responses to the questionnaires about “whether the use of the AHMS 
facilitated improved goal setting with veterans” resulted in two noteworthy 
responses. One provider wrote, “it prompts asking what goals the client has”, 
which implies that the provider did not ask about the veteran goals before the trial. 
Another provider wrote, “it is hard to set goals when the main condition is 
ongoing”. This appeared to be a common problem, with many podiatrists and 
chiropractors documenting ‘goals’ such as “monthly foot care” or “ongoing back 
care”, which might be a goal of the health service provider, but says nothing about 
the health outcome to be derived by the veteran. 
According to providers, Veterans had mixed reactions to the notion of goal setting. 
In the mid-term questionnaire providers were asked whether they found that 
veterans were active participants in setting the goals of their care. Two thirds of 
providers said that veterans do participate in their goal setting, although they 
reported a number of factors that reduce ability of veterans to set goals. Veteran 
health was cited as one barrier to identifying veteran based goals; many veterans 
are “debilitated by age and poor health” and “often veterans need help focusing on 
setting goals as their cognition is affected by CVA”. Another barrier to veterans 
setting goals was their perception that “you’re the doctor, you should tell me 
what’s going to happen” (reported by a chiropractor in the telephone interview). 
Another provider reported that “goal setting is an unfamiliar concept to veterans. 
Most are just used to being passive recipients of health care” and “they just want 
you to administer the treatment”. Many providers reported that a number of 
veterans refused to participate in the trial because of the perception of increased 
bureaucracy being a waste of time (a sentiment shared by some providers). Some 
providers believed that veterans did not want to quantify the outcomes of their care 
because they felt (correctly) that if they demonstrated an improvement, they would 
no longer receive that service.  
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The responses to the trial of both providers and veterans indicate that goal setting 
was not a routine part of allied health care. Providers expressed difficulties with the 
notion of setting realistic and achievable goals within the context of their service 
delivery. Similarly, many of the veterans were either perceived by providers as 
being unable to identify the goals of their care, or explicitly said that it was the role 
of the provider to tell them what to expect. Additionally, the focus on goals and 
outcomes actually threatened the ongoing receipt of health care services to some 
veterans.  
Reimbursement for ‘best practice’ 
The additional time required to document the information required by the AHMS 
was commonly reported as a barrier to the implementation of the model. On the 
mid-term questionnaires, provider estimates of the time required ranged from ‘no 
extra time’ to ‘two hours for the first appointment then an additional half an hour 
for every additional appointment’. Providers who attended the focus group agreed 
that the AHMS stipulates the minimum reporting standards. However they 
expected that DVA should reimburse them for adhering to the standards. 
5.5.4 Ongoing monitoring of providers 
The AHMS establishes a set of guidelines that could constitute the minimum 
standards for provider record keeping. However, the clinical records are stored 
with the health service providers, and there are 30 000 providers in different 
locations around Australia, so the Department still required some mechanism to 
ensure that the veterans are receiving good quality care. This section describes the 
mechanisms of accountability explored within the AHMS framework to try to 
ensure provider accountability to DVA.  
Previous mechanisms of accountability within DVA have relied on a gate-keeping 
role by allied health advisors. DVA set a ceiling on the amount of care that could 
be delivered. Any provider who delivered the care within the permissible range 
underwent little scrutiny by DVA. Providers who needed to increase the amount of 
care provided, or deliver an unusual or expensive services had to obtain permission 
from the advisor before proceeding with that intervention. Under the system of 
‘prior approval’ advisors had no formal mechanisms through which they could 
monitor the quality of care by the health service providers. The lack of adequate 
literature for many allied health disciplines also meant that there was little evidence 
to determine whether providers were giving appropriate treatment.  
To help identify changing mechanisms of accountability, I felt that it was important 
to determine the existing systems used by advisors to monitor providers. This was 
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also necessary to ensure that advisors were receiving appropriate information on 
which to base their decisions about providers in the new model.  
A focus group of seventeen advisors from four states, representing all of the 
disciplines participating in the trial was held in Sydney on the 17th of August, 
2000. Advisors were asked how they could determine the quality of providers 
before the removal of prior approval. The points separating ‘quality’ and ‘aberrant’ 
providers are described in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: The qualities on which advisors judge allied health service provider 
quality.  
‘Quality’ providers ‘Aberrant’ providers 
• Timeliness of reports returned to 
DVA 
• Gut feeling 
• Reasonable speed of access to 
service provider 
• Good clinical reasoning (determined 
by the quality of the information they 
give to the advisor in reports or 
requests for increased services) 
• Providers who seek the opportunity 
to discuss the health issues of the 
veteran 
• Member of the professional 
association 
• Participates in professional 
development and attends seminars 
• Willingness to change 
• Excessive number of treatments 
• Complaints by Veterans 
• Lack of variation in treatment type or 
reporting 
• Poor quality documentation (reports) 
• Over-prescription of equipment or 
services 
• Providers who encourage 
dependency of the Veteran 
• Providers who inappropriately raise 
Veteran expectations 
• Hostility towards advisors 
The following anecdote from a physiotherapy advisor illustrates the subjective 
difficulties in using the AHMS to determine health service provider accountability. 
The advisor audited the files of a physiotherapist who was perceived to fall into the 
‘quality provider’ category based on the providers’ professional reputation within 
her discipline, the advisor’s own experiences with the provider and feedback from 
veterans. However the audit of the physiotherapists files showed no compliance 
with any of the features of the AHMS, including goal setting, documenting the 
discharge of the veteran, or reviewing the progress of the Veteran at each occasion 
of service. The advisor thought that the physiotherapist was clinically competent 
and reported that she demonstrated superior clinical knowledge and good 
communication skills which surprised the advisor and led her to question the 
relationship between the AHMS and the health outcomes for veterans. It also 
highlights the range of indictors, subjective and objective, on which provider 
accountability is judged. 
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The removal of prior approval meant that advisors were receiving very little of the 
information that they had previously used to make judgements about provider 
quality. I asked the advisors what information they would like to receive to 
facilitate their roles of monitoring of health service quality and supporting 
providers. The advisors identified the following points; 
• They requested that the contracts with providers establish the minimum 
standards of practice and conduct and specify the steps that will be taken if 
providers do not comply with the standards. For example, they asked that the 
contract specify when and how the counseling of ‘aberrant’ providers should 
be given. The advisors felt that each discipline could develop their own 
standards and models for management. 
• The advisors wanted monitoring systems based on information collected by 
each provider that could be reported back to the advisors. For instance, they 
wanted to introduce diagnostic codes so that benchmarking could be developed 
based on the numbers of occasions of service for that particular condition. 
• That DVA should increase the administrative difficulties for providers who do 
not adhere to the minimum standards. For example aberrant providers could be 
requested to provide a detailed care plan for each veteran, be required to return 
to the system prior approval, or obtain a second opinion on their management 
of veterans. Alternatively, DVA could introduce a mentoring system in which 
an aberrant provider purchases ‘expert’ time to improve their professional 
standards. 
• ‘Preferred provider’ applications to DVA are currently processed at a national 
level without any consultation with other professional representatives. The 
advisors suggested that they should be consulted before providers are accepted 
as preferred providers by DVA. Forging relationships with other compensable 
bodies such as health insurance agencies or Work Cover could strengthen the 
protection of purchasers against poor quality providers. 
The advisor feedback was included in the final report to DVA. A number of these 
points rely on information that could not be determined within the scope of the 
trial. Given existing information sources, five methods of post-payment monitoring 
were investigated as part of the trial of the AHMS; 
1. Rates of adherence to the allied health management system; 
2. Average number of Veteran contacts per provider; 
3. The average costs of Veteran services per provider; 
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4. The average number of Veteran contacts for particular procedures or 
conditions; and 
5. Combinations of the type of management undertaken and the costs / number of 
contacts per Veteran. 
A summary of these points, the sources of data and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each are listed in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Comparison of post-payment monitoring methods  
Benchmarking  Data source Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Rates of 
adherence to the 
AHMS. 
File audit of a 
sample of each 
providers 
Veteran files. 
Clearly identifies areas in 
need of improvement and 
the quality of provider 
record keeping. 
The high cost of accessing 
and auditing health service 
provider records. 
2. Average 
number of 
Veteran contacts 
per provider.  
Billing vouchers Data already collected – 
will not require changes 
to existing information 
systems. 
As benchmarking is 
linked to payment 
vouchers, there is likely 
to be a high rate of 
compliance with 
information provision. 
Not specific to the types of 
interventions delivered, eg 
acute care versus chronic 
maintenance which may 
bias particular providers. 
Providers may fit the norms 
for the quantity of service 
provision but this does not 
necessarily reflect the 
quality of the care 
provided. (Quality will be 
assumed once providers 
use the AHMS however). 
3. The average 
cost of services 
per provider. 
Interpolated 
from billing data 
and estimated 
on a per capita 
basis. 
Data already collected, 
no changes to existing 
information systems. 
High compliance rates. 
As above. 
4. Average 
number of 
Veteran contacts 
for particular 
procedures or 
conditions.  
Modified billing 
vouchers  - 
requires that 
specific 
procedures are 
coded and 
identified on 
billing vouchers 
Provides details on 
specific procedures 
rather than on an 
average of all 
procedures.  
As per the quality issues 
mentioned above. 
The need to actually 
identify specific items and 
code for these given the 
difficulties classifying 
health service types by 
allied health providers. 
5. Combinations 
of health service 
types and costs / 
contacts 
Billing vouchers 
(if modified) 
Provides a breakdown of 
the average costs per 
Veteran given a specific 
distribution of health 
service types.  
Reliant on changes to 
billing vouchers / coding 
systems. 
 
The initial proposal for ongoing monitoring was to identify five common 
interventions per discipline and establish a definition of an average ‘episode of 
care’ for each that would form the basis of benchmarking for those disciplines, and 
to help identify interventions for which clinical pathways would be an appropriate 
tool. Data derived from the pilot study was to be used to help identify the common 
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interventions, based on reported ‘conditions’ on the Intention to Treat forms and 
feedback from providers on their mid-term questionnaires.  
The data derived from the trial have highlighted two major difficulties with the use 
of ‘common interventions’ as a basis for benchmarking. Firstly, there are no 
standardised criteria for defining interventions and secondly the same provider may 
treat multiple conditions. 
The lack of standardised criteria for determining interventions 
Providers listed a range of information under the heading ‘conditions’ including 
diagnoses and treatment descriptions. In the mid-term questionnaire, providers 
were asked to list the most common reasons that Veterans require their services. 
These results did narrow down the definitions somewhat, but still provided a wide 
range of reasons for intervention. The recruitment of 69 veterans by podiatrists 
resulted in the reporting of 60 different conditions. In many cases, the interventions 
may have been similar, but there was no way to determine this from the 
information provided. Similarly, occupational therapists, who recruited 60 veterans 
into the trial reported 62 different conditions. More than 60% of occupational 
therapy appointments were listed as ‘assessment only’ despite wide variations in 
the conditions listed (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). In some cases, the first conditions were 
similar, but then the reporting of an additional ‘condition’ would mean that 
clustering of similar conditions was not appropriate.  
The reporting of diagnoses by allied health service providers is curious, as few 
allied health service providers actually treat the condition being reported. For 
instance, one occupational therapist reported ‘brain tumour’ as the condition being 
treated, yet only reported three predicted contacts with the Veteran, and labeled the 
management type as ‘assessment only’. Occupational therapists don’t, as a rule, 
treat brain tumours. However they are likely to adjust the home environment of a 
Veteran who has reduced mobility arising from the brain tumour. In this case, a 
description of what was done, rather than the underlying diagnosis, would have 
been more useful. 
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Table 5.5: Selection of conditions listed by occupational therapists for 
Veterans requiring ‘assesment only’. 
Condition 1 Condition 2 
Dizzy turns  
Arm knife wounds (victim of attack at home)  
Left CVA 1992 High risk of falls 
Mesothelioma Frailty, Falls 
Emphysema  
Brain tumour  
Dizziness with postural change Removal of benign tumour 
Osteoarthritis Diabetes and heart issues 
 
Table 5.6: Selection of conditions listed by podiatrists for Veterans requiring 
‘assesment only’. 
Condition 1 Condition 2 
Bilateral hammer toes Plantar callus 
Buckled toes Pelvic pain / OA 
Can’t reach feet  
Diabetes type 2  
Diabetes type 2, risk increasing  
Gait restriction  
Inability to reach nails  
Maintenance of foot health  
Long toe nails  
Poor eyesight Arthritis 
Recent hemiplegia, right side  
 
Most of the ‘conditions’ give little information about the treatment provided. For 
example, diabetes was listed sixteen times by dieticians, podiatrists and 
occupational therapists with the predicted numbers of contacts ranging from one to 
twelve. Neither podiatrists nor occupational therapists actually treat the underlying 
disease of diabetes as such, but play a part in the management or prevention of 
complications. The label ‘diabetes’ does not provide an indicator of the types or 
extent of the complications. A Veteran with diabetes may require annual foot 
assessments or he or she may have a chronic diabetic foot ulcer requiring multiple 
weekly dressings. The interpretation of the data is improved when seen in the 
context of the type of treatment (assessment only, acute, chronic, maintenance). 
The providers and advisors involved in the trial requested a standardised 
classification system for use with the Allied Health Management System. Providers 
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believed that a classification system would facilitate their reporting to DVA and 
provide a common language for certain treatment decisions. Advisors felt that a 
classification system would facilitate the introduction of benchmarks for particular 
intervention types.  
A variety of classification systems are available, including the National Allied 
Health Casemix Committee’s Indicators for Intervention (IFIs), WorkCover, ICD-
10CM and Comcare. However the data collected in the pilot study indicates that 
not one system will be appropriate for all disciplines and indeed, many systems 
would have difficulty with intra-disciplinary applications. Feedback from the 
providers and advisors indicated that different levels of classification were of value 
for particular purposes. For example, the psychologists use a classification system 
called DSM – IV, which provides labels for diagnostic classifications used by 
psychologists. This system appeared to have acceptance by most psychologists, but 
would be irrelevant for the majority of other professions. The IFIs are the most 
recent code set developed for allied health service providers, however they have 
only been validated within hospital, not community settings. Allied health advisors 
believed that the IFIs did not adequately cover the reasons that veterans attend 
ambulatory settings. The IFIs code the reason that the patient receives an 
intervention, rather than saying what the actual intervention was. So professional 
differences in treatment choices may actually alter the treatment that was given, 
regardless of the reason for receipt of the treatment. The Chiropractors reported 
that the WorkCover model appropriate, but the podiatrists did not.   
Treatment of multiple conditions by the same provider 
A number of providers reported multiple conditions for the same veteran. Of the 
258 veterans recruited, 165 (64%) were reported as having one condition, 75 (29%) 
had two conditions and 18 (7%) had three conditions. There was no correlation 
between the number of reported conditions and the predicted number of contacts (p 
= 0.7). Veterans receiving occupational therapy were likely to be reported as 
having multiple conditions, for example hip replacement and prostate cancer. 
However this bore no relationship to the numbers of contacts. Veterans with 
diabetes may be seen by a dietician for management of their diabetes, but also 
require counseling on weight loss and the management of hypertension. Diabetes 
and hypertension are common comorbidities, however not all Veterans with 
diabetes will be overweight and be hypertensive. As a result, the numbers of 
contacts are likely to be highly dependent on the individual health state and other 
issues such as socio-economic status, home support and the physical ability of the 
veteran to prepare food. The presentation of veterans with multiple conditions and 
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for a variety of treatment types with the same provider increases the difficulty of 
identifying single ‘conditions’ or treatment types that can be used for monitoring 
purposes. 
Providers were requested to report on the types of management provided under the 
headings; 
- Assessment / prescription (of equipment) only 
- Management of acute condition 
- Management of flare-up of chronic condition 
- Maintenance management of chronic condition 
Ninety percent of all providers completed the ‘treatment type’ on their intention to 
treat forms. Overall, the proportion of each type of management was approximately 
equal at around 25%, however the predicted number of contacts varied. The lowest 
predicted contacts occurred with assessment / prescription services with an average 
of 2 (SD 1). There was no significant difference between the other three categories, 
however the trends from these data indicate that acute care requires the most 
occasions per episode, followed by chronic management and then maintenance. 
The results for maintenance are slightly misleading as some providers, such as 
podiatrists and chiropractors see some Veterans for maintenance care on an 
ongoing basis. In these cases, the predicted contacts are reported as annual contacts 
only, but may go on for many years. Thirty-one veterans were reported as receiving 
more than one type of treatment. 
Table 5.7: The average number of predicted contacts by health service type 
 Predicted number of contacts 
Service type Mean SD Range Median No. 
Assessment / prescription only 2 1 1 – 5 2 49 
Acute management 10 7 2 – 40 8 49 
Chronic mgt – flare-up 8 5 1 – 25 7 55 
Maintenance mgt 7 7 1 – 52 6 55 
Not recorded 6 5 2 – 25 4 21 
Total 7 6   229 
 
Whilst the overall proportion of each type of management was approximately 
equal, there was inter-provider variation in treatment types. Occupational therapists 
primarily undertake assessment and prescription services for Veterans. 
Chiropractors, physiotherapists and speech pathologists have reported much higher 
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rates of acute and chronic management of Veterans, whereas 60% of podiatry 
treatment is maintenance management. 
The final report submitted to DVA recommended that the most practical system for 
ongoing monitoring against benchmarks was the comparison of average numbers 
of contacts or costs per Veteran between providers of the same discipline. This 
method uses existing data sources and does not rely on the adoption of complicated 
classification systems by providers. This monitoring system will only be used to 
ensure the efficiency of service delivery (ie identify possible over-servicing). The 
lack of consensus on health service classification means that monitoring health 
service providers on the basis of particular types of interventions or procedures will 
be complicated, costly and time consuming. The development and adoption of 
clinical pathways is appropriate where common interventions or procedures are 
identified,. Although these can be managed and encouraged through strategies for 
clinical quality improvement, not an ongoing monitoring process. Additional data 
items may be reported by providers on billing vouchers for monitoring purposes, 
including “types of management” (assessment only, acute care, chronic, 
maintenance only) and self-reported use of the AHMS and / or clinical pathways. 
These items will help to develop provider profiles. 
The implications for the variations in the classification of health services are 
twofold. Not only is it not possible to undertake routine reporting on the basis of 
‘conditions’, but standards of care cannot be easily identified for ‘commonly 
treated conditions’ by allied health service providers.  
The final report to DVA proposed that the Allied Health Management System 
highlights the need to clearly distinguish between clinical quality improvement and 
ongoing monitoring of providers. The following flow chart illustrates the different 
roles of each and the processes which can be undertaken to implement both.  
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Figure 5.6: Dual mechanisms of accountability for allied health service 
providers 
 
Optimal quality care and outcomes for Veterans 
 
  
 
 
Quality of provider care to clients 
 
Provider accountability to purchaser 
 
  
Role 
- Ensure Veteran receives the best quality 
care 
- Matching Veteran needs to services 
- Ensuring the achievement of Veteran 
goals 
 
Role 
- To ensure that services are provided 
in an efficient manner 
   
Mechanisms 
- “Bottom up” approach 
- Implementation of the AHMS 
- Use of Clinical Pathways 
 
Mechanisms 
- “Top down” approach 
- Monitoring on the basis of number of 
contacts / average costs and provider 
profiles 
- Advisor role in reviewing outlying 
providers 
 
 
 
Implementation 
- Involvement of professional associations – 
accreditation, monitoring, dissemination of 
information, professional education 
- Support of private health insurance 
agencies 
- Development of a range of training 
resources 
- Involvement of tertiary training institutions 
- Contracts 
 
Implementation 
- Identify the normal distribution of 
provider contacts and costs and two 
standard deviations from the mean 
- Increase the information on billing 
vouchers to include types of 
management and use of the AHMS / 
clinical pathways to support the 
development of provider profiles. 
- Training for program 
managers/advisers? 
5.6 The response by the Department of Veterans' Affairs 
The steering committee reconvened in early 2001 to discuss the findings and 
recommendations of my report. The committee expressed concern at first that they 
still did not have health outcomes that could be included in the purchasing 
contracts with providers. Professor Grimmer retraced the steps that led to the 
development and evaluation of the AHMS, including their inability to identify 
health outcome measures that complied with the Department’s own requirements 
for user friendliness, practicality or compatibility with existing information 
systems. 
The steering committee agreed that the AHMS was a useful tool to ensure health 
service provider quality. However, they believed that the implementation of the 
AHMS was the responsibility of the professions, not their role as purchasing body. 
As a result, DVA accepted the recommendation that they should approach the 
professional associations and registration boards to discuss their role in the 
implementation of the AHMS and, to seek their cooperation and support for its 
introduction.  
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DVA supported the introduction of the AHMS so that allied health advisors could 
assist providers in the management of clients with very high service needs. 
Additionally, they agreed that the quality principles underpinning the AHMS 
should be introduced as part of undergraduate allied health training in tertiary 
institutions. The chair of the steering committee (Narelle Hohnke) undertook to 
meet with the Joint Heads of (allied health) Schools board to discuss the role of 
quality in undergraduate study. 
The advisor and provider requests for the introduction of an allied health 
classification system was perceived by the steering committee to be beyond the 
scope of the role of DVA. Instead, they agreed with the recommendation that the 
introduction of an allied health classification system and identification of 
benchmarks could be discussed with other compensatory and insurance bodies.  
5.7 Within case-analysis 
The Department of Veterans' Affairs proposed a model of post-payment monitoring 
that they hoped would use health outcomes to both increase Departmental 
efficiency and demonstrate the effectiveness of allied health services. The Centre 
for Allied Health Research undertook extensive research into health outcome 
measures, but found that there were no measures that would fulfill the requirements 
of DVA. Instead, the Centre for Allied Health Research redefined the tender 
requirements in order to be able to deliver a product that could be implemented by 
DVA. The question asked by DVA was whether the health services they were 
purchasing would achieve the optimal outcomes for veterans. The question 
answered by the AHMS was, how can we optimise the quality of services received 
by veterans at the clinical level and provide indicators of that quality to DVA to 
reduce their own regulatory needs. 
In this case, the use of contracts between health service providers and the 
purchaser, was not new. DVA believed that by making the contracts more explicit 
by specifying the outcomes of patient care, they would be able to remove a tier of 
health service monitoring, namely the role of the allied health advisors in prior 
approval. The actual model developed for the Department incorporates health 
outcomes as part of a tool that is designed to ensure clinical quality, but which 
relies on traditional process indicators to monitor health service providers. The 
AHMS differs from the originally intended approach in the following ways; 
• Outcomes are monitored at an individual patient level, but are measured 
against specific goals rather than the use of a single, generic outcome 
instrument. 
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• The ongoing monitoring of providers is based on process indicators, 
specifically, the numbers of occasions of service and the costs of services 
delivered.  
• Health outcomes are not included in the purchasing contracts with providers. 
Unlike ACT Community Care, which had up to five tiers of management between 
the point of production of the outcomes data (patient-provider) and the purchasing 
contract, DVA purchases services directly from the health service providers. In 
effect, this eliminated many of the structural requirements for reporting present in 
the ACT Community Care model. However, DVA was still unable to implement 
the outcomes approach in the form that they had originally intended.  
The structural concerns for DVA were less to do with management hierarchies, and 
more to do with the wide geographic dispersion of the providers. This means that 
ensuring provider accountability through mechanisms such as file audits is 
dependent on relatively costly and time consuming processes of copying and 
mailing clinical records to an advisor. It also makes the providers difficult to access 
for training. The relative inflexibility of the DVA information systems limited their 
ability to collect the intervention specific data they would require to collect health 
outcomes information. Even when providers are held directly accountable for the 
provision of outcomes data, systems need to be implemented to ensure its 
collection and collation. 
This case study illustrates that there are still problems with the use of health 
outcomes in health service provider accountability. The AHMS was developed in 
response to the inability of the tenderers to identify health outcome measures that 
could be used in purchasing contracts with DVA. They found that it was difficult to 
identify health outcome measures that were a useful indicator of clinical quality 
outside the individual patient-provider relationship. The alternative system 
developed by the Centre for Allied Health Research, the AHMS, endorsed the 
measurement of health outcomes at the clinical (patient–provider) level. However 
this was designed to ensure that the health service provider both set and achieved 
appropriate goals of veteran care. The AHMS included health outcomes as only 
one indicator of health service provider accountability to their patient, highlighting 
the need for additional indicators and measures that could be extracted from the 
patient-provider interaction and reported to DVA. 
Health service providers and veterans both expressed some difficulties with the use 
of health outcomes. Many providers had problems with the identification and 
quantification of veteran goals. A number of providers thought that they were 
documenting veteran goals and health outcomes, when in fact they were recording 
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expected health service provision without commenting on the expected or actual 
health change. For many veterans, concept of ‘patient derived goals’ represented a 
paradigm shift from their expectation of the medical model of care. 
At the time of writing, DVA had still not implemented any form of monitoring of 
health service providers. However, the feedback from the advisors and the attempts 
to identify appropriate monitoring mechanisms in the trial highlights the need for a 
range of indicators of health service quality. It is likely that more than one source 
of information will be required to provide information about clinician 
accountability. For example, indicators may include clinical outputs such as health 
service volume, but may also include factors such as professional development and 
education. As the anecdote of the physiotherapist highlighted, objective indicators 
of health service quality do not always correlate with subjective indicators. 
Therefore, indicators should be seen in the context of a range of information about 
health service provider accountability. Additionally, mechanisms of accountability 
do not always easily translate into measurable numbers. For instance, the allied 
health advisors reported using a number of highly subjective mechanisms for 
provider accountability, only some of which directly related to patient care, others 
were professional issues such as professional education.  
Providers and advisors both requested that DVA implement a standardised 
classification system for allied health interventions. Advisors thought that this 
information would be useful to identify benchmarks for the number of occasions of 
service for particular interventions. The trial showed that diagnostic categories 
alone would not necessarily be useful. Instead, a range of treatment descriptions 
and possibly labels about the type of service being offered (acute, chronic, 
assessment etc) would increase the meaningfulness of health service information. 
The purchasing role of DVA created tension between their ability to dictate 
provider behaviour and their responsibility to implement changes at the patient–
provider interface. As a purchaser, they requested greater accountability of their 
health service providers. When they were unable to identify health outcome 
measures that could be reported by allied health service providers, they 
investigated a model that increased the emphasis on health service provider quality. 
Two important points arose from this. First, the model was purchaser driven. 
Whilst providers agreed that the model formed best practice standards, they said 
that DVA would have to pay them more if they were to use it. This is an important 
point for purchasers who attempt to direct change in the health service providers 
from whom they purchase services. Secondly, after piloting the AHMS, DVA 
abrogated responsibility for its implementation. Instead, they felt that the 
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responsibility for the improvement of clinical quality was a professional issue, not 
the responsibility of the purchasing organisation. However, they were willing to 
discuss further monitoring systems (e.g. allied health classifications and the 
development of benchmarks) with other compensatory bodies. The latter point 
indicates that the purchaser sees clearly defined roles within the accountability 
hierarchy. Ironically, the reporting and documentation of health outcomes by many 
providers is likely to be dependent on the implementation of a system like the 
AHMS. In this case, the purchaser created demand for change, and even developed 
a system through which the change could be initiated (the AHMS). They had the 
potential to influence the introduction of this change by linking the use of the 
AHMS to reimbursement. Instead they decided to take a far less aggressive 
approach and negotiate with professional associations for its introduction. 
Again, like the ACT Community Care case study, DVA attempted to use health 
outcomes in provider accountability and the resulting model placed the patient –
provider interaction under a great deal of scrutiny. In other words, the new systems 
of accountability are in fact highly invasive. What started out as an apparently 
simple request for health outcomes has invaded the sanctuary of the patient – 
provider relationship. Provider accountability is no longer about costs or volumes, 
it is about what providers write and how they write it. It has the potential to 
prescribe quite detailed processes and to constrain the patient provider relationship 
in what may be unintended ways. 
In this case study, the implementation of the health outcomes approach was fraught 
with difficulties. Apart from the obvious challenges of the cultural change for 
providers and veterans and the inaccessibility of data, there was no sound 
framework on which to collect outcomes data. The inability to then link the data 
back to any indicator of veteran health status essentially leaves DVA back where 
they started in terms of the measurement of health outcomes. Based on the results 
of this case study, it is appropriate to question whether health outcomes were ever 
going to be the answer. Perhaps, clarification of the questions at the start would 
have prevented this perceived compromise. 
In summary, the DVA case study has shown that health outcomes are one 
component of health service provider accountability and are important in the 
context of the patient-provider relationship. However, it is difficult to identify 
appropriate outcome measures that can be used as an external indicator of clinical 
quality. The external monitoring of health service provider accountability relies on 
a range of indicators. At the clinical level, health service providers are largely 
unfamiliar with the concept of health outcomes, or even setting realistic patient 
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derived goals. For many patients, the concept of ‘patient derived goals’ represented 
a paradigm shift from the medical model of care.  
In Chapter Six, I introduce the cross-case analysis which examines the reasons why 
health service organisations are unable to apply the health outcomes approach in 
the way that they intend. The analysis focuses on the accountability interactions 
within the purchaser - provider model. I identify the role that health outcomes can 
take within each model of accountability which in turn clarifies the barriers to the 
applications of health outcomes theory as each organisation has attempted to apply 
it.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Both ACT Community Care and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs aimed to 
introduce health outcomes as a way of attempting to ensure that health service 
providers delivered care that would optimise the outcomes of the service users, and 
because of a perception that the former measures of service output (mostly 
throughput) were not appropriate. Both organisations have highlighted a number of 
barriers to the application of the health outcomes approach. This chapter presents 
the cross-case comparison of the two sites to examine why these organisations had 
difficulty using health outcomes as an accountability mechanism. The propositions 
generated from the examination of the two case studies are compared with the 
original six studies presented in chapter two as a process of verification.  
The questions that have driven this research are; 
1. What are the barriers to the application of the health outcomes approach in 
the community and allied health setting? and 
2. What conditions must be met before health outcomes can be used as an 
accountability tool in purchasing contracts for community and allied health 
services? 
6.2 Analytical framework 
The aim of the analysis is to develop a theory to address the problem of why the 
application of the health outcomes approach in the two organisations was 
unsuccessful and address the research questions. The analysis of the case studies 
was undertaken iteratively to draw on the themes identified in the literature, 
including the six examples of organisations that attempted to introduce the 
outcomes approach. The themes emerging from the literature include the need for 
exploration of the accountability frameworks; barriers to the application of health 
outcome measures themselves; and difficulties accessing the outcomes data.  
These themes form the basis of the analysis, and this chapter is presented in two 
parts to reflect these themes. The first part examines the accountability models 
within each organisation. The focus returns to health outcomes in the second part 
of the chapter where I explore the barriers to the application of health outcomes 
information in contractual accountability. 
The evidence around the outcomes approach that has been presented to date has 
arisen from three key sources; the review of the literature, which has informed the 
development and rationale for the introduction of health outcomes; the six 
published examples of organisations that had attempted to introduce the outcomes 
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approach, but which were unsuccessful; and the case studies of ACT Community 
Care and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.  
Table 6.1 summarises the key issues that emerged from the two case studies as a 
result of their attempt to introduce the health outcomes approach. These themes are 
describes in detail in the summaries of each case study at the end of chapters four 
and five respectively. 
Table 6.1 Summary of the key issues for each organisation  
Theme Case study 1 – ACT Community Care Case study 2 – DVA 
Accountability • Unclear who is responsible for 
collection of health outcomes data  
• Increased scrutiny on the patient 
provider interaction 
• Poor rates of administration of 
outcome measures 
• Lack of adherence to 
documentation of process data (eg 
dates, number of occasions of service, 
care plans) 
• Lack of clarity about 
who should implement and 
enforce the outcomes 
approach 
• Need for systems to 
monitor the accountability 
structures 
• Increased scrutiny on 
the patient provider 
interaction 
• Need for range of 
quality indicators 
Health 
outcomes 
• Difficult to identify appropriate 
outcome measures for a wide range of 
interventions 
• Difficulty to define many 
interventions 
• Poor rates of adherence to 
collection of outcomes data 
• When do you measure the 
‘outcomes’ of care? 
• Outcome measurement can 
become part of the next process 
• Objective outcomes do not 
necessarily correspond with subjective 
outcomes 
• Difficulty identifying reproducible 
processes of care or defining the 
intervention 
• Questionable benefits of using a 
quantifiable outcome score - narrative 
more useful 
• Bias in the selection of patients on 
whom outcomes are measured 
• Difficulties extracting health 
outcomes data from files 
• Objective outcomes do 
not necessarily correspond 
with subjective outcomes 
• Difficulty defining the 
interventions 
• Difficulties quantifying 
the outcomes of care 
• Providers had 
difficulties differentiating 
between the processes and 
outcomes of care 
• Difficulty accessing data 
due to the geographic 
dispersion of providers 
• Providers required 
increased reimbursement for 
implementing a more data 
intensive approach  
6.3 Cross-case comparison 
The remainder of the chapter compares the findings from each of the case studies 
and their implications for the role of health outcomes in community and allied 
health service accountability.  
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The role of health outcomes as an accountability tool was not explicitly 
acknowledged by either organization. Similarly, the widespread use of report cards 
and other forms of monitoring are often not presented under the banner of 
‘accountability’, thus the accountability relationships are not examined, which can 
create some confusion as to who is accountable to whom and for what and lead to 
the inappropriate use of accountability mechanisms. The examination of the role of 
health outcomes within an accountability framework enables an exploration of 
accountability relationships, including the stakeholders and what they are 
responsible for producing. 
The case studies have provided an in-depth analysis of two different perspectives 
on the application of health outcomes as an accountability tool. In both of the case 
studies, the desire to introduce health outcomes was driven by the purchaser for the 
purpose of contractual accountability. The investigation of the use of health 
outcomes was directed by the purchaser in the case of the Department of Veterans' 
Affairs and by the providing organisation in the ACT Community Care example. 
Despite the different perspectives, neither organisation was able to include health 
outcomes within their purchasing agreements.  
ACT Community Care tried to identify process indicators that could serve as 
proxies for health outcomes within the purchasing contract, but found that systems 
were required to identify, introduce and monitor these processes at a clinical level 
before they could be measured or reported.  
The ACT Community Care case study demonstrates that there are different levels 
of responsibility within purchaser-provider accountability. The actors within ACT 
Community Care that have the contractual relationship with the purchaser (ie the 
managers) were not the same actors responsible for producing the health outcomes 
(the providers). The “organisation” was expected to be accountable for producing 
health outcomes. Yet, the organisation did not hold the staff who actually produce 
the health outcomes responsible for this product. For ACT Community Care to 
hold their providers accountable on the basis of either processes or outcomes, they 
would need to introduce systems that monitor what happens at the patient – 
provider interface and to facilitate the collection, extraction and aggregation of data 
that can be reported to another audience.  
Even if these systems were in place, there were difficulties with the actual 
measurement of health outcomes, as the vignettes illustrated. For instance, where 
instruments were used to measure health outcomes, they did not accurately reflect 
the extent of the intervention. The outcomes could not clearly be attributed to the 
interventions. Providers did not use the outcome measures with all eligible clients, 
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introducing the potential for selection bias. The accuracy and completeness of the 
information recorded in the patient files was sometimes compromised to protect 
patient confidentiality. These factors alone demonstrate that information that is 
derived within the clinical context does not automatically have relevance to 
stakeholders outside of this interaction. 
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs purchases services directly from allied health 
service providers on behalf of veterans. In effect, this means that the tiers of 
management between the clinician and the purchaser are missing. They developed 
a model that focused on the use of a ‘best practice’ system of documenting the 
patient provider interaction in which the patient record was the main archival 
source of information. However, DVA still had to address the two fundamental 
issues around the collection of health outcomes data. First, they developed a system 
that explicitly held providers accountable for the collection of health outcomes 
data. This system established minimum standards for the patient – provider 
interaction during the entire episode of care. The original proposal was that 
providers would be held accountable for adherence to these standards through 
routine file audits by allied health advisors. The second area that DVA had to 
address as a purchaser was the question of who should be responsible for the 
implementation of this model. Whilst they felt that it was within their capacity as a 
purchaser to collect health outcomes data, they did not see it as their role to 
implement a system through which health outcomes would be documented by 
providers. 
In both case studies, providers demonstrated low levels of adherence to the 
minimum levels of reporting as proposed by Codman (Codman 1916) and 
subsequently by Grimmer in the AHMS.  
Both the ACT Community Care and DVA models recognised that health outcomes 
are an important component of the patient–provider relationship. Both have also 
highlighted that health service provider accountability is difficult to capture with a 
single indicator or measure. At the time of writing, neither organisation had 
implemented an approach for health service provider accountability.  
The attempts to measure health outcomes in each case study resulted in the scrutiny 
of what actually happens at the interface between the patient and the provider. This 
shows that the use of contractual accountability in the purchaser-provider 
relationship has the ability to pervade not just the relationship between a 
purchasing and a providing organisation, but also, theoretically to the level of the 
smallest interaction between a health service provider and a patient.  
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For ACT Community Care to be able to produce health outcomes data for the 
purchaser, they would, in turn need to hold each individual staff member 
accountable for the production of health outcomes data. The implementation of 
contractual accountability has a domino effect. The purchaser holds the managers 
of the providing organisation responsible, who, in turn holds the health service 
providers accountable for improving the health outcomes of their patients. The 
health service providers then hold the patients responsible for the identification of 
clear and achievable goals. In reality even if these structures were in place, both 
case studies highlighted a number of practical barriers to the meaningful collection, 
extraction and aggregation of outcomes data for reporting purposes. 
Thus, there are two important issues for the use of health outcomes in health 
service provider accountability. There are distinct levels of accountability within 
the purchaser-provider framework with different information capacities and 
requirements. Information needs to be collected that will flow up and down the 
accountability hierarchies to progressively inform stakeholders at each level but the 
information needed at each level is not necessarily the same. To obtain the 
information, the various stakeholders need to be held accountable to the level 
above for the production of that information. The second issue is that even if those 
information structures were in place, there are still problems with the collection, 
extraction and aggregation of meaningful health outcomes data within the 
accountability framework. 
6.4 Health service accountability  
The literature and both case studies have shown that accountability is not a single 
interaction. It involves a range of stakeholders with different information 
requirements. However the difficulty applying the outcomes approach does not lie 
with health outcomes alone, but rather with the assumption that health outcomes 
are an appropriate indicator of health service quality or effectiveness when they are 
seen outside the patient-provider interaction. Health outcomes are one mechanism 
of accountability. A range of accountability mechanisms are required to address 
contractual requirements between the purchaser and provider. 
Section 2.3 described a number of interpretations of the notion of health service 
accountability, the potentially infinite accountability relationships that could arise 
within the health care setting and the shifting values that influences what is 
measured. Whilst a range of accountability relationships exist in health service 
organisations, two stand out in terms of their importance of reporting within a 
purchaser-provider framework; professional accountability, that is the interaction 
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between the patient and the practitioner; and contractual accountability, which is 
the accountability of the provider or manager to the funder.  
Figure 6.1 illustrates the locus of accountability in the professional and contractual 
models arising within the two case studies. Within the professional model, the 
important interactions are patient - provider and provider – profession 
accountability. Contracts either occur between the provider and the funder, as was 
the case with DVA, or between the purchasing organisation and managers (ACT 
Community Care). The remainder of this section examines these two models of 
accountability in light of the case studies.  
Figure 6.1: Locus of professional and contractual accountability in the 
purchaser-provider model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.1 Professional accountability 
The professional model is the traditional model of accountability within the health 
field. This model focuses on the inter-relationship between the patient and the 
provider with the emphasis on the well being of the patient.  
Professional accountability arises from the actions of the individual health service 
provider that impact on the health outcomes of the patient. Ideally, the interaction 
is defined through discussion and deliberation with the patient to identify the goals 
of the patient and work towards the achievement of these goals.  
The locus of accountability are the provider to their patients and the provider to 
their professional organisation or colleagues (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). The 
accountability of health service providers to patients has been upheld over recent 
decades through reactive mechanisms such as complaints procedures and litigation, 
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where the patient claims that the provider did not adhere to the self-defined 
standards of the profession (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). Historically, the 
professional model relied on implicit approaches to accountability (Sharpe 2000). 
New-managerialism has led to the introduction of more pro-active mechanisms of 
accountability into clinical practice such as the development of guidelines, clinical 
pathways, the formalising of complaint mechanisms and incident monitoring 
systems. Within the professional model, health service providers are accountable 
both to their patients and professional colleagues and associations. I will describe 
these in detail under the headings provider –patient accountability, and provider-
profession accountability. 
6.4.1.1 Provider – patient accountability 
The reliance on implicit systems of accountability has meant that until relatively 
recently, the patient-provider relationship has remained largely inscrutable by 
formal mechanisms. As both of the case studies illustrate, extracting any 
information from or about the patient-provider interaction can be challenging. 
New-managerialism promotes the use of objective systems of accountability, such 
as audit, to facilitate the collection and removal of data from the sanctuary of the 
patient-provider relationship. Informal systems do exist, such as word of mouth 
and informal patient complaints and compliments, however under the audit culture 
imposed by the new management systems, these are often difficult to 
systematically incorporate as an indicator of patient-provider accountability.  
From the case studies, formal procedures of accountability can be seen to take two 
forms (Figure 6.2). They can either be file based systems (such as the AHMS) or 
external monitoring / surveillance systems, such as incident and complaint 
monitoring systems.  
External monitoring / surveillance systems are explicit procedures that investigate 
issues of patient safety, specific outcomes, adverse events or customer feedback on 
particular issues, where the data are collected outside the patient-provider 
interaction. Often, it is difficult to link the domain in question back to a specific 
intervention or provider. Client satisfaction surveys are a common example of an 
external monitoring system used in community health settings. 
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Figure 6.2: Procedures of accountability within the provider-patient 
interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 summarises the possible procedures of ensuring accountability within 
the patient - provider interaction, based on the information available from the case 
studies and the literature. File-based systems rely on the information that is 
documented in the patient record for provider accountability and require audit 
procedures to extract the information. File-based procedures formed the basis of 
monitoring for the majority of projects in the case studies. 
The formal procedures of patient – provider accountability were poorly developed 
at the commencement of both case studies, however the desire to measure health 
outcomes led, in both cases, to the introduction of procedures of accountability at 
the patient-provider level.  
The AHMS is an example of a file-based system of accountability. Prior to the 
development of the AHMS, DVA did not specify any formal domains or 
procedures of accountability for veteran care. Providers were accountable purely 
on the basis of health service volume.  
The AHMS specifies a number of domains of provider-patient accountability by 
defining some proposed minimum standards of allied health care for veterans. 
These include documenting patient goal setting, goal achievement, the progress of 
goals, red and yellow flags which may impede the treatment outcomes, the 
estimated duration of the episode of care and follow-up of patients to determine 
their outcomes. It also encourages providers to reflect on the outcomes of their care 
and the treatment they provided. The proposed procedure of accountability was the 
audit of veteran files to determine rates of adherence to the components of the 
AHMS. Despite the fact that DVA purchases services on behalf of veterans, they 
did not see the implementation or enforcement of patient-provider accountability 
through the AHMS as their role as a purchaser.  
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The attempts to include health outcomes in purchasing contracts would require that 
allied health providers first collected the health outcomes data. The Department of 
Veterans' Affairs did not believe that it was their responsibility to introduce the 
mechanisms through which health outcomes data would be collected, but they did 
expect that they could hold providers responsible for the potential output of such a 
mechanism. The outcome for DVA was that no formal systems of patient-provider 
accountability have been implemented to date. 
At the commencement of the ACT Community Care case study, there were no 
organisation-wide formal procedures of patient-provider accountability. Some 
programs had implemented file-based systems such as clinical pathways and 
standardised care plans (for example, the Wound Outcomes Project, Innersole 
Project and the Alcohol and Drug Project). As there were no formal requirements 
adhere to these systems, nor were there any structured audit procedures to monitor 
whether providers used them, many of them were poorly utilised. Subsequent to the 
commencement of the health outcomes project, the purchasing contract has 
included an agreement that client care plans will be completed for all patients. 
Monitoring systems have recently been introduced to enforce their use.  
ACT Community Care undertakes an annual customer satisfaction survey which is 
a form of external monitoring of provider-patient accountability. The customer 
surveys are anonymous and individual service providers cannot be identified, 
which reduces the direct accountability of individual providers to patients through 
this mechanism. Informal mechanisms of reporting customer satisfaction, such as 
letters written to the CEO are often publicised in the staff bulletin. Formalised 
complaints and incident monitoring systems are currently being implemented.  
The accountability between the provider and patient is commonly seen as the 
responsibility of the provider to the patient. However, within the DVA case study, 
the AHMS effectively holds the patient accountable by asking the patient to specify 
his or her desired outcomes of care. The AHMS makes explicit at the start of care 
what the patient and the provider agree that the intervention is attempting to 
achieve. The understanding is that the intervention will cease, either when the goals 
are achieved, or after a certain amount of care is delivered if the goals have not 
been achieved. Providers reported that many veterans had the expectation of 
ongoing care, which the application of this model would challenge. Patients of 
ACT Community Care are required to sign their care plans at the start of care to 
state that they understand what the provider has discussed with them.  
These systems reinforce the neo-liberal governmentality concepts of patient 
empowerment and control. They effectively change the role of the patient from 
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being a passive recipient to an active participant in their care within the patient-
provider relationship. The patient is held accountable for their expectations at the 
start of their care. Thus, the new accountability systems rearrange the 
accountability equation to include patients within their control. 
Both case studies indicated poor provider-patient accountability from the results of 
the audits of the file-based systems. Providers do not routinely document the 
patient goals or outcomes. Even when there were clear mechanisms of ‘best 
practice care’ such as the AHMS and clinical pathways, there was no systematic 
way to assess whether providers actually adhered to these processes. Nor were 
there any structures for reporting this information. The reporting of health 
outcomes or processes is dependent on the development of appropriate reporting 
procedures at the patient – provider level to be able to extract the appropriate 
information. This assumes that the appropriate health outcomes data can be 
extracted. The barriers to the use of health outcomes are discussed in the second 
part of the analysis. 
In some cases, the health service providers did not complete the client file 
accurately or completely in order to protect client confidentiality. For instance, the 
alcohol and drug program case-workers, said that they did not necessarily 
document all the relevant details about a patient, or did not always document 
patient details accurately. Patients rarely signed their care plans. The case-workers 
believed that their responsibility to the patient was to maintain confidentiality and 
protect the patient from the possible risks that might arise if their file were 
subpoenaed for use in a court case. This has implications for the implementation of 
file-based audit procedures. First, the client record is a confidential document and 
accessing that information specifically for the purpose of obtaining health 
outcomes data is highly invasive. Secondly, to hold providers accountable on the 
basis of the accurate documentation of patient details may present health service 
providers with a conflict of interests. What is considered to be best practice for the 
organisation may not be best for the client. In other words, the domains of 
professional accountability may be at odds with the domains of contractual 
accountability.  
ACT Health Records Privacy Legislation enables health service providers to access 
patient data… on the condition that it is not used for any other purpose unless... the 
use of the information is related to the management, funding or quality of the 
health service received by the consumer (ACT Government 1997) Section 1(e). 
This legislation protects the provider who accesses the patient file, but it does not 
overcome the potential breach of patient confidentiality.  
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There are a number of different guidelines about what should be included in file 
audits (Bradshaw and Braid 1999). Most clinical audit procedures prioritise 
systems information, such as the date, provider name and signature. Whether these 
factors really impact on the outcomes for the patient, or even the patient experience 
is questionable. However, identifying appropriate indicators of ‘good care’ is not 
simple. The example of the DVA physiotherapist, who was perceived by her 
professional peers to be a good provider but did not adhere to any of the 
components of the AHMS, attests to the potential limitations of solely the file 
contents as an indicator of the provider quality or their interaction with their 
patient. Clinician concerns about the value of the auditable domains of care have 
been raised in the use of report cards in the US (Gross, Braun et al. 2000). 
For file-based systems to be effective, the domains of accountability need to be 
carefully considered. The risk of poorly developed domains of file-based 
accountability is that they could lead to the development of a series of prescriptive 
guidelines about what constitutes ‘good patient care’ that focus on the objective, 
auditable components of care. This is known as Goodhart’s Law, where what can 
be counted counts and what does not count ceases to become important (McIntyre 
2000). Applying Goodhart’s Law, health service quality begins to become defined 
by the presence of monitoring systems, rather than by a clearly defined set of 
guidelines that constitute quality care. The end product is a new set of rules for 
providers to comply with that take additional time, therefore resources. But it will 
be difficult to determine whether they improve the quality of the patient 
experience.  
Both case studies have illustrated examples of the use of explicit and formal 
procedures for determining provider-patient accountability. The AHMS and the 
development of clinical guidelines represent similar approaches to defining and 
implementing ‘best practice’ care standards. In order for these domains to form 
part of the accountability process, they need to be systematically monitored. The 
monitoring of these systems are dependent on the accountability hierarchies in 
place. The following section describes the domains of accountability between 
health service providers and their profession. 
6.4.1.2 Provider - profession accountability 
The accountability of health service providers to their professions has, until 
recently been a poorly developed area within allied health. The main proponents of 
provider-profession accountability are professional registration boards and 
professional associations.  
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Appendix A summarises the registration and accreditation systems in place for 
podiatry, dentistry, occupational therapy, dietetics, psychology, speech pathology, 
osteopathy, orthotics, nursing, physiotherapy and social work in Australia.  
Registration normally specifies the minimum standards before a provider can use a 
professional title. It may include other requirements, such as recency of practice. 
Podiatrists, physiotherapists, psychologists, chiropractors and osteopaths require 
state registration before they can practice under their professional title. There are 
state and territory variations in the registration requirements of speech pathologists 
and occupational therapists. Social workers and nutritionists and dieticians are not 
required to register in any state in Australia. Both ACT Community Care and the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs require evidence of registration status (where 
applicable) before providers can commence employment with them.  
Allied health professional associations take an active role in health service provider 
accountability through the provision of continuing professional education, and 
more recently, accreditation systems (Nancarrow and Clark In press). The common 
themes used to promote accreditation systems include; the formal recognition of 
skills maintenance, reassurance to consumers and other stakeholders about the 
quality of the care provided, and to establish standards that can be recognised by 
funding bodies (Australasian Podiatry Council 2000; Australian Physiotherapy 
Association 2000; OT Australia 2001)  
Government funding bodies and third party organisations have proposed 
a variety of systems for accrediting practitioners – one system, driven by 
the profession is simpler for individuals and third party organisations  
(Australasian Podiatry Council 2000). 
However, whilst professional associations propose that accreditation is an 
important mechanism for funders and third party payers, the funders have not 
recognised this in the form of increased reimbursement to the providers. The 
accreditation systems appear to be under utilised by purchasers in their search for 
domains and procedures of accountability. This may be due to their relatively 
recent introduction.  
Additionally, the ‘reassurance to consumers’ has not resulted in the consistent 
distribution of information to consumers of allied health services. The occupational 
therapy association claims to have actively promoted their accreditation system to 
employers, purchasers and consumers, although the outcome of this promotion on 
patient awareness has not been evaluated. 
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Rates of membership of professional associations vary from state to state and 
between disciplines. Within associations, the accreditation programs are voluntary. 
Some professional associations have developed clinical practice guidelines that are 
endorsed and disseminated by the association, however, the uptake of these 
systems are not routinely monitored. 
Professional associations that have implemented accreditation systems have 
developed formalised systems of monitoring which range from self-report 
(Australasian Podiatry Council 2000) to individual practice audits (Australian 
Physiotherapy Association 2000). Providers that do not undergo accreditation are 
rarely subjected to any form of ongoing monitoring by their association (Emanuel 
and Emanuel 1996).  
The domains and procedures of accountability for each of the allied health 
accreditation systems are also summarised in Appendix A. The domains of 
accountability range from a focus on continuing education (Dietitians Association 
of Australia 2001) to a detailed system that includes the examination of patient 
records, quality management and professional conduct (Australian Physiotherapy 
Association 2000). The procedures of accountability largely focus on the 
submission of a self-completed professional development plan by the allied health 
service provider to their professional association. The one exception to this is the 
Australian Physiotherapy Association which undertakes random audits of 
physiotherapy practices to monitor provider accountability. 
The variations in the domains and procedures of accountability of the accreditation 
systems means that accreditation does not ensure the same standards across 
different disciplines. The lack of a consistent approach to health service provider 
accreditation by allied health disciplines may confuse purchasers and the patients 
that use the services.  
Unlike medicine, where most doctors are regulated and funded on the basis of 
continuing competencies, allied health providers have little external encouragement 
or incentive to maintain stringent professional standards. Membership of 
professional associations is not mandatory. There are normally costs associated 
with maintaining skills or attending continuing professional education (Nancarrow 
and Clark In Press). Remunerative recognition of accreditation status by purchasers 
may increase provider incentives to become accredited. For accreditation to be 
systematically endorsed and adopted across disciplines by purchasers and funders, 
professional associations are likely to need to adopt consistent standards.  
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Neither DVA nor ACT Community Care formally recognise professional 
accreditation systems. Within both organisations, professional accountability is 
upheld informally through the provision of professional support networks.  
Providers within ACT Community Care are responsible to both their team leader 
and a professional leader. It is the role of the professional leader to ensure that the 
professional standards are upheld within the organisation, although there are no 
formal, explicit methods through which professional standards are upheld.  
The professional representatives within DVA are the allied health advisors. They 
judge professional accountability according to the range of subjective and objective 
indicators listed in Table 5.3 including ‘gut feeling’, membership of the 
professional association and the quality and variety of reports presented to DVA. 
However the advisors also claimed that they had little formal support either from 
DVA or their professions to fulfill their professional supporting roles. There were 
no explicit mechanisms through which ‘under-performing’ providers could be 
disciplined. The lack of literature to support many allied health interventions meant 
that differences of opinion about a particular intervention were difficult to resolve. 
Importantly, as the vignette of the physiotherapist demonstrated, the range of 
subjective indicators of provider ‘quality’ listed by the advisors did not necessarily 
correspond with the objective measures captured by the AHMS. 
The implementation of the AHMS was seen by DVA as the role of professional 
associations, not something that should be routinely monitored or necessarily 
enforced by DVA. The Occupational Therapy Association agreed to include the 
AHMS as part of their accreditation program and award accreditation points for the 
use of the AHMS, although their system for monitoring its’ use is not yet clear. 
One of the recommendations arising from my report to DVA was that they 
introduce a two-tiered payment system that recognises accredited providers if they 
used the AHMS, however they did not embrace this concept.  
Professional accountability is a gradually evolving area of community and allied 
health service delivery. However, with the exception of professional registration 
few of the components of professional accountability are mandatory or 
enforceable. The discipline specific inconsistencies and state variations in 
professional associations, means that patients and purchasers have little, if any 
information about professional competence or quality on which they can base their 
choice of health services.  
Professional accountability specifies the domains of health service provider 
competence and the responsibility of the provider to the patient for the achievement 
of health outcomes (amongst other things). In both case studies, the purchasers 
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attempted incorporate domains of professional accountability, such as health 
outcomes into purchasing contracts.  
As the next section illustrate, it was partly the inappropriate application of these 
domains of accountability that led to the difficulties incorporating health outcomes 
into purchasing contracts. 
6.4.2 Contractual accountability 
Contractual accountability is the obligation of the provider or providing 
organisation to meet the contractual requirements of the purchaser. The purchaser-
provider relationship is specified by a contractual agreement that should, 
theoretically, provide a great deal of autonomy to the provider for the provision of 
outcomes or outputs.  
The domains of accountability within the contractual model generally include 
financial performance and professional competence. Contractual accountability 
should make explicit not the detail about the outcomes of care, but the processes by 
which they are checked. Douglas terms this the ‘rituals of verification’ (Douglas 
1992). This enables the purchaser to manage at ‘arms length’ by monitoring the 
systems of accountability, rather than the actual processes of care. 
The purchasers, in both case studies interpreted their contractual obligations to 
mean that the providers or providing organisations should demonstrate quantifiable 
improvements in patient health outcomes and that these should be included in 
purchasing contracts.  
However, health outcomes are a domain of professional accountability, not 
contractual accountability. They arise from the interaction between the patient and 
the provider. In both case studies, the systems of professional accountability that 
could inform the purchasers about professional conduct were poorly developed. 
Neither organisation had implemented file-based systems of accountability to 
monitor provider–patient accountability, so they did not actually collect health 
outcomes data. Nor did they recognise professional accreditation. Thus, the 
systems of professional accountability that could form the basis of the procedures 
of verification for contractual accountability were not in place.  
The result of the lack of professional accountability systems was the introduction 
of procedures to ensure some of the domains of professional accountability, such as 
the AHMS by DVA and the internal monitoring systems in the Alcohol and Drug 
and Wound Management Projects within ACT Community Care. However, neither 
DVA, nor the ACT Community Care managers adopted a formal or systematic 
approach to their introduction. The Department of Veterans' Affairs surmised that 
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professional associations should implement the AHMS. However they did not then 
include the rituals of verification within their own contracts to ensure that providers 
were using it (such as accreditation). 
For contractual accountability to include domains of professional competence, the 
domains of professional accountability will need to be defined and enforced within 
the organisation. Both case studies have highlighted the need to clearly delineate 
the models and resultant domains of accountability. For instance, the ACT 
Community Care case study illustrated the difficulties including health outcomes in 
contractual accountability between the DHCC and ACT Community Care when the 
actual responsibility for the production of health outcomes data is a component of 
professional accountability. In this case, there were no mechanisms in place to 
ensure that the health service providers were producing the output (health 
outcomes) for which the organisation was claiming responsibility. 
The Department of Veterans' Affairs had a slightly different mechanism of 
ensuring contractual accountability. Before the removal of prior approval, the 
volume of care for particular interventions was pre-determined. Accountability was 
ensured by a form of ‘gate-keeping’ in which providers wanting to increase the 
amount of care provided to Veterans had to contact their allied health advisor for 
‘prior-approval’. Providers who did not have prior approval for the care provided 
did not receive payment for this care. Since the removal of prior approval, there 
have been no formal mechanisms of accountability implemented. 
Instead of inventing new models of health service accountability, purchasers could 
examine the systems implemented by the professional associations and recognise 
the existing accreditation status of providers. The development of multiple, 
separate, disjointed systems of accountability is likely to create duplication, 
additional expense and an increased need for infrastructure to monitor and collect 
the data. Purchasers could contribute to the debate around the domains and 
procedures of what constitutes minimum standards of allied health profession 
accreditation and purchase services on the basis of factors that they deem to be 
important. The political model of accountability, mentioned in section 2.3, would 
support purchasers by enabling health care consumers to prescribe the domains of 
accountability that are important to them.  
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Figure 6.3: The levels of accountability within the purchaser-provider 
framework 
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However, it does not appear that the purchasers or providers have explicitly 
examined the models of accountability within their own organizations which has 
resulted in the inappropriate attempts to incorporate components of professional 
accountability, such as health outcomes, into contractual accountability.  
In conclusion, there are two components of accountability that are of importance 
within the purchaser-provider relationship; professional and contractual 
accountability. Professional accountability specifies the factors that are important 
to optimise the outcomes of the patient and uphold the good name of the 
profession. Contractual accountability is the obligation of the provider or providing 
organisation to meet specific responsibilities dictated by the purchaser. Figure 6.3 
summarises the key components of these accountability models. By attempting to 
use health outcomes in contractual accountability, purchasers have transgressed the 
boundaries of professional accountability. The result of this encroachment has been 
that the previously impermeable patient-provider relationship has been exposed. 
The domains for which providers are expected to be accountable, such as the 
reporting of health outcomes and in some cases, adherence to ‘best practice’ 
processes such as clinical pathways have been found to be seriously deficient in 
practice. The more subjective measures of provider accountability, such as patient 
satisfaction are missing from this relationship and are often measured externally to 
the patient provider interaction.  
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By not explicitly defining the locus and domains of accountability, the 
organizations have attempted to apply accountability procedures that are unsuitable 
for the purpose for which they were intended. Additionally, by not making the 
accountability relationships explicit, the organizations have not utilised 
accountability technologies that are already available, such as accreditation 
systems, that would potentially shift the burden of verification from the 
organizations to, say, professional associations, whilst preventing duplication of 
some resource intensive processes.  
The key points arising from this section are;  
1. In order for organisations to introduce new-management style 
accountability systems, they first need to define the accountability 
relationships and the domains and procedures of accountability within those 
relationships. 
2. Health outcomes are a component of professional accountability, not 
contractual accountability.  
By incorporating health outcomes into purchasing contracts as it transgresses 
the patient – provider relationship and takes clinical information into the 
management setting. 
The next section of the analysis examines the barriers to the application of health 
outcome measures in the clinical setting. 
6.5 Barriers to the application of health outcome measures 
As the first part of this analysis demonstrated, health outcomes form an important 
part of patient - provider accountability. That health service providers will deliver 
interventions that optimise the health outcomes of the patient is an implicit 
expectation of the majority of health service interventions. The reporting of health 
outcomes data implies that there is an audience outside the patient - provider 
interaction that is interested in knowing the outcomes of care, generally of a sample 
or population of patients. The desire to include health outcomes in contractual 
accountability is an example of an external audience.  
Both case studies illustrated that health service providers frequently do not 
document the outcomes of the care of the patient. Not only does the reporting of 
outcomes require that the outcomes of care are identified, they must be extracted 
from the patient – provider interaction. The data must then be aggregated and 
interpreted in a way that is meaningful to the audience, in this case, the purchaser. 
In other words, to facilitate the reporting of the outcomes of health care, a number 
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of conditions need to be met which are beyond the normal scope of patient – 
provider accountability. The aim of this section of the analysis is to identify those 
conditions and compare these with the reality observed in the two case studies. 
Health outcomes are commonly defined as a change in health status which is 
attributable to an intervention or a series of interventions (AHMAC). Implicit in 
this definition of health outcomes is four assumptions about health outcome 
measurement; 
1. That a change in health status can be measured or objectified in some way; 
2. That the intervention can be defined; 
3. That the change in health status can be attributed to the defined intervention; 
4. The health outcomes data are accessible. 
I have used these four points as the basis of the second part of the analysis, 
highlighting a number of practical barriers to the collection of health outcomes data 
for the purpose of ensuring contractual accountability. These factors are 
summarised in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Factors defining the application of health outcome measures 
6.5.1 Measurement of health status 
For health outcomes to be quantified, the difference in health status before and 
after the intervention must be measured. The definition of a health outcome as a 
change in health status which is attributable to an intervention… underpins the 
need to measure health outcomes. The initial proposal for the use of health 
outcomes in both case studies assumed that the change in health status would be 
able to be quantified in a way that could be reported to the purchasing body. The 
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barriers to the measurement of outcomes highlighted within the case studies can be 
summarised under three headings; 
1. The difficulties identifying objective outcomes of care; 
2. The limitations of the instruments used to measure outcomes; and 
3. Different stakeholder requirements for the use of outcomes data. 
6.5.1.1 Identifying measurable outcomes of care 
One of the factors underpinning the reporting of health outcomes for patient 
groups, particularly for the purpose of contractual accountability, is the 
simplification of the outcomes into meaningful, summary information. Michael 
Moore, ACT Health Minister stated at the 1998 health outcomes conference that 
“this means numbers”.  
Many medical interventions have objective, biochemical or biological markers that 
can be quantified and used as end-points to an intervention. For example, changes 
in blood pressure, glycated haemoglobin A1C for diabetes, erythrocyte 
sedimentation rate and even body temperature. In contrast, few community health 
interventions actually manage disease processes. Instead, they manage the 
consequences of disease, such as their impact on the activity or participation of 
individuals. The result is that the end-points are often quite subjective and require 
different types of tools for their measurement.  
Thousands of generic and specific health outcome measures have been developed 
to help solve the difficult problem of measuring health status. However, not all 
outcomes lend themselves to measurement, and not one measure can accommodate 
all the possible outcomes of care. Firstly, the lack of evidence to link the outcomes 
to the intervention means that knowing what to measure is difficult, as Grimmer 
and colleagues found when attempting to identify health outcome measures that 
could be used by ten different allied health disciplines for the DVA project. They 
proposed the use of a generic measure that could be used within the clinical 
intervention. They did not expect that the results would be extracted and 
aggregated for reporting purposes. 
The ACT Community Care case study highlights the continuum of intervention and 
outcome types possible within a community health setting (Table 4.3). At one end 
of the spectrum there are reproducible interventions with objective outcomes of 
care, such as wound healing. This is an outcome that is easily defined, easily 
measured and relatively unambiguous. At the other end of the continuum are the 
interventions that are totally dependent on the physical, social and environmental 
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context of the patient. In this case, a combination of patient goals, available 
resources and the ability of the health service provider to access those resources, 
will determine both the intervention and the outcome of that intervention. The 
effectiveness of the intervention is judged by the achievement of the client and 
provider agreed goals. For example, a client who has Down’s syndrome may have 
the goal of being able to work. His or her ability to work will depend on the 
provision of a suitable work place, the ability of the client to access that work 
place, through public transport or other means, and then the ability of the client to 
undertake the type of work that is available. The achievement of this goal is 
difficult to quantify in a way that makes it comparable with other interventions. 
The intervention itself is unique to that client. Therefore, there is no way of 
comparing the way that the outcome was achieved for that patient. Additionally, 
there are many factors outside the health care environment on which that outcome 
is dependent, such as the support available in the home environment. 
The quantification of health outcomes data raises two important issues in the 
exploration of the routine use of health outcomes in a clinical setting. Firstly, the 
privileging of quantitative data over qualitative and secondly, the questionable 
value of the quantitative results once they have been aggregated. 
The perception that “if we can’t measure it, we can’t do it” is flawed if the 
measurement instruments are not yet developed well enough to accurately measure 
the outcomes. The risk of this perception is that health service providers will be 
driven to measure what they can measure at the expense of the things that they 
cannot reliably quantify. The danger of selecting inappropriate measures is that 
they may not provide an accurate reflection of the impact of the health service. The 
use of the Dartmouth COOP charts in the IAU project is an example of this. 
6.5.1.2 The limitations of instruments designed to measure 
health outcomes. 
Health outcome measures are primarily developed by researchers for use in 
research settings – despite claims that they can be used in routine clinical care 
(Nelson, Landgraf et al. 1990; Bennett, Patterson et al. 1998). The three limitations 
to the use of health outcome instruments identified in this study were first, the 
problems identifying instruments that accurately reflect the actual outcomes of 
care. Secondly, encouraging the providers to actually use these instruments, and 
finally, the issues around data collection and manipulation. 
The Intake and Assessment Unit project illustrated the limitation of the Dartmouth 
COOP chart at accurately reflecting the effectiveness of the assessment process 
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(Section 4.5.3). The assessment process does successfully achieve client goals in 
the majority of cases. However, this was reflected poorly in all the quantitative data 
reported for the project. Of the clients who were followed-up (again a major source 
of bias), small improvements in functional status were reported, however these 
improvements did not reflect the important outcomes such as client independence 
which was obtained through a relatively small intervention such as Home Help. 
The study by Hill et al shows that the use of a generic instrument does not 
discriminate between the impact derived from the intervention or the other 
comorbidities that influence health (Section 2.4.2)(Hill, Harries et al. 1996).  
Where the measurement of health outcomes relied on the use of additional 
instruments by clinicians, such as the FHSQ, the COOP charts and the nutrition 
screening tool, the rates of dissemination were generally poor. Providers reported 
that they forgot to give out the questionnaires, did not have time, or felt that they 
were not appropriate for particular clients. If health outcomes data are to be 
collected and aggregated for reporting purposes outside the clinical intervention, it 
is important that they are from a representative sample of the population receiving 
the intervention. Providers require increased time to disseminate the additional 
instruments if they are used. Similar findings were reported in the DVA nursing 
outcomes project and the National Mental Health Strategy (Stedman, Yellowlees et 
al. 1997; Emerson 1999). 
A number of health outcome instruments require additional data entry and 
manipulation for the results to become accessible and meaningful. In the podiatry 
innersole pilot study, the podiatrists did not look at the completed questionnaires, 
but found the qualitative feedback from patients useful, giving them a basis to 
respond to patient requirements. The FHSQ required dedicated software before the 
results could be interpreted. The SF-36, which was not used in this study, but is a 
common outcome tool also requires mathematical manipulation to make the results 
meaningful. This means that if the instrument is to be incorporated into routine use, 
health service providers require access to a computer. If the results cannot be 
accessed immediately because they need to be taken away from the clinical setting 
for manipulation, they lose value as a clinical tool for health service providers. 
The Dartmouth COOP charts, whist requiring no additional manipulation to give 
the final result, did not add any value to the data collected by the health service 
providers, thus ceased being completed prior to the end of the trial period. The 
DVA trial recommended the use of a modified version of the Patient Generated 
Index. Whilst there was some resistance to the quantification of outcomes – both 
from the perspective of the patients and the providers, there were also benefits from 
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its application. For instance, prior to the introduction of the AHMS, a number of 
providers were not eliciting the actual goals of the patient, or revisiting these on a 
regular basis prior to the implementation of this model. The use of the Patient 
Generated Index encouraged this. 
There are almost as many ‘health outcome’ instruments as there are studies on the 
topic (Grimmer 1999), however the applicability of using quantified outcome 
instruments on a routine basis in clinical care must be questioned as a result of 
these two case studies. Firstly, the difficulty selecting an instrument which 
accurately reflects the outcomes of care has been highlighted. If an appropriate 
instrument can be identified, the practicalities of implementing its use need to be 
taken into consideration. All of these projects have illustrated the low compliance 
rates with the administration of health outcome instruments by allied health service 
providers. Providers appear to only use outcome measures where they are actually 
a part of the intervention delivered to the patient, such as the timed-ten-metre walk 
by physiotherapists. The low rates of documentation of any client goals or 
outcomes – quantified or unquantified, means that it is unrealistic to assume that 
providers will take the extra time to implement a time-consuming instrument to 
measure health outcomes. 
6.5.1.3 Stakeholder issues in measurement 
The use of health outcome instruments that have pre-defined domains of health 
status assume that most people value the same qualities of health or outcomes of 
care. This has implications both for the application of specific instruments for each 
patient as well as the audience who receives the results. Some of these issues were 
discussed in the literature review. The cultural limitations of some instruments has 
already been covered (Fox-Rushby and Parker 1995).  
Most health outcome instruments produce results for a number of domains of 
health status. For example, the FHSQ provides results on four domains of foot 
health; pain, shoe, general foot health and foot function. The SF-36 gives 
information about eight domains of health. These domains may be important to 
inform researchers or health service providers However, giving purchasers or 
managers the results of a number of domains of health status, for a range of 
interventions, is likely to be of little value. 
The ACT Community Care projects illustrate that whilst health outcomes can be 
quantified the results are not used to inform the purchaser. Likewise, the DVA 
project did not require that health service providers actually send the ‘health 
outcomes’ to DVA, rather, they form the minimum standard of reporting in the 
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patient’s file. Existing reporting to the purchaser is still undertaken on the basis of 
processes, not health outcomes. The information required by purchasers is not 
necessarily the same as the health outcomes information required by health service 
providers.  
Often, statistical analyses are required to facilitate the interpretation of health 
outcomes data. Neither ACT Community Care nor DVA routinely employ staff 
with statistical skills. Payne identified a lack of statistical skills as one reason that 
many providers do not undertake research within their clinical practice (Payne 
1999).  
In summary, differences in stakeholder requirements mean that not one single 
measure of health outcomes will be appropriate for all settings or purposes. 
Patients will interpret their well-being and their outcomes through a value filter that 
is determined by their health condition, gender, cultural background and individual 
expectations. The requirements of health service providers of health outcomes data 
is distinct from the needs of managers and purchasers. This means that the content 
and the way the information is presented will need to be tailored to the specific 
audience. 
This section has described some of the limitations to the measurement of health 
outcomes in the clinical setting, namely the difficulties identifying objective 
outcomes of care, the problems with some of the available outcome instruments 
and the difference in stakeholder requirements. The next section describes the 
issues around attributing the outcomes to the intervention. 
6.5.2 Attribution 
One of the major criticisms of the use of health outcomes in justifying health 
service expenditure and allocation is the issue of attribution. The prerequisites for 
attributing an outcome to an intervention are (Harvey 1996): 
- A known relationship between health outcomes and specific treatments, and; 
- An assurance of the quality of care so that the expected outcomes are achieved. 
Whilst there has been significant growth in evidence based medicine and research 
into the effectiveness of interventions, the majority of health service interventions 
have not been evaluated in well-conducted scientific trials and even fewer 
interventions have been demonstrated to work in everyday practice (US Congress 
1988). The paucity of evidence for the majority of allied health interventions 
increases this problem in a community health setting. Russell argues that basing 
judgements about performance on health outcomes that are not clearly attributable 
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to an intervention is unethical and may actually result in reduced equity of resource 
allocation (Russell 1998).  
Even where health outcomes have been linked through research to a health service 
intervention, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the outcome would 
have occurred anyway, or may have occurred for other reasons. A good example of 
this is the client who participated in the Innersole Outcomes Project who 
demonstrated a large improvement in foot health status scores despite never 
wearing her innersoles. A number of studies have demonstrated that factors other 
than the intervention contribute to the measured outcomes (Jankowski 1999). For 
instance, post-operative return to work is influenced more by social status than by 
the health status of the patient (Lawrence, Doll et al. 1996).  
The difficulty attributing the change in health state to the intervention means that 
the value of using of health outcomes data as a mechanism of contractual 
accountability is limited unless risk adjusted outcomes can be determined. As few 
allied or community health interventions can be evaluated this exactly, the use of 
risk-adjusted outcome measures in health service accountability is likely to be 
many years away. For some community based interventions, this will never be 
possible due to the individual patient and contextual factors on which the outcomes 
are dependent. 
The difficulties attributing the outcomes to the intervention are the reason that most 
performance indicators are based on process indicators. However, these have been 
criticized on the basis that they do not necessarily reflect what the intervention is 
aiming to achieve (Nancarrow 2001). 
6.5.3 Accessibility of data 
The reporting of health outcomes outside the patient-provider interaction is 
dependent on the outcomes being documented in the first place, and then their 
extraction from the clinical interaction. Whilst this sounds obvious, there were a 
number of technical barriers to achieving this in both case studies, and the 
examples presented in the literature review. Broadly, the obstacles to accessing 
data can be grouped under the headings of physical and ethical barriers. 
The technical barriers to the accessibility of health outcomes data were provider 
compliance with the collection of data, the geographic dispersion of providers, the 
information technology systems in place and poor file management systems. The 
ethical barriers to the accessibility of the data included patients and providers 
refusing to consent to provide the information, and secondly, legal issues around 
what was actually reported in the file. 
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Ideally, health outcomes data would be accessible from a single database, or the 
marriage of many databases at the press of a button. The reality is that few of these 
systems exist in community health services within Australia at present. One of the 
major barriers to collecting outcomes information in the ACT Community Care 
study was the lack of information technology infrastructure. Clients who received a 
particular intervention could not be identified. Often files could not be located. The 
information systems were not up to date with respect to the ‘living or dead’ status 
of many clients. Even when files could be found, often the necessary data were 
missing. DVA had a more practical limitation to accessing their data. The 30 000 
allied health service providers from whom they purchase services are widely 
dispersed around Australia, many away from regional areas, making it difficult to 
access files or providers. Additionally, the purchasing role of DVA meant that 
providers expected to be reimbursed for increased provision of information. 
Health outcomes measurement and reporting is dependent on the sharing of 
information derived from the interaction between a patient and their health care 
provider. Apart from the previously described difficulties of actually measuring the 
outcomes, a culture in which health service providers are prepared to share 
information is necessary (Wood 1999). 
In cases where the health service is being purchased by an organisation on behalf 
of the patient, there is normally some form of implied or expressed access of the 
information to the purchasing organisation. Providers who contract to DVA agree 
that the veteran file is the property of DVA and as such, can be accessed by DVA 
at any time.  
Most providers who participated in the DVA trial were aware that their files could 
be audited at any time by DVA, however one of the most common points of 
contention about being involved in the trial was the fact that providers felt that they 
should be reimbursed for the extra amount of paperwork required to participate in 
the trial. Whilst most of them agreed that the information being requested by DVA 
was the minimum standard which should be addressed, by having their files 
audited, providers said that they needed to improve the way that this information 
was recorded. This meant changing the way that they write, using less jargon and 
making the files generally acceptable to any external audit process. 
The perspective of the patient is rarely considered in the drive for outcomes data 
collection. Sharing of information is seen as a barrier to outcomes collection from 
the perspective of health service providers, however in many cases, the patient is 
not consulted about the use of their records for purposes of eliciting health 
outcomes data or quality assurance mechanisms. This raises ethical questions 
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around the collection of any health data. If health outcomes measurement is to 
become a routine part of clinical care, at what stage should patient consent be 
obtained, if at all?  
ACT Community Care programmes have policies on patient consent and are 
currently formulating a service wide consent policy. Additionally, the ACT 
government has a policy on patient privacy which was described previously (ACT 
Government 1997). 
Most of the health outcomes projects have been undertaken under the umbrella of 
‘clinical quality improvement’ and have not been through ethics approval. These 
projects do involve collecting patient specific data, often pertaining to their health 
status, and aggregating it at an intervention level. The line between ‘quality’ and 
‘research’ is very fine in this instance.  
The reality is that most allied health data is not accessible, and in fact, in the 
majority of cases, health outcomes data is not routinely collected. This project has 
identified that data accessibility of health outcomes data is limited by file 
management systems, the quality of recording of data, lack of sophisticated 
information systems and lack of consensus on exactly what should be reported. 
Accessing patient files can influence what health service providers will actually 
record in a positive or negative way depending on the perspective of the 
stakeholder.  
6.5.4 Defining the intervention 
One of the most important insights that I obtained through undertaking the two 
case studies was the lack of clear classification systems for community based allied 
health services. This was possibly the most contentious point of discussion with 
providers and purchasers of allied health services, and an issue that was reinforced 
by the UK study by Flynn et al (1996). Most believed it should be possible to 
describe what it is that the health service provider is doing and why. Moreover, 
there was an expectation by purchasers, managers and some providers that some 
form of ‘standard of care’ could then be developed around these classifications. 
Indeed, my initial proposal to ACT Community Care was based on this 
assumption. Interestingly, attempts to introduce any form of classification system 
were met with varying levels of resistance in both case studies.  
Another point highlighted by the two case studies was that different classifications 
may be required for different purposes. Diagnostic coding may be of significance 
to the health service provider and perhaps a DVA advisor to help them establish the 
type of intervention and any possible contra-indications. However, as the DVA 
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results illustrated, the use of diagnostic codes as a basis for undertaking ongoing 
monitoring of providers by a purchaser has little value. This was illustrated by the 
DVA example of the management of “diabetes” by podiatrists, dieticians and 
occupational therapists with highly varied numbers of occasions of service and 
presumably the delivery of quite different interventions. 
The data provided in the DVA case study clearly highlights the diversity of 
interventions provided by allied health service providers, and the reasons for these 
interventions. Discussions with providers from each discipline indicate that some 
form of classification may be able to be developed for each. Chiropractors and 
psychologists both reported existing classification systems with which they are 
satisfied; one is psychology specific (DSM-IV) and the other was a Workcover 
classification system. The physiotherapists at ACT Community Care were able to 
identify their sixteen major intervention types. Podiatrists identified the six main 
interventions that they undertake. Social workers used time as a mechanism to 
delineate between their interventions and were reluctant to use any form of 
diagnostic system. Dieticians were involved in the development of the Indicators 
for Intervention developed by the National Allied Health Casemix Committee. 
They felt that this system accurately described their services. No single existing 
classification system is likely to be appropriate to all health service providers.  
The health service intervention is the unit underpinning the measurement of health 
outcomes, and indeed, the supposed reason for the change in health status. Thus, 
the difficulties in actually defining what health service providers do has important 
implications for the measurement and reproducibility of the outcome. The diversity 
of service types provided within each discipline supports the notion that it is not 
enough to have a ‘physiotherapy outcome’ or an ‘occupational therapy’ outcome. 
Outcomes of these services can be as diverse as preventing falls, increasing range 
of motion or decreasing pain. Importantly, a number of different underlying 
diagnoses might require the same intervention to achieve these outcomes. 
Before allied health services can move to a health outcomes management strategy, 
it may be appropriate that they develop and adopt a classification system to 
describe what it is that they do.  
In summary, there are a number of practical barriers to the routine collection of 
health outcomes in an allied or community health care setting. This does not mean, 
however that health outcomes should not be ascertained. Given the paucity of 
evidence for the effectiveness of many allied health interventions, the complexity 
of many community based services and the multiple morbidities of many of the 
clients of community and allied health services, it makes sense to follow and 
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document the outcomes of every client. The results of the two case studies do not 
support the widespread introduction of health outcome measures. From the 
available evidence, clinicians did not utilise quantifiable changes in health status 
but were able to respond to the narrative or subjective outcomes of care. Health 
outcomes are difficult to extract from a clinical interaction, and their meaning and 
value varies according to the audience receiving the information.  
6.6 Propositions 
This chapter has explored the application of health outcomes in health service 
accountability by ACT Community Care and the Department of Veterans' Affairs 
to examine the barriers they faced. I have explored their approach from the 
perspective of the accountability frameworks in which health outcomes were 
applied, and examined the actual use of health outcome measures themselves.  
Health outcomes, as they were applied in the context of the two case studies, were 
an attempt to make explicit, and quantify, the results of an interaction between a 
patient and clinician. The organisations expected that they would be able to 
aggregate the change in health outcomes and use them as a system of contractual 
accountability between the purchaser and provider. There appear to be a number of 
factors that have influenced the application of the approach in these cases that lead 
to the following theoretical propositions; 
Organisations attempting to introduce new-managerial style accountability 
frameworks need to clearly define their accountability relationships. By clarifying 
the accountability relationships, managers can identify the appropriate domains and 
procedures for verification within that relationship. The identification and 
definition of the accountability relationships will help managers and purchasers to 
identify tools that are already available. There is clearly not one approach that fits 
all, as these case studies and the examples in the literature review have identified.  
In the six cases presented in the literature review, none had developed clear 
accountability structures for the provision of health outcomes data. In two 
instances, (National Goals and Targets and Divisions of General Practice) the lack 
of clear accountability relationships was highlighted as a barrier to the 
implementation of the outcomes approach.  
Health outcomes are not an appropriate mechanism of contractual accountability. 
In a health service setting, health outcomes a product of the patient-provider 
interaction, thus, they are a component of professional accountability. By 
incorporating health outcomes into purchasing contracts, they are being placed in 
the domain of contractual accountability, which theoretically makes managers 
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responsible for the results of clinician's professional actions. The inability to clearly 
attribute a change in a health status to any health care intervention means that 
whilst health outcomes may be a useful adjunct to clinical care, they must be used 
with caution as a way of allocating resources, or even measuring health service 
effectiveness.   
There are a range of potential tools for demonstrating health service accountability, 
as Figure 6.3 illustrates. These domains require further investigation to determine 
whether they appropriately reflect the interactions they aim to represent and to 
ascertain their relevance to the stakeholders involved (which is dependent on a 
clear understanding of the accountability relationships).  
None of the six case studies in the literature review were able to use health 
outcomes in any system of contractual or management accountability. The 
AHMAC mental health project found that outcomes were difficult to translate into 
useful information for management purposes. Similarly, the DVA and education 
projects found difficulties linking funding to outcomes. The National Goals and 
Targets project acknowledged the difficulties attributing outcomes to the impact of 
the health services. The impact of the new accountability frameworks on each of 
the case studies was the collection of a great deal more ‘quality’ related service 
information, however in the absence of an accountability structure, the value of this 
information and the stakeholders who benefit from it are unclear.  
Given current technology, quantifiable health outcome measures are not the most 
appropriate or useful tool for determining professional accountability. In order to 
extract data from a clinical interaction that can be quantified, aggregated – and then 
interpreted in a meaningful way is fraught with difficulties. In order for health 
outcomes to be used as a domain of contractual accountability, five conditions 
must be satisfied:  
1. The outcome must be able to be attributed to the intervention.  
2. The outcomes data must be documented and collected in a systematic 
way.  
3. The intervention must be able to be defined and reproduced within 
finite boundaries.  
4. The outcomes must be measurable in an objective way; and 
5. The data must be accessible, both technically and ethically. 
Within the two case studies presented, few of these criteria can be met with current 
levels of research or technology. Indeed, in some cases, the criteria will never be 
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met. For instance, many community health interventions cannot be clearly defined, 
nor can the outcomes be objectively measured. The application of health outcome 
measures in a clinical setting is subject to selection bias and loss to follow-up. 
Health outcome measures take time to administer. It is difficult to capture the 
influence of an intervention with many of the tools that are currently available for 
the measurement of health outcomes. Thus, the value of routinely using 
quantifiable outcomes of care must be questioned, except when that outcome forms 
the explicit goal of care, such as a measurable change in blood pressure or blood 
glucose (however, these are often clinician derived goals rather than patient driven 
goals). Few community and allied health interventions explicitly aim to achieve a 
quantifiable outcome. Rather, they aim to achieve improvement in more subjective 
aspects of a patient’s well-being. Few health outcome measures capture these 
subjective outcomes of care and the value of simply ‘asking the patient’ seems to 
be poorly recognised.  
The use of health outcomes in health service accountability is based on the dual 
assumptions that the audience is homogeneous and that the same information will 
be beneficial to informing all stakeholders. Both DVA and ACT Community Care 
assumed that if the recipients of care had better outcomes, then this would translate 
into useful information about the accountability of the health service provider. In 
reality, however there are a number of different stakeholders interested the 
outcomes of care and accountability of providers. As one author observed “notions 
about accountability are more than descriptions of the current system; they are also 
normative guides to determine the institutional structures for health care 
organisations and the type of health care delivery system we should have” 
(Emanuel and Emanuel 1996). 
Each of the six case study sites, and the UK study by Flynn et al expressed 
difficulties providing outcomes data. In most cases, these barriers fit under the five 
headings described above. Attribution of the outcome to the intervention was 
expressed as a difficulty by the National Goals and Targets, Divisions of General 
Practice, DVA, AHMAC mental health project and the Education project. 
The collection and reporting of health outcomes data presented difficulties in each 
case due to the lack of available outcome measures (except the AHMAC mental 
health project), difficulties physically collecting and collating the data, the poor 
quality of the data and the lack of IT infrastructure (DGP, AHMAC and DVA) to 
support the collection of outcomes data. The result in each case has been an 
increased burden of data collection, with a focus on the easily collectable items 
rather than necessarily clinically meaningful data. 
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The six case study sites appear to have had less difficulty defining their 
interventions than ACT Community Care or the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. 
However, the study by Flynn et al (1996) described in Chapter Two highlighted a 
number of barriers to defining community health interventions. 
However, health outcomes form a fundamental component of professional 
accountability. It is the responsibility of the provider to ensure that the intervention 
achieved the desired goals, and if it did not, to identify why, then to facilitate 
patient goal achievement through other mechanisms. Professional accountability 
can be demonstrated explicitly and formally through the systematic audit of patient 
files to ensure that aspects of accountability are present. The responsibility for this 
level of accountability can either fall to the professional associations or to the 
providing organisation. However, unless mechanisms are introduced to ensure that 
the accountability cycle is complete, that is, to evaluate the adherence or 
compliance with the criteria for specific content areas, and mechanisms through 
which these can be reported, there will be no way of ensuring provider 
accountability.  
6.6.1 Plausible rival hypotheses 
This thesis has examined the role of health outcomes in health service 
accountability for two Australian community and allied health services and the 
reasons that they had difficulty applying the outcomes approach. The two services 
were examined in the context of a number of other organisations that attempted to 
implement health outcomes in health service accountability and also experienced 
difficulties.  
All of the organisations described in this study experienced difficulties with the 
provision of the health outcomes information. As this chapter has highlighted, there 
are a number of common features across these organisations, as well as some 
differences due to the different contexts in which the health outcomes approach has 
been applied.  
One of the striking similarities between all of the organisations is their under-
preparedness for the introduction of the outcomes approach. For instance, their 
inability to define community and allied health interventions, the lack of 
appropriate information systems and unclear lines of accountability, highlight the 
need for a great deal of infrastructure before a health outcomes approach be 
properly implemented. It may be that these systems can eventually be developed 
and implemented to support an outcomes approach to health services 
accountability. However, this thesis has identified a number of considerations 
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about accountability structures, relationships and stakeholders that require 
clarification to implement any useful or meaningful accountability system.  
The question of ‘what’ information to collect has not been adequately addressed. 
At the clinical level, there are still difficulties defining who community and allied 
health practitioners are, what it is that they do, and who they do it for – quite aside 
from the issue of how effectively they perform their roles and how to demonstrate 
this. These problems are not unique to ACT Community Care or the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs, and as the study by Flynn shows, not unique to the Australian 
health care environment. Additionally, the value of the data collected under the 
‘accountability’ label and to whom it has value requires a great deal more 
investigation at all levels of health service delivery.   
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a cross-case analysis of the Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs and ACT Community Care application of the health outcomes approach to 
community and allied health service accountability. Whilst each case alone 
presents a valuable example of the application of the use of health outcomes, the 
cross-case analysis has highlighted a number of common issues that need to be 
considered in the development of new accountability structures. Chapter Seven 
concludes the thesis by readdressing the research questions and examining the 
relevance of the findings to a range of stakeholders.  
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7.1 Introduction 
In this thesis I have used case study analysis to examine the previously unexplored 
application of health outcomes to community and allied health service 
accountability in Australia.  
Chapter Two demonstrated the perceived need for purchasers, funders, providers 
and managers to embrace new mechanisms of accountability, and the appeal of 
health outcomes for this purpose.  
The case studies illustrated two organisations that have attempted use health 
outcomes to hold health service providers accountable. In Chapter Six, I identified 
that within the purchaser – provider context, there are a number of stakeholders, 
but two important accountability relationships. The first is professional 
accountability, which is the accountability of the provider to identify, and where 
possible, achieve the optimal outcomes for the patient. The second is contractual 
accountability, which is the agreement between the purchaser and provider to 
achieve specific, contractual outputs. Health outcomes clearly form a component of 
professional accountability, but in order to use health outcomes in contractual 
accountability, a number of conditions must be met (accessibility, attribution, 
define the intervention, measurement of health status). Where these conditions 
cannot be met, other indicators may be required to illustrate health service 
effectiveness. 
In this chapter, I revisit the research questions in light of the results derived from 
the case studies and their analysis. I discuss the implications of the research 
findings for health service provider accountability and the significance of this for a 
range of stakeholders. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the areas that 
may benefit from future research. 
7.2 Conclusions about the research questions  
Question 1. What are the barriers to the application of the health outcomes 
approach to health service accountability for community and allied health 
services? 
The emphasis on organisational accountability is inescapable within the current 
climate of neo-liberal governmentality. As a result, community and allied health 
service providers are expected to find accountability mechanisms that can be 
specified in purchasing contracts. Accountability implies the extraction of simple 
indicators from different levels of the organisational hierarchy that reflect what was 
done and how well it was done. The audit of these items is described as the rituals 
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of verification, where the actual item themselves cease to be important, but the 
monitoring of them becomes the public display of organisational accountability 
(Douglas 1992). The use of health outcomes was one attempt to reduce the 
complex interaction of health service delivery to a single indicator.  
Health outcome measures themselves are fraught with difficulties. This thesis has 
shown that health outcomes are not always an accurate reflection of what was done 
or how well it was done in the health service setting. The application of 
quantifiable outcome measures is of questionable value of to clinicians and has 
significant resource implications. These factors are likely to reduce the incentive of 
clinicians to apply outcome measures in practice. Many community and allied 
health service interventions do not have a finite ‘end-point’, so it is unclear when 
outcomes should be measured. In some cases, the measurement of the outcome 
forms part of the next process of care. 
The two case studies indicate that allied and community health service providers 
are generally not good at identifying what it is that the patient wants, or patient 
goals, and that they rarely document whether the patient goals are achieved. Since 
the health outcomes movement is based on the premise that the goal of health 
services is to optimise patient outcomes, health outcomes are obviously an 
important part of accountability within the patient – provider interaction. However, 
the statement at the start of Chapter One “if we can’t measure it, we can’t do it” 
highlights one of the unrealistic expectations of the outcomes movement. Health 
service providers are being asked to report on the measurable outcomes of their 
patient care, when in fact, in these case studies, they do not routinely document 
patient goals or the achievement of these. Additionally, the lack of classification 
systems means that defining the intervention that led to the outcomes is fraught 
with difficulties. Before outcomes can be measured, the condition and or the 
intervention needs to be defined. 
The use of any single indicator, such as a health outcome, brings with it the risk of 
Goodhart’s Law, where the things that are counted count and what is not counted 
ceases to be important (McIntyre 2000). The case studies have demonstrated that 
accountability is multi-dimensional and stakeholders value different domains of 
accountability, therefore no single indicator can give the whole picture of health 
service effectiveness.  
The emphasis on health outcomes has opened the Pandora’s box of the previously 
inscrutable patient-provider interaction. The health outcomes literature would have 
us believe that the application of ‘best practice’ and the resulting health outcomes 
are the most important component of this interaction. However, Codman and 
 196
Grimmer both teased apart this relationship to emphasise a much broader, and less 
mechanised approach to patient care that specifies the identification of realistic and 
achievable patient goals and reflection upon the methods used to achieve these 
goals by the provider (Codman 1916; Grimmer 2002). 
Neither of the organizations studied had the systems in place to support the 
collection or collation of health outcomes data. Few clinicians were equipped to 
apply health outcome measures in their clinical setting. The organizations lacked 
the information technology and management support to ensure that the health 
outcomes data could be collected, extracted and aggregated. When health outcomes 
data were made available, it was difficult to use them in the way in which it had 
been intended. Outcomes data were not used to inform purchasing contracts in 
either case study, or to inform clinical practice. Indeed, sometimes the quantifiable 
outcome measures contradicted the narrative account of the patient. 
The use of health outcomes in health service accountability is an attempt to reduce 
all of the components that go into the delivery of health care into a single outcome 
measure. Within this is an assumption that the inputs can be defined in some way, 
and that the outcomes can be accurately reflected in a single number or summary 
score. As the case studies have shown, a move to focus on the health outcomes of 
the patients in health care delivery is a good thing, as ultimately, health services are 
designed to improve the outcomes of the patients. However, the current emphasis 
on pre-defined health outcome measures reinforces the notion of the ‘body as a 
machine’ and the separation of diagnosis and treatment from the patient (Miller and 
Crabtree 2000). Health outcome measures may be an appropriate adjunct to 
determining the effectiveness of a health care intervention from the clinicians’ 
point of view, but should not supersede the impression of effectiveness from the 
patient’s perspective. Nor should health outcome tools come to define the 
important outcomes of care. If the purpose of the intervention is to provide some 
benefit to the patient, that benefit should be made explicit from the patient’s point 
of view, and that should be the ultimate test of the effectiveness of any 
intervention. Unfortunately for managers, such outcomes rarely translate well into 
numeric indicators of effectiveness.  
Health outcomes are an important component of community and allied health 
service provider accountability, but they are not the answer to health service 
provider accountability. They form only one element of the accountability 
framework, and within that framework they are an insensitive indicator of health 
service effectiveness if used alone. If health outcomes are to be extracted from the 
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patient - provider interaction, a number of conditions must be met, which leads to 
the second research question. 
Question 2: What conditions must be met before health outcomes can be used in 
purchasing contracts for allied and community health services? 
For health outcomes data to be reported meaningfully beyond the patient – provider 
relationship, they need to be reduced to numbers so that they can be extracted, 
aggregated and interpreted for reporting purposes. If health outcomes are to be 
used in purchasing contracts, four criteria must first be met:  
1. The health outcome has to be measured and quantified; 
2. The intervention needs to be defined; 
3. The outcome of care must be attributable to the intervention; and 
4. The outcomes data must be accessible. 
As the analysis in Chapter Six illustrated, each of these points represents a large 
hurdle for community and allied health services at present. Given that health 
outcomes are only one component of health service accountability, it may be more 
practical, and pragmatic to expend resources on indicators of effectiveness that are 
meaningful and already accessible.  
7.3 The implications for theory 
In this section, I reflect on the implications of this research on the three important 
components of theory; health service accountability, health outcomes and 
community and allied health services.  
7.3.1 Health service accountability 
The new accountability mechanisms appear to be sanctioned at all levels of health 
service delivery and purchasing despite the increased scrutiny of providers, the 
burden on managers and the potential invasion of patient privacy. As Strathern 
points out, “transparency of operation is everywhere endorsed as an outward sign 
of integrity” (Strathern 2000:2). She goes on to say that the new systems of 
accountability advance important values, that is, responsibility, openness about 
outcomes and the widening of access. The result of the endorsement of the 
accountability culture is that health service providers will increasingly be held 
accountable for their actions. The growth of professional accreditation systems that 
providers voluntarily participate in reflects these values.  
 198
This thesis has highlighted a number of issues for the implementation of 
accountability systems within health service settings; 
• Health service provider accountability cannot be reduced to a single numeric 
output. The purpose of this thesis has been to explore the role of health 
outcomes in health service provider accountability. Specifically, I have 
investigated the use of health outcomes in purchasing contracts. Health service 
providers are responsible for trying to optimise the health outcomes of their 
patients. However, to reduce the entire patient – provider interaction to a 
numeric summary of the patient health outcome ignores the many components 
that go together to produce that outcome. As the case studies have shown, 
health outcomes can improve irrespective of the delivery of an intervention. 
Conversely, patient outcomes can worsen through no fault of the health service 
provider. There are often a number of ways to achieve the same outcome, some 
more efficient than others. Health outcomes are clearly not the best or only 
indicator of health service provider accountability. As the literature has 
demonstrated, accountability systems are subject to the changing values of 
health service delivery, so the domains of accountability are likely to change 
over time. As a result, the way that the systems of accountability are 
established have the potential to drive (or reflect) what is important in health 
service delivery, although they do not seem to achieve this particularly 
effectively at present.  
• Health outcomes are an important part of health service provider 
accountability, but are not appropriate for contractual accountability. To say 
that health outcome measures are not the best or the only indicator of health 
service provider accountability does not mean that they have no place in the 
delivery of health services. Providers need to know that they are achieving the 
outcomes of their care. They need to know whether the goals of the patient are 
being taken into account and whether patient expectations are being met. But, 
the provision of this information to another audience such as a purchaser takes 
the health outcomes information outside of its intended use. The extraction of 
outcomes data from within the clinical interaction normally requires the 
quantification of the outcomes. This is difficult to achieve in a meaningful way 
given the current limitations of many outcome measures and the paucity of 
evidence to support the majority of community and allied health interventions.  
• The collection of quantifiable health outcomes data has major time and 
resource implications for health services. Given their current, limited value to 
many clinicians, managers and purchasers, health outcomes may not have the 
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intrinsic value that the proponents of outcomes based accountability assumed. 
In some cases, the measurement of outcomes can actually hide the reality of 
the outcome of the intervention for the patient and may be most effectively 
augmented by actually asking the patient and incorporating their perspectives 
into improving clinical practice. 
• There are a range of accountability technologies, such as complaint 
mechanisms, surveillance systems, volumes and costs of health services, 
continuing professional education, registration, professional membership, 
qualifications and accreditation. The application of these technologies within 
community and allied health services are ad-hoc. The application of these 
technologies requires time and resources that could otherwise be committed to 
the delivery of health services, so the most effective method of implementation 
should be determined. The lack of a clear accountability framework that is 
underpinned by clearly defined goals and values has lead to the indiscriminate 
use of a wide range of accountability technologies. If the accountability 
relationships were made explicit, and the goals of those relationships defined, it 
may be possible to select a clear range of accountability tools that would reflect 
what is actually happening, rather than measuring what can be measured.  
• Indicators are just that. Indicators should provide a summary picture of a 
particular aspect of the health service interaction. They do not provide the full 
picture of any level of health service accountability, rather they are the ‘tip of 
the iceberg’ (Sharpe 2000). A range of indicators is likely to be required for 
different technologies of accountability. The indicators need to provide a 
meaningful reflection of the level of accountability they illustrate. It may be 
appropriate or necessary to augment the use of indicators with narrative and 
subjective input from stakeholders to give some level of meaning and value to 
the indicator data. In contrast to the value – neutral approach under which new-
managerialism has attempted to employ new systems of accountability, which 
include health outcomes, health care delivery is not value neutral. The 
indicators and outcomes employed are a reflection of the values of the health 
system, and as the example of the Australian Health Care Agreements has 
illustrated, the indicators need to be able to respond to the new values of the 
health system. Thus, indicators are not stable entities, they need to reflect the 
values of the stakeholders at any given time. 
• Contractual accountability has the potential to impact on all levels of health 
care. Neo-liberal governmentality is described as government at a distance, 
implying a ‘hands off’ approach to management. However, as the two case 
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studies have illustrated, the new accountability mechanisms have the ability to 
pervade the smallest level of patient - provider interaction, for example, by 
monitoring what is written in patient notes. The importance of providing this 
level of detail to a health service purchaser must be questioned. Instead, 
purchasers should ensure that the accountability systems are in place. In other 
words, the purchasers of health services ensure that the practices of self-
checking are in place, and then withdraw control to the point where they are 
simply checking the resulting indicators of performance.  
• Accountability emphasises the systems of monitoring rather than necessarily 
the quality of patient care. As Power said 
what is being assured is the quality of control systems rather 
than the quality of first order operations. In such a context, 
accountability is discharged by demonstrating the existence of 
such systems of control, not by demonstrating good teaching, 
caring, manufacturing or banking. (Power 1994).  
The relationship between the systems of monitoring and the quality of patient care 
is difficult to separate, and there is a risk that the systems of monitoring will 
become the way that organisations actually define good quality care. 
Accountability, and the systems of ensuring accountability appear are an 
increasingly accepted component of health service delivery. Health outcomes, or 
indeed any single indicator, are unlikely to provide an accurate picture of what 
actually happens at the patient – provider interface. Instead, a number of 
approaches are likely to be required. Accountability systems have the potential to 
permeate the patient provider interaction, yet the value of the information extracted 
from that interaction does not necessarily reflect what or how good that care was. 
Neo-liberal governmentality has created a culture in which monitoring systems are 
necessary to extract indicators from various components of care. Community and 
allied health services have not developed clear or coherent methods of monitoring 
at this stage.  
7.3.2 The influence of new systems of accountability on community 
and allied health service providers 
Community and allied health services have evolved under a medical model of 
professionalisation and embraced (or been subjected) similar models of 
accountability to the medical profession, including registration and accreditation 
systems (Larkin 1983). The introduction of neo-liberal governmentality can 
potentially influence a number of aspects of health service provision which may 
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impact on the autonomy of health service providers (Borthwick 2000; Dent and 
Whitehead 2002).  
The services examined within this thesis functioned separately from medical 
practitioners. Thus, my ability to elucidate on the impact of medical dominance on 
community and allied services from the empirical work was limited. However, I 
can comment on the implications of the introduction of new-managerialism for 
allied health service providers within these settings.   
Under new-managerialism, clinical tasks, which were previously left to the 
judgment and expertise of the professional, are now more likely to come under 
external scrutiny from managers and professional bodies in the form of clinical 
audit and peer review processes. In situations where there is evidence to support 
best practice, professionals are likely to be held accountable on the basis that they 
deliver care in accordance with defined standards. Ironically, this means that 
disciplines that lack evidence to define best practice may be more able to 
reasonably rely on clinical judgment and reasoning than those disciplines with 
clearly defined protocols. In other words, the growth of evidence-based practice 
effectively reduces the clinical autonomy of professional groups with a larger body 
of research evidence.  
Conversely, however, research evidence can increase the scope of practice of these 
disciplines by providing a clear basis for what works and what does not. New-
managerialism moves the responsibility for outcomes and thus, control over the 
processes of care from professionals to managers. Presumably, if there are 
competing interventions and providers, the interventions with the greatest 
supporting evidence would win the support of funders, as was the case with 
podiatric surgeons obtaining NHS funding in the UK (Borthwick 2000). The 
implication of this is that the shift to a focus on quality and outcomes may impact 
on professional boundaries by allowing the discipline that has empirical evidence 
to show that it can deliver the best or cheapest care to provide an intervention, 
rather than the discipline that has historically controlled that corner of the health 
care market.  
Professions seem willing, and even eager to participate in the new accountability 
technologies, as the growth of voluntary accreditation system in Australia 
demonstrates (Nancarrow and Clark In press). This has the double edged sword of 
providing an externally verifiable indicator of their fitness to practice, but also 
makes explicit the components of care which were previously implicit. This makes 
the professional roles more able to be monitored, is more likely to expose them to 
competition through the explicit definition of the roles, and in theory, easier to 
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manage. As Dent points out, being accountable on the basis of explicit technologies 
of care rather than on the basis of the trust that used to accompany professional 
prestige, automatically reduces one of the definitions of autonomy (Dent and 
Whitehead 2002).  
Community and allied health services are potentially at a disadvantage in this 
approach because they lack the organisational and geographic boundaries imposed 
by the hospital setting. There appears to be less clarity about who these workers are 
and what they do (Brown, Crawford et al. 2000). The lack of clear definition 
around community and allied health practitioners makes the distinctions between 
the types of interventions difficult to clearly define. The types of interventions 
delivered in the community and acute setting differ also. Many interventions that 
are delivered in the acute sector appear to involve a single practitioner delivering a 
clearly defined, one-off intervention with a goal that is related to reducing 
impairment at an organ or tissue level or improving function. In contrast, 
community and allied health interventions can include a number of practitioners 
delivering care over an extended period of time to achieve a common goal. The 
setting of care may also influence the ability of workers to control their 
professional boundaries. Far more flexibility of roles is required to deliver care in a 
home environment than a hospital because of the lack of supporting technology and 
infrastructure. Further research is required to examine this point.  
The values of the health system have, in part, been shaped by the 
professionalisation of medicine and the scientific approach to health service 
delivery. Thus, these two areas form an important basis for the new accountability 
structures, through the use of clinical practice guidelines and new systems of 
professional regulation, for instance. However, where medical dominance has 
largely defined the anglo-american systems of health care delivery to date, it is 
possible that the new systems of managerial accountability will be seen to define a 
new era in health service delivery.  
7.3.3 Health outcomes 
Health outcomes, in their current incarnation, arose from a desire to demonstrate 
that health services or health interventions are effective. Rigorous scientific 
methodologies are employed to measure the efficacy of surgical and medication 
based interventions. Some community and allied health interventions lend 
themselves to evaluation in this form, however many do not. This does not mean 
that all health services should not have some form of outcome. It does mean that 
not all health services have reproducible interventions that will lead to a stable and 
defined outcome.  
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Where interventions have been shown to be effective, it could be deemed that a 
provider is irresponsible if he or she uses an alternative intervention that has either 
not been validated, or is known to be less effective.  
Health service providers are responsible for identifying and where possible, 
achieving, the realistic health related goals of their patients. They should not, 
however, be held responsible for the evaluation of the interventions. This would be 
analogous to asking pharmacists to evaluate the effectiveness of the medication 
they dispense from their pharmacies. Thus, different questions about the 
effectiveness of an intervention can be asked in a clinical setting to a research 
setting. In the research setting, it is feasible to quantify and compare outcomes 
between different interventions or on different patients. In a clinical setting, for 
allied and community health services at least, the provider needs to identify the 
patient goals and propose a mechanism through which those goals will be achieved 
that is based on research if it is available. The provider can then assess the 
effectiveness of care against the achievement of those goals. Quantifying the 
outcomes, unless it is a routine part of the evaluation of that intervention, (such as 
the ‘timed ten metre walk’ in physiotherapy) can detract from the overall delivery 
of the intervention. In many cases, it is a poor reflection of the outcome of care.  
Health outcomes have reinforced the credibility of medicine, initially through 
medicine’s ability to cure with penicillin and undertake pain-free surgery with 
anaesthetics. With this credibility has come professional autonomy. Paradoxically, 
when health outcomes are applied as a management tool they reduce the autonomy 
of health service providers substantially through the application of clinical practice 
guidelines, the introduction of surveillance systems and the need for continuing 
education to learn the new techniques that the latest outcomes research have 
demonstrated. This application of self-imposed control mechanisms further 
emphasises Strathern’s point that transparency of operation is endorsed as an 
outward sign of integrity. 
Community and allied health services have not embraced the culture of research 
and evidence to the same extent as the medical profession. As a result, it is now 
more difficult to hold these professions accountable with the same level of scrutiny 
that can be applied to medicine. Allied and community health services are 
described in the literature as being subordinate to and less autonomous than 
medicine. The slow development of an ‘outcomes culture’ has meant that 
community and allied health service providers have far fewer formal mechanisms 
of accountability than medicine. For instance, continuing professional education is 
not compulsory for all community and allied health service providers, whereas 
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general practitioners must maintain minimum standards to retain vocational 
registration in Australia.  
The relationship between health service outcomes, processes and structures 
underpins the Donabedian systems approach to quality. This model is appropriate 
in settings in which the intervention and the outcomes can be clearly defined and 
there is a demonstrated, attributable relationship between the two. However, the 
difficulty clearly defining community and allied health service interventions, 
measuring the intervention and then identifying any attributable link mean that this 
approach is not appropriate for many services. The emphasis on health outcomes in 
the two case studies appears to have come at the expense of the monitoring of 
health service processes, such as adherence to minimum standards of 
documentation, potentially undermining necessary areas of quality improvement. 
The desire to improve health outcomes is presumably the reason that societies 
dedicate vast resources to the delivery of health systems and services. Health 
outcomes are used as a research tool to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficacy 
of a variety of interventions. It is in this role that health outcomes have the power 
to lend legitimacy to a range of interventions. Different parameters are required for 
their application when they are taken out of the research context and applied as a 
management tool. Health outcomes are necessary to determine whether an 
intervention was effective. However the meaning of this result is often lost if taken 
out of the immediate patient – provider episode of care. Instead, attempts to take 
health outcomes out of their clinical context have resulted in systems that hamper 
the autonomy of health service providers and redistribute resources towards 
monitoring and away from patient care, with an unknown benefit to the patient. 
7.4 Implications for policy and practice 
In this section I describe the implications of this research on the main stakeholders 
in the purchaser – provider accountability framework, namely; community and 
allied health services, patients, providers, managers and purchasers. 
7.4.1 Implications for community and allied health services  
The collective ‘community and allied health services’ is not clearly defined. Nor 
are the services delivered by each of the component disciplines. This definitional 
dilemma is compounded when services are delivered by multi-disciplinary teams of 
providers. One of the original problems highlighted in this thesis was the 
perception of health service providers that “if we can’t measure it, we can’t do it”. 
But, even more fundamental than our inability to measure health services is our 
 205
inability to define what community and allied health services actually do. The 
problem may be more accurately stated as ‘if we can’t define it, we can’t measure 
it’. Although, even if the intervention or the people who deliver it can be defined, 
there is no guarantee that the outcomes can meaningfully measured. 
Many of the difficulties underpinning the health outcomes approach for community 
and allied health service providers stem from the lack of clear descriptions of the 
types of services delivered. In some cases, this is because the delivery of a 
particular health service is context dependent. That is, it relies on particular social, 
environmental or economic settings for its delivery. Consequently, it can be 
difficult for researchers to make generalisable statements about the effectiveness of 
care. The lack of definitional boundaries also makes allied and community health 
services difficult to evaluate. The multi-disciplinary nature of much of the care 
means that it is not always clear which parts of the care should be evaluated, or 
from whose perspective. 
The limited research and evaluation culture within community and allied health 
services means that there is little evidence around which the processes of health 
care can be standardised. Thus, compared with medicine, is has been harder to hold 
community and allied health services accountable for the processes of their care.  
Community and allied health services receive far less funding than their medical 
counterparts (Palmer and Short 1994). Therefore, the types of infrastructure 
necessary to implement the accountability systems are less likely to be available. 
This may also stem from an uninformed perception that community and allied 
health services are less invasive, and therefore less dangerous than medical 
interventions. 
The costs of implementing accountability structures need to be considered. The 
implementation of systems and gathering of information is costly in terms of time 
and infrastructure. Where services are not specifically funded to provide this 
information, the cost of providing this information is likely to detract from the 
delivery of clinical care. 
Finally, the question of ‘whose responsibility’ is it to implement the new systems 
of accountability needs to be addressed by each of the stakeholders in the 
accountability relationship. The Department of Veterans' Affairs did not believe 
that it was their role to introduce new systems of accountability to the providers 
whose services they purchase, believing instead, that it was the responsibility of 
professional bodies. ACT Community Care, as a large provider of services has 
adopted the role of implementing the new mechanisms of accountability, but they 
are still in the process of deciding what gets reported to whom. Professional 
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associations are starting to introduce accreditation systems. Registration Acts are 
under review in many Australian states, with an increased emphasis on provider 
accountability, patient safety, and an enhanced role of registration boards in the 
monitoring of providers. These changes further reinforce the culture of 
accountability in health care, whilst informally spreading the responsibility for the 
implementation of the accountability culture. Ideally, each stakeholder would 
identify their own area of accountability whilst recognizing the input from other 
systems of accountability. This thesis has contributed an understanding of the roles 
of each stakeholder in the accountability relationships within community and allied 
health services. 
7.4.2 Implications for service users 
Neo-liberal governmentality emphasises the role of consumers and stakeholders in 
public sector accountability. This is reinforced by the health outcomes movement 
which claims to increase patient participation in health care decision making 
(Greenfield, Kaplan et al. 1985; Ellwood 1988; Kasper, Mulley et al. 1992; Legg 
England and Evans 1992). The new accountability structures have the potential to 
bring benefits to patients in terms of better quality care, however the cost of these 
improvements are resource and privacy implications for the patient. 
The potential gain for patients arising from the new accountability systems is an 
improvement in the quality of their care. For instance, the AHMS is a prescriptive 
guide for allied health providers that tells them what to do and what to document. 
Whilst adherence to these principles may not improve the health outcomes of the 
patient, the DVA steering committee agreed that these components should form the 
minimum standards of patient care. If indeed the content of the patient file is an 
indicator of the quality of patient care, patient care can be improved an enormous 
amount from its current status. The AHMS also encourages critical self-review by 
providers, which may lead to superior or more appropriate care by health service 
providers for their patients. Additionally, as professional associations move 
towards accrediting providers, health service providers may be more likely to 
attend training and be aware of recent technologies or better techniques. Thus, the 
introduction of such systems may lead to an improvement in the quality of patient 
care. 
The new accountability systems may help patients to judge the attributes of health 
service providers. For instance, registration, or accreditation of certain disciplines 
informs the patient that the health service provider has complied with certain 
regulations that are considered valuable by that profession. The meaning and value 
of accreditation and registration will need to be communicated to consumers so 
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they are better able to use this information. The current accreditation systems for 
allied health service providers vary greatly, and most have not incorporated the 
values of service users in their development (Nancarrow and Clark, in press).  
There are potential costs for patients of the new accountability systems. There may 
be an increased response burden for the patients. For example, many health service 
organisations send surveys to their patients to obtain feedback on their satisfaction 
with services (Williams 1998). Health outcomes information is normally examined 
in the context of information about the patient, such as demographic and other 
health details. Where this information is extracted in a research setting, patients are 
required to provide informed, written consent, and the methodologies have been 
passed by ethics committees. The extraction of health outcomes data from clinical 
records is generally regarded as ‘quality improvement’ and no ethical approval or 
patient consent is sought. Some providers involved in the case studies saw the 
extraction of patient data as a breach of confidentiality. This issue will need to be 
addressed by institutional ethics committees.  
In some cases, the changing accountability systems that emphasise patient control 
represent a paradigm shift for patients. For example, some veterans expected the 
health service provider to make decisions about the goals of their care, whereas the 
new accountability systems require patient input into decision-making. The 
changing role and expectations of consumers within the health system is likely to 
take some time to actually change consumer practices and expectations. 
The new accountability systems are not limited to ensuring health service provider 
accountability. They have the potential to influence patient accountability as well. 
This was illustrated by the veterans who did not want to set measurable goals 
because they knew that their health service entitlement would end when they 
achieved a certain health status.  
The information imbalance between health service providers and patients will be 
difficult to redress, however the new era of accountability espouses the values of 
transparency and openness about outcomes that may lead to better informed 
consumers (Strathern 2000). The model of political accountability described by 
Emanuel (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996) is one way to ensure increased patient or 
community involvement in the decisions about the important domains of health 
service accountability. 
7.4.3 Implications for clinicians 
The new systems of accountability have created a culture in which the patient-
provider interaction will systematically come under external scrutiny. Allied health 
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professionals have largely relied on systems of trust and professional honour, with 
little transparency at the level of the patient- provider interaction. The new models 
of accountability have been seen most prominently in the public health service 
sector. However changing registration acts and interest in accountability from large 
purchasers such as DVA and health insurance companies means that private 
providers will not be immune from new accountability pressures.  
Clinicians are already experiencing the scrutiny of the new accountability changes. 
Anecdotal evidence from the clinicians both within ACT Community Care and the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs indicates that they feel increasing pressure to 
produce measurable outcomes of their care, as indicated by the title of this thesis. 
But it is not just health service purchasers who are demanding more accountability. 
The legislation around professional registration in the ACT is currently under 
review, with the new models proposing the increased governance powers of boards 
to monitor the activities of health service providers. A number of professional 
associations have introduced voluntary professional accreditation systems. 
This means that under new accountability models, professional bodies have to 
define exactly what is expected from clinicians in terms of their provision of care 
to patients. The Grimmer and Codman approaches have done this to a certain 
extent. The move to embrace health outcomes emphasises one component of 
provider – patient accountability. Unfortunately, it is not an easily accessible 
indicator, nor the only measure of the effectiveness of the patient-provider 
interaction. 
The results of the two case studies indicate that allied and community health 
service providers are not very good at identifying or documenting the goals or 
outcomes of their patient care. Yet before health outcomes can be used for 
reporting purposes, the provider actually needs to determine what the outcome is 
and document it.  
However, the results of this thesis indicate that there is a long way to go before 
health outcomes will be a feasible basis for reporting on health service provider 
accountability. Meanwhile, there is a need to identify other, more appropriate 
indicators that have some meaning and value to the range of stakeholders for whom 
they are intended. 
The implications for clinicians are that their clinical interactions are likely to 
become an increasing focus of health service accountability, instead of health 
service volume and throughput. For professional groups to adhere to these sytems, 
they first need to define what constitutes quality clinical care, in consultation with 
both patients and the literature. They should then determine how they will adhere 
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to these levels of quality and monitor it. Clinical pathways are one example of 
prescriptive models of health service delivery in action. But again, as the case 
studies and the literature have demonstrated, unless providers are made 
accountable for these in some way, they will not use them.  
The ACT Community Care case study highlighted the potential for conflict 
between the domains of professional accountability and contractual accountability. 
Professionals working in particularly sensitive fields, such as alcohol and drug 
services or with victims of crime, may see that the documentation of the all of the 
information about the patient may place the patient at risk. However, if audit 
procedures examine rates of adherence to documentation, then the provider may be 
seen to be ‘non-compliant’. The mechanized nature of audit does not allow for the 
prioritising of clinical judgement in these cases.  
7.4.4 Implications for managers 
The case studies have illustrated two different models of health service delivery. 
The first relies on a hierarchical management structure and includes ‘line’ 
managers (ACT Community Care) whilst the second involved individual purchase 
agreements between a large health service purchasing organisation and individual 
providers. The latter model excludes the management tier in the purchaser – 
provider framework so the managerial implications are limited to the first model of 
service delivery.  
Where managerial structures exist, the responsibility for implementing the new 
systems of accountability is will fall onto the managers. Indeed, their roles are 
likely to be defined by these new accountabilities. Their tasks are likely to include 
the implementation of appropriate structures, such as reporting hierarchies, 
information technology and classification systems to facilitate the flow of 
accountability information. Managers will also need to clearly delineate the roles of 
each of the stakeholders within the accountability framework, and establish the 
domains and procedures of accountability to facilitate reporting on these. 
Managers, along with professional bodies such as associations and registration 
boards, are likely to be in the strongest positions to define exactly what constitutes 
accountability of health service provision.  
Managers and purchasers would be better served by examining the many existing 
and evolving systems of allied health professional accountability, such as 
accreditation, rather that attempting to introduce additional, resource intensive tiers 
of provider monitoring. This will promote the valued principles of helping / 
monitoring people to help / monitor themselves. Purchasers can maintain arms 
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length management and uphold the public perceptions of accountability through the 
rituals of verification. The risk of this approach is that the quality control systems 
become the focus of accountability rather than the first order operations, in this 
case health care. 
7.4.5 Implications for purchasers 
The new systems of governmentality have been described as achieving their 
objectives through ‘action at a distance’ (Miller and Rose 1990). In other words, 
systems are implemented that seek to bring the organisation, or in this case, health 
service providers into line. In this study, both purchasing organisations expected 
that they would be able to obtain health outcomes data. As this study has shown, 
the focus on health outcomes led to increasing scrutiny on the smallest components 
of the patient – provider interaction. Despite this, neither purchasing organisation 
achieved their goal of actually accessing health outcomes information. To feed this 
information, in its minute detail to the level of the purchaser is likely to be costly, 
time consuming, and largely irrelevant  
That DVA (the purchaser) employed an external consultant to identify health 
outcome measures that they could include in purchasing contracts and ACT 
Community Care (the provider) was put in the position of having to identify health 
outcomes on which it could report highlights one of the idiosyncrasies of 
purchaser-provider separation. That is, the purchaser generally does not have the 
knowledge to make informed decisions about the services it is purchasing, so the 
onus moves to the provider, or other bodies to develop the domains of 
accountability.  
The purchasers, in both case studies, could have simplified their own requirements 
for professional accountability by exploring the accreditation systems already 
implemented by professional associations. By purchasing the services of accredited 
providers, they are accepting and endorsing the standards that professions believe 
indicate quality health service provision. It also removes the burden of 
responsibility from the purchaser to introduce costly infrastructure for the 
collection and monitoring of the domains of accountability.  
The purchaser, as a representative of the community, should have some clear 
priorities about what constitutes ‘good’ care, as they are acting as a proxy 
consumer. In reality, however, purchasing priorities are poorly defined and the 
provider, not the purchaser, often determines the allocation of resources.  
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7.5 Areas for future research 
In undertaking this research, I came across a number of areas that require further 
exploration including; a need for a greater understanding of patient constructions of 
quality care, the need for a clear history of the development of allied health 
services in Australia and their role with respect to medicine, which could, in turn 
lead to new methods of evaluating the effectiveness of allied health care, and the 
need for further investigation into community and allied health service 
classifications.  
The focus of this thesis has been primarily on health service purchasing and 
providing organisations, largely ignoring the most important participant in the 
delivery of health services – the patient. Despite the growing consumer movement, 
this study has found that providers demonstrate poor levels of accountability to 
purchasers and patients using current definitions of accountability. Further study 
into the expectations of patients regarding health service provider accountability 
and how patients judge the effectiveness of the care they receive would be valuable 
to inform the professional accountability argument. Additionally, given the current 
focus on patient empowerment, such a study would give patients the tools they 
need to guide their own informed decision making about health service selection. 
This information could be used by the organisations that purchase health services 
on behalf of patients to guide their purchasing and accountability decisions, rather 
than leaving the development of indicators up to the health service providers (as 
was the case with the ACT Community Care case study). 
In undertaking the background review for this project, I attempted to find literature 
on the history of the development of community and allied health services. As 
indicated in Chapter Two, this group of providers is poorly defined and has 
dynamic boundaries according to pragmatic and contextual needs. The literature on 
allied health services is largely fragmented according to disciplines and historical 
information was difficult to find. A documented history of the development of all 
allied health service providers in Australia would be a valuable tool to both unify 
allied health service providers, and strengthen their own identity in the field of 
health service delivery.  
The inconsistencies in the accreditation systems for allied health service providers 
have the potential to confuse both patients and purchasers (Nancarrow and Clark In 
Press). Different disciplines have quite different accreditation standards. Allied 
health providers may benefit from the systematic examination of all the allied 
health accreditation systems and the development of a unified set of standards. The 
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introduction of minimum ‘allied health’ accreditation standards would establish a 
common basis that patients and purchasers could identify with.  
The well-documented perceptions of medical dominance and allied health 
subordination calls for the deconstruction of the concept of ‘medical dominance’. 
An empirical investigation of the domains of dominance beyond the well described 
aspects of autonomy, income, gender balance and accountability would provide a 
greater understanding of the relationships between different health service 
providers, their self-perceptions and their status within the community.  
As both case studies demonstrated, there is a paucity of quality evaluations of 
community and allied health interventions across most disciplines. There is a need 
for allied health service providers to undertake quality research of the effectiveness 
of the majority of their interventions. Although, it needs to be recognised that not 
all community and allied health service interventions fulfil the traditional medical 
model because of the large contextual differences in the application of many of 
these interventions. Therefore it would be useful to explore different 
methodologies for the evaluation of community and allied health interventions.  
Two recent initiatives have explored allied health classifications; the National 
Allied Health Casemix Committee Indicators for Intervention and the National 
Codeset Project: Community Based Health Services (National Centre for 
Classification in Health 1998; National Allied Health Casemix Committee 1999). 
However the recent development of both projects means that neither have been 
tested or applied within the community setting. The case studies highlighted some 
of the barriers to the classification of community and allied health based 
interventions and I believe this area would benefit from investigation in a range of 
health settings. 
Finally, one of my most valuable resources in the write up of this thesis was a book 
by Marilyn Strathern, titled “Audit Culture”, which is an anthropological study of 
the effect of the new systems of accountability on higher education. There are a 
number of parallels between the adoption of neo-liberal governmentality in the 
health and education sectors. A juxtaposition of the approaches used in both health 
and education may benefit both fields through a sharing of problems and 
achievements. Additionally, a more detailed anthropological view of the adoption 
of neo-liberal governmentality in health, the resulting mechanisms of 
accountability and their effect on the delivery of health services would help to 
contextualise the current changes for health service providers. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the role of health outcomes in community and allied 
health service accountability. Accountability is an expanding and evolving 
requirement of stakeholders at all levels of health service delivery and funding. The 
application of an accountability framework to the outcomes approach has clarified 
the role of health outcomes within accountability structures for community and 
allied health services. The directive to use attributable health outcomes as an 
accountability framework within a purchaser – provider model is a misconceived 
management strategy.  
Health outcomes do have their place in health service accountability, but only as 
one of many indicators of health service quality and effectiveness. The current 
limitations around attribution, data accessibility, defining community and allied 
health service interventions and identifying appropriate measurement tools means 
that health outcomes are not an appropriate mechanism of contractual 
accountability.  
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